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Abstract 
Critical constructivism provides for a comprehensive analysis of the process of 
socialization of states on their way into European Union. The analysis of the historical 
patterns of enmity and mistrust as they pertain to the relationship between EU and Turkey 
provides for an insightful account explaining its repetitive stagnation. This research 
concludes that the relationship between EU and Turkey is fragile due to the discoursive 
practice of othering, the raison d’être of which rests on historical-identitarian social 
constructions. Since this practice goes both ways, and is most visible in political discourse 
in particular instances (such as the refugee crisis), the relationship must be studied not by 
using a comprehensive theory of international politics. Rather, it must be studied by using 
a theoretical method that seeks to explain the relationship not in its totality (hence not 
predicting its course) but rather seeks to understand it by examining its contingencies. 
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Introduction to Senior Undergraduate Research Thesis 
1. Introduction 
 The topic of this thesis is the relationship between European Union and the 
Republic of Turkey. It aims to investigate the relationship through the lens of an approach 
in international relations that is called constructivism. This thesis is a work in EU 
integration. As the EU integration is a process of adjustment of social, political, and 
economic policies/ways of one sovereign state with a system of 28 states, I maintain that it 
has to be studied continuously through a prism of social theory of international politics. 
This comes primarily because EU integration is a unique example of the modern history of 
international politics where multiple sovereign states are conjoining in a process of social, 
political, and economic integration.  
  This thesis asks a question of what constitutes the social background of the 
relationship between EU and Turkey. It further inquires how that social background 
influences the state of play between the two. In order to come to a satisfying answer, this 
thesis aims to provide an account of Turkish politics, the constitution of Turkish and 
European identities as they pertain to each other, as well as the global context in which this 
relationship is set (i.e. the refugee crisis or the Cyprus issue). The main argument of this 
thesis is two-fold. In the first instance, it states that because Turkey and EU are social 
players who have had a formed negative intersubjective image of each other due to history 
of engaging in the process of othering (see below), their relationship has been the one of 
relative mistrust and misunderstanding (see chapter “Constructivism and IR: EU-Turkey 
Relationship is What Agents Make of It”). Consequently, there is a specific logic of 
appropriateness (refer to the chapter “Constructivism and IR: EU-Turkey Relationship is 
What Agents Make of It”), which operates between these two actors that is an essential 
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element of the relationship. That logic of appropriateness (re)produces the intersubjective 
knowledge held between EU and Turkey, thus creating identities that differentiate between 
Turkey as a (non)European actor in one instance and EU as a union of European states 
which share a common experience of Turkey (Müftüler-Baç and Stivachtis, 17). In the 
second instance, this thesis claims that because of the first argument, all the issue-areas in 
which Turkey and EU are cooperating (e.g. the refugee crisis) will be used in the context 
of the mutually constituted intersubjective knowledge and the meaning that knowledge 
produced in their relationship. This means that the established knowledge and experience 
of Europe with Turkey, and vice versa, affects the integration of Turkey in a European 
society of states1, and their relationship, across a wide range of issue-areas. The refugee 
crisis (see chapter “Refugee Crisis: A New Frontier?”), for example, is one of the areas 
where this research establishes that the intersubjective image of Turkey and EU influences 
the process and the outcome of the negotiations.  
At the outset, this research identifies three reasons for why the relationship between the 
EU and Turkey is stagnating. Although conceptually, these three issues are broad, they are 
necessary to frame the thesis and its conclusions. These three reasons are as follows: 
Turkish political volatility, the identity construction between Europe and Turkey, and the 
global context. They are presented below.  
2. Relationship and Its Discontents 
 Reçep Tayyip Erdoğan, the current President and the former PM of the Republic of 
Turkey, declared 2014 to be the year of the EU integration (Commission Report 2014, 3). 
                                                 
1 Hedley Bull states that a society of states exists when a group of states that are conscious of certain 
common interests and values join in a society in a way that they conceive themselves to be bound by a 
common s of rules in relation to one another, and share a working of common institutions (Bull, 13). 
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To the scholar of EU-Turkey relations, this statement might seem ironic because, given the 
power of hindsight, one can notice that almost every year in EU-Turkey relations has been 
the year of (failed) EU integrations. According to Erdoğan’s statement, Turkey is willing 
to push forward more arduously to join the European Union, a block of twenty-eight 
member states engaged in an almost-political and economic union. However, since 2014, 
not much has been done to improve the state of play in the relationship, so Turkey finds 
itself in a position of frustration with the EU, and the EU finds itself ruminating whether 
to allow Turkey to even continue being a candidate for membership. The reasons for this 
are multiple, but I will argue that they are all connected to the larger issue of identity, which 
truly creates an atmosphere of utter mistrust and non-solidarity between the two.  
The first issue, as outlined above, is the issue of Turkish political volatility. In this 
sense, President Erdoğan wanted to voice his commitment to the European Union not only 
as a dedication to the Kemalist dream of integrating Europe into the West, but also as his 
own commitment to portraying his politics as not subversive but constructive (we will 
discuss this later in the research). President Erdoğan came out as a product of a long-
running synthesis of an openly religious politician with the pro-EU and pro-secularism 
stances. That synthesis changed the Turkish political constellation and decreased the 
secular influence of the Turkish military while at the same time opting for a western 
discourse of multi-culturalism and religious representation in order to open the public 
sphere to more religious influence (albeit not successfully as will be shown in later 
chapters). Turkish military traditionally served as a sort of a panopticon engaged in 
monitoring and controlling the Turkish government for decades before the rise of the AKP 
(Bogdani, 151). The long-established exercise of power by the military has kept the 
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Kemalist political legacy at the forefront of Turkish political life with four coups 
orchestrated in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997 (Bogdani, 151) (See chapter “Turkey, EU and 
the Construction of Identities”). By exercising its power of protecting the secular 
constitution from the rise of Islamist parties, the military contributed to the volatility of 
Turkish politics and Turkish society, and has delayed the EU integration process multiple 
times.  The AKP (the Justice and Development Party) is seen as a direct threat to Turkey’s 
Kemalist legacy, but it is also seen as the key modernizer of a country that has stagnated 
for too long in the late 20th century. The AKP came after the collapse of Bulent Ecevit’s 
government due to the 2001 “Turkish Economic Crash” and naturally brought with it an 
atmosphere of refreshment, but also an atmosphere of tension. The party won every Turkish 
national election after 2002 by running on the pro-EU platform which combined promise 
of reforms, eradication of corruption, creation of jobs, and, most importantly, propagating 
public religiosity as crucial ideological components aimed at distinguishing AKP from 
other parties in Turkey.  
AKP’s ideology stems from the decades of Islamic political activity within Turkey, 
starting in the 50s with the founding of the Islamic-oriented Democratic Party and Adnan 
Menderes’s premiership of Turkey, which lasted for almost ten years, from 1950 to 1960 
(Bogdani, 151). Parties running on an Islamic platform held office many times throughout 
Turkish political history but were always successfully quenched by the military. However, 
their ideology always managed to remain within political and public sphere of Turkey. The 
culmination of the struggle between secularist and religious cleavages in Turkey came in 
the 1996 with the election of Neçmettin Erbakan of the Islamist Welfare Party as the PM. 
The demise of Erbakan’s government changed the Islamic political landscape in Turkey as 
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well as the secular one. After the “post-modern coup” of 1997, through which Erbakan’s 
government was pressured to resign under threats of coup d’état, Turkey was left in a 
political conundrum. The period after the “post-modern coup” helped the Islamic political 
ideology to reorganize and with that change its template from anti-EU to pro-EU, and 
thereby garner more acceptance from Europe (Dismorr, 44). This is where the AKP came 
in; organized from the remnants of the Welfare Party, it surprised the world by winning its 
first election in 2002 in a landslide victory (Bogdani, 151). On the other hand, the secularist 
political option (parties such as CHP) have become increasingly more national and 
disillusioned with what the EU has to offer for Turkey. Dismorr concludes:  
Although the reforms had widespread support in Parliament and among the 
public, contradictory forces were at work below the surface. Traditionalists 
with strong nationalistic sentiments feared or mistrusted the EU’s real 
intentions. They stood against the reformists, who increasingly lobbied for 
one, single thing; a date for Turkey (Dismorr, 57).    
Those years between 1997 and 2001 proved to be crucial not only for the Islamist 
political re-orientation in Turkey but also for Turkish European integration. The customs 
union ratified in 1996 paved the way for the invitation of Turkey to become an EU 
candidate after the Helsinki Summit of 1999 and finally created an atmosphere of EU-
Turkish cooperation. Turkey reluctantly accepted the invitation (due to the Cyprus issue, 
see Chapter 4 “Issues”, sub-chapter d “Cyprus: Identity, Security, and the EU-Turkey 
Relationship”) and the negotiations started in 2005, a bit late given the fact that Turkey 
already waited for six years. Unfortunately, since 2005, not much was achieved on Turkish 
path towards the EU although many things changed within Turkey and within the EU. 
Apart from the issue of Turkish domestic political volatility, there are many human rights 
issues Turkey faces that are either the direct result of this political instability or are simply 
the result of Turkey being in a place it is, bordering Iraq, Iran, Syria, and the Caucasus 
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region. In 2005, this cocktail of issues, combined with French and Dutch rejection of the 
EU Constitution (see chapter 4 “Issues”, “Public Opinion”, section 1), signified the 
enlargement fatigue in the EU and slowed down the reforms in Turkey as well as incentives 
from Europe (Dismorr, 65). The fatigue lasts even today, in 2016, with Juncker’s 
Commission openly advocating no enlargement during its mandate which lasts until 2019 
(Juncker, 12). The latest enlargement happened in 2013 when the Republic of Croatia 
became a member. 
 The second reason for the stagnation is, unsurprisingly, the construction of 
identities of Europe and Turkey. Here, I am referring to the Europe as a discursive construct 
which is a part of what Stuart Hall names “the West” (Hall and Gieben, 197). In that sense, 
Europe as a discursive construct is perceived as modern, secular and technologically 
advanced, but also Christian which has serious repercussions on how Europeans view, and 
“other”, Islam (Hall and Gieben, 186). Turkey is a country of almost eighty million people, 
more than 90% of whom are Muslims. This influences the way EU perceives the role of 
Turkey in its neighborhood (and within its own political system). Turkish bid for EU 
membership is a test which directly challenges the discourse of “the West” in Europe and 
as such makes the divisions over Turkish membership even deeper. Even though the EU 
block is mainly divided on pro-Turkey and against-Turkey membership, both sides have 
entrenched political positions.  
The “against” side is politically stronger due to fact that it plays the cultural 
argument which the general European populace supports and because it is followed by the 
strongest party in the EU, the European People’s Party (please refer to chapter 4 “Issues”, 
Public Opinion, section 1). EU, per more Demo-Christian politicians such as Sarkozy or 
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Merkel, is a cultural concept, a union of European states and of implicitly Christian history 
(see chapter 4 “Issues”, Public Opinion, section 1). This idea of Europe as a Christian 
nation was further publicized with the now infamous statement of Pope Benedict XVI that 
Europe is a cultural continent and a continent of Christian history (Bogdani, 78). The idea 
of the EU as a “Christian Club” is making it harder for Turkey to be perceived as a rightful 
candidate for the membership. Although the EU and its members reject the “Christian 
Club” classification, it is a constant reminder that EU needs to work more on its openness 
to Muslim societies, and its relationship with Turkey is a perfect chance to demonstrate 
that (Akçapar, 4).  
On the other hand, the “pro” side argues that Turkish history is inextricably linked 
to Europe and has influenced Europe for centuries, and that therefore Turkey has the right 
to join and participate in the EU. Representatives of this block are governments of UK, the 
Netherlands, and Spain. They emphasize the modernization and secularization Turkey 
underwent in the past 80 years as a part of Kemalist policies of moving Turkey to the West 
as a crucial reason for why Turkey is western, and European (see chapter 4 “Issues”). This 
internal division makes the Turkish bid for the EU membership immanently more difficult 
as the approval of membership of any country to the EU rests on the principle of unanimity 
of its members. Currently, the divide in the EU has been exacerbated by the geo-political 
issues of immigration, Syrian Civil War, and the attempted coup d’état in Turkey. EU’s 
internal conflict stands as an example of a complex relationship EU and Europe have not 
only with Turkey, but also with Islam. The historical and social dimensions of Europe-
Islam relations are crucial to understanding Euro-Turkish relations and as such will be 
investigated in this research. 
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 The final reason for the stagnation in relations is the global context. In the 
introductory statement, I said that 2014 was marked as the “Year of the EU” in Turkey, but 
we are currently in 2017 and the process remains stalled, if not exacerbated. Turkey opened 
14 out of 33 negotiation chapters in 12 years since accession negotiations started and has 
only completed the Science and Research chapter so far (Commission Report 2015, 86). 
This only serves as an example of how slow and essentially painful the negotiation process 
is. The EU today is significantly different than EU twelve years ago, and has many 
existential challenges which make it less willing to focus on enlargement (such as the 
sovereign debt crisis or the issue of Brexit). Unfortunately, it is hard to ascertain in which 
way these recent developments will influence the relationship between EU and Turkey. In 
addition to all of the aforementioned issues, the long-standing issue of the Cyprus crisis is 
looming over EU-Turkey relations. The Cyprus issue combines EU, Turkey, Greece, and 
Cyprus, in an uncanny cacophony of divergent interests, perceived identities as well as 
normative roles players have towards each other. It is of great importance to understand 
the issue of Cyprus as it relates to the functioning of the relationship between the EU and 
Turkey. 
This thesis will focus on the three aforementioned issues (Turkish political 
volatility, the identity construction of Europe and Turkey, and the global context) when 
analyzing the relationship between the EU and Turkey. However, there are many complex 
social and political dimensions arising from the relationship between the EU and Turkey 
that revert us to issues beyond the ones mentioned earlier in this chapter. Will the EU be 
able to accept Turkey? Will Turkey ever be able to acquiesce to EU’s liberal-democratic 
normative-institutionalism? Will EU remain unified enough to sustain itself? How will the 
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political cleavages in Turkey (secularist vs. religious) coexist in the future? And, finally, 
will Turkey take a deeper turn to authoritarianism? Answering these and other questions 
will be a hard task because they are multi-dimensional and are crucial for grasping the 
inherent complexity of relationship between EU and Turkey, and beyond that, the inner 
complexity of both the organization and the state, respectively. 
 This thesis is split into five chapters most of which have their own sub-chapters and 
focus on different aspects of the relationship. Chapter one, titled “History”, serves as a 
cornerstone of the thesis and provides an insight into the history of the relations between 
the two. History must be a cornerstone of this thesis as it guides both the researcher and 
the reader through the vast complexity of Turkish integration into Europe, European 
geopolitical landscape, and transformation through which both Turkey and the EU went 
through in the last fifty years. From the early days of the process starting with the Ankara 
Agreement (1963) to the present, EU and Turkey have changed immensely and have 
yielded a plethora of dimensions through which one can analyze their relationship. 
Overviewing the history of the relationship helps us follow that complicated road and stay 
on track with rapidly changing Euro-Turkish political landscape of today.  
 Chapter two titled “Current Situation” briefly overviews the recent developments 
in the relationship (for example, the EU-Turkey Migrant-Swap Deal) and overviews the 
most recent EU Commission Report (2016), due in November 2016. The purpose of the 
EU Commission Report is to assess the current progress of Turkey on its path to becoming 
the EU members. EU Commission publishes this report annually for every country that is 
trying to become a member of the EU and is the best mirror of EU’s views on the position 
of each state in relation to its successes in integration to acquis communautaire (or the 
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Copenhagen Criteria). Therefore, it is essential thesis to survey the Report as it will help 
me articulate better the EU’s complex, and sometimes murky, position on Turkish 
accession. 
 Chapter three, titled “Constructivism and IR: The EU-Turkey Relationship is What 
Agents Make of It”, serves to position this work theoretically within critical constructivism. 
As this work seeks to analyze the history of the relationship with the aim of understanding 
socio-cultural and identitarian issues burdening the relationship, it must use an ideal theory 
to defend its conclusions. The EU-Turkey relations are an aspect of EU studies and, 
henceforth, need to be studied through the issues of socialization of states within the EU 
system. In that sense, Turkish integration in the EU is an essential part of the relationship 
and must be, therefore, understood with regards to social process of the relationship. 
Chapter four is titled “Issues” and is divided into four sub-chapters, each analyzing and 
overviewing its assigned issue-area. Through “Issues”, I present the complex 
dimensionality of the relationship between the EU and Turkey by analyzing different issue-
areas relevant to both actors today. In the first issue area, I investigate the relationship 
between the two in the sub-chapter called “Turkey, EU, and Construction of Identities”. 
As indicated, the chapter focuses on the identity construction between the two and its 
effects on the political dimension of the relationship. In this case, I look at the relationship 
between Turkey and EU from the standpoint of critical constructivism and will illustrate 
my main argument which is that Turkey and EU constantly keep on “othering” each other 
as their identities, and because of that, interests, while not mutually exclusive, are 
significantly different. This causes them both to behave in ways that are easily disruptive 
of continuing accession negotiations and are harming not only their political relations, but 
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also social perceptions of both Turkey’s role in Europe and Europe’s role in Turkey. 
Finding a way to construct each other’s identities in a mutually inclusive way is, at this 
moment, hardly possible so the EU and Turkey relationship will continue to stall.  
The second sub-chapter of chapter four is “Public Opinion”. In this sub-chapter, I 
seek to present data on the EU-Turkey relationship in two sections. The first section 
analyzes literature and data on the public opinion of Turks and Europeans on Turkish 
membership. With that in mind, concomitant with qualitative data found in literature on 
public opinion on EU-Turkey relationship, this research seeks to obtain real-time statistics 
from Eurobarometer, EU’s regular research into public opinion of Europeans (from both 
member and candidate states) regarding pertinent issues within the block. The second 
section uses data derived from my interviews. I conducted interviews with the members of 
the Turkish community in Germany and Turkish academics in Germany during my studies 
at the Free University of Berlin in the Fall of 2016. Interviews are useful for this research 
not only because they demonstrate its academic strength (the importance of original data 
for academic research) but also because they help us grasp individual perspectives on the 
issues of identity, history, and social constructions on the relationship (see “Methodology” 
below). 
The issue area of immigration is presented in its own sub-chapter titled “The 
Immigration Crisis: A New Frontier?”. In this sub-chapter I argue that the Immigration 
Crisis is an issue-area which gives Turkey significant leverage over the EU in both political 
and economic terms because Turkey serves as a sort of gatekeeper for migrants to Europe. 
Given the fact that Europe (EU) is encumbered with swathes of migrants and refugees at 
its doors, Turkey is given a lot of attention, particularly after the EU-Turkey Migrant Swap 
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Deal (2016), as it helps EU to mitigate the influence of their influx onto its territory. The 
sub-chapter will conclude with the notion that even though Turkey has significant leverage 
over the EU in this field (i.e. EU needs Turkey to ensure the functioning of its Asylum 
system at the moment), Turkey will not be able to score political points and open more EU 
accession chapters due to the fact that it is not complying with the acquis properly and is 
failing to understand the strong normative-institutional aspect of EU politics. On the other 
hand, EU is constantly failing to adjust its foreign policy to Turkey as it views it as just 
another candidate rather than an emerging world-power which cannot be treated 
normatively like some other states (i.e. Croatia). The conflictual intersubjectivity which 
was developed in recent months precisely because of two diverging political narratives is 
causing the EU-Turkey relationship to stagnate and is threatening its survival. In order for 
the relationship to continue on its normative course, both sides need to re-start the dialogue, 
end the discursive “war with words”, and properly identify all the issues that have come on 
their path. Without that, EU is risking losing one of its greatest partners, Turkey, to other 
countries (such as Russia) which will result in further foreign policy difficulties in the 
Middle East and elsewhere in the world. 
Another issue-area explored in this thesis is the issue of Cyprus. This chapter 
investigates the constructivist effects of one of the world’s longest political crises. The 
Cyprus issue has been at the forefront of EU-Turkey relations since 1974 and its question 
has gained a new momentum recently with a series of botched meetings between the Greek 
and Turkish Cypriot representatives in Geneva, under good offices of Ban Ki-Moon, the 
now-former UN Secretary General.  Cyprus is a politically divided island which entered 
the EU in its entirety in 2004. The north side of the island belongs to Turkish Cypriots who, 
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with the help of Turkish military in 1974, established their own independent state, only 
recognized by Turkey. The south side belongs to Greek Cypriots who have a lot of political 
influence in the EU due to the fact that Greece is also a member-state. Greece and Turkey, 
combined with the EU, represent the most significant players, and even, decision-makers 
in the case of Cyprus’ reunification. This is especially visible during the time when the 
reunification negotiations resume and Turkey, and Greece, take up very strong attitudes 
towards the issue. I argue that this narrative of Cyprus as an indispensable part of Greek 
and Turkish identity is interconnected with actual interests both states have in the area (see 
“History”), and legitimizes a conflicting intersubjective perception which seeks to 
construct Cyprus as partly Turkish and partly Greek. EU’s involvement with the issue has 
been limited, as the EU has outsourced it largely to Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey, however, 
EU is still blocking six negotiation chapters (since 2006) in the Turkish accession 
negotiations solely due to the issue of Cyprus. I end the chapter with a recommendation 
that EU must approach the issue more seriously and demand from all three sides to give in 
to a more honest and stronger compromise on the issue. It is crucial not only for EU’s 
internal safety, but also for relations between Greece, Turkey and EU to be more relaxed 
and open 
In the fifth chapter of the research, called "Perspectives for the Future", I offer 
different perspectives to the issue of the EU-Turkey relationship. These perspectives serve 
to be a thoughtful ending of the research by recentering the issue of the EU-Turkey 
relationship away from the question of whether Turkey will enter the bloc. One way of 
recentering the issue is by acknowledging the impossibility of Turkish accession to the EU 
at a given moment. This would allow us to accept different models of Turkish integration 
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in the EU that will offer it close association and an almost-membership status. The aim of 
this approach would be to relax the tension produced by constant failures to acquiesce to 
the Copenhagen Criteria. This does not mean that Turkey will be offered the infamous 
“Privileged Partnership”2, but rather, it makes use of policy practicality to help Turkey and 
EU gain political momentum in order to continue its full integration. This modality was 
entertained in Meltem Muftuler-Bac’s Divergent Pathways: Turkey and the European 
Union: Re-thinking the Dynamics of Turkish-European Relations book and seems like a 
constructive way of bringing interests and identities of both EU and Turkey together 
without risking disillusionment on the part of Turkey and frustration on the part of the EU. 
Finally, this thesis ends with a conclusion which provides an overview of the 
matters entertained in the work and concludes with some closing remarks on the issue of 
EU-Turkey relationship.  
3. Methodology 
This thesis is a qualitative work in social sciences. Since this research seeks ways 
to gain a deeper understanding of the EU-Turkish relations, it is important then to also 
understand the perspective of European Turks on the Euro-integrations of their home-
country.  
This research will use mixed methods for collecting data on EU-Turkey relations. 
As the research part of the thesis is conducted in Berlin, Germany, where I spent the Fall 
semester of my senior year, I decided to seek potential participants from both academic 
circles and from the sphere of public (i.e. laymen).  
                                                 
2 Privileged Partnership is an alternative proposal to Turkish membership of the EU. While not excluding 
Turkey form EU, this proposal, supported by politicians such as Sarkozy and Merkel, offers Turkey deeper 
integration within EU’s economic sphere (access to the single market, for example) while excluding the 
probability of its membership in the community.  
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The principal way of collecting data for this research is, of course, through written 
academic works in the form of books and journal articles/publications. Turkey-EU 
relations have generated a great deal of written works which provide a great basis for 
analyzing this issue from a material and interest-oriented point of view. Therefore, the 
academic resources are not there to fulfill the goal of this thesis alone, they are merely 
useful for supplementing facts as well as certain ideas on how to proceed with the research. 
As this work is a work in critical constructivism, further analysis of discourse is needed to 
supplement and contribute to its analysis of the relationship (please see “Constructivism 
and IR: Relationship is What States Make of It”). A discourse is:  
By 'discourse', we mean a particular way of representing 'the West', 'the 
Rest' and the relations between them. A discourse is a group of statements 
which provide a language for talking about (i.e. a way of representing-a 
particular kind) of knowledge about a topic. When statements about a topic 
are made within a particular discourse, the discourse makes it possible to 
construct the topic in a certain way. It also limits the other ways in which 
the topic can be constructed. (Hall and Gieben, 291).  
This means that I garner a significant amount of news reports, articles and news 
journals that will allow me to identify how Turkey and the EU engage in a political 
discourse of othering which will further allow me to disentangle the historical-social 
patterns of mistrust, enmity, and blackmail in politics between EU and Turkey. Therefore, 
combining interviews with academic sources and every-day news reports will allow me to 
present a clear picture of how identity formations influences politics between the EU and 
Turkey.  
The secondary method of collecting data for this research is a structured interview. 
Structured interview is an ideal technique for this thesis as it allows the researcher to 
prepare a set of questions participants should answer. This allows for a lot of control of 
what kind of answers the researcher is getting, which further allows the researcher to 
16 
 
specify the issue they want to learn more about. The interviews I conducted lasted from 20 
to 40 minutes, depending on the length of participant’s answer. All of the questions are 
enlisted in the Appendices at the end of this work.  By using structured interview, the 
researcher can obtain precise qualitative data relevant for the research. Interviews are often 
not the most comfortable way for participants to express their opinions, particularly given 
the current post-coup situation in Turkey, where the government is actively seeking ways 
to capture critics or dissidents from the regime. However, it is the most convenient way as 
it allows the researcher to gain a personal, yet informative, insight into what people (both 
academics and laymen) think about the issue of Turkish EU integration. I guarantee 
complete anonymity to all the participants, unless they wish not to be anonymous. For this 
purpose, I generated the “Informed Consent Form” in order to inform participants about 
potential benefits or risks of participating in my research. Informed Consent Form is a 
standard practice in the field of qualitative social research through which participants are 
thoroughly informed about the research they are participating in. The sample consent form 
is included in the Appendices section at the end of this thesis.  
 The sampling method for the research is snowball sampling. Snowball sampling is 
a type of sampling method that allows researcher to identify a person (or persons) who 
meets the criteria for inclusion in a study (Social Research Methods, 2016). When the 
researcher identifies the person/s he then establishes a rapport through which he obtains 
information about other people or organizations who fit the research criteria (Social 
Research Methods, 2016). The newly created web of fitting participants then provides 
further information to the researcher about a desired project. I decided to choose this 
method for obtaining participants for my thesis project because I am taking a course “Islam 
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and Europe” which deals heavily with integration of Muslims in Europe. Turks, being the 
largest Muslim population in Germany, and in Berlin, are a significant part of my 
coursework and I intend on focusing on this group for my research. Therefore, in order to 
get connected to the Turkish community in Berlin, I need a gateway person who would 
“snowball” the whole research process. My professor is a German Turk and a practicing 
Muslim, so he is fitting to provide contact with Turkish organizations in Berlin as well as 
it Turkish community. My professor provided mostly academic contact whereas I also need 
more of non-academic contacts from general Turkish community in Berlin. A colleague of 
mine at the Free University of Berlin, where my study abroad takes place, did her honors 
thesis on the issue of Syrian refugees in Germany (with emphasis on the city of Berlin). 
Being of Arabic, Muslim, origin, she provided me her personal contacts with regular Euro-
Turks who were willing to talk to me about their perception of EU and Turkey’s 
relationship.  
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Chapter 1. History of Relations Between the EU and Turkey 
1. Early Relations: From Ankara Agreement to the Invasion of Cyprus 
 The history of the relationship between the European Union and the Republic of 
Turkey often seems like a never-ending rollercoaster. Divergent interests, unresolved 
socio-political issues, the stigma of Turks as backwarded Muslims, European and Turkish 
political turmoil, all truly bring into question the credibility of the European Union and the 
trustworthiness of Turkish application to the EU. Turkey first applied to become an 
associate member of the European Economic Community in 1959 and has since then been 
on a “long and winding path” to achieve its goals (Akçapar, 19). The reasons for Turkish 
application were multiple, but there are two main ones that must be mentioned. The first 
one relates itself to the course Atatürk (Mustafa Kemal, the founding father and the first 
president of Turkey) set which can be simplified, although not summarized, in three words; 
modernization through westernization. The second reason for Turkish application for the 
EEC membership is a combination of two main political factors: Turkish involvement in 
the Western-Atlantic structure (NATO member since 1952, founding member of the 
Council of Europe in 1949) and the aftershock of Greek application which was submitted 
to the EEC in 1959. Turkey submitted its application only two weeks after Greece, with 
Adnan Menderes, the then-PM, remarking:” What can they do that we cannot?!” (Dismorr, 
37).  
Turkish membership path was seriously interrupted with the 1960 coup and the first 
strain on EU – Turkish relations manifested in the form of Turkish Kemalist military’s 
interference with democratic order. The coup saw Adnan Menderes’ removal from the 
office after 10 years of serving and his public hanging just a year afterwards. Adnan 
Menderes remains an interesting, and polarizing, figure in Turkish public life. He and the 
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Democratic Party were significant actors in Turkish political life for over a decade after 
ending CHP’s (Republican Nationalist Party- founded by Mustafa Kemal himself) political 
dominance in the 1950 elections. Menderes was also the first in line of Turkish politicians 
who took easier stances towards the concept of Turkish secularity thus opening the 
government and the politics to more religious involvement (Rabasa and Larrabee, 36).  
 Turkey was granted an associate member status after the military relinquished 
power to CHP (led by Ismet Inönü) and signed, in 1963, the Ankara Agreement which was 
defined as a long-term process outlining three main stages of the Turkish path to the EU 
(Bogdani, 23). These stages are as follows: a preparatory stage, aimed to prepare Turkish 
society and economics to becoming an EEC member (agreement stipulates a time frame of 
five years), a transitional stage aimed at providing a timeframe of twelve years during 
which Turkey should become ready for transitioning to the EEC (agreements such as the 
Customs Union of 1996 were a part of this stage), and a final stage which was meant to be 
the last step before fully integrating Turkey into the then-EEC (Ankara Agreement, 5). 
Upon signing the Ankara Agreement, the EEC Commissioner Walter Hallstein remarked: 
Today we are witnessing a historic event. Turkey belongs in Europe. Here 
lies the significance of this event. This is an expression of reality rather than 
a summarized geographical fact or the historical events of the past few 
centuries (Dismorr, 38).  
What then-Commissioner Hallstein meant was that because of geopolitical reasons 
and the bipolar world order, Turkey belonged to EEC not only as a European nation, but 
also as an ally crucial for fighting the Soviet influence. This position changed over time 
and with the fall of the USSR, the cultural discourse aiming to present Turkey as non-
European gained foothold in Europe thus making it harder for Turkey to integrate more 
(See chapter “Turkey, the EU and the Construction of Identities”).   
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 The period between 1963 and 1974 was a turbulent time not only for Turkey but 
also for Europe. The European Economic Community, to which Turkey applied initially, 
become the European Communities with the signing of the with the “Merger Treaty” of 
1967 thus reflecting a more politically-natured union among its members. To add to this, 
the EC later on became a more normative institution with a clearer, albeit not fully 
normative, criteria for accessing it (the Copenhagen Criteria, for example, were 
institutionalized in 1993 with the Maastricht Treaty). Turkey, on the other hand, underwent 
a military coup (1971) which worsened its democratic record and invaded Cyprus in 1974 
thus significantly delaying the association progress.   
2. Turkish Invasion of Cyprus 
The ethno-national turbulence, and the subsequent Turkish invasion, on the island 
of Cyprus stand tall as the most important problems of the relationship between EU and 
Turkey. Until 1981, the Cyprus issue was not per se thought of as the European issue in 
formal terms. However, when Greece entered the EC as a full-fledged member in 1981, the 
Cyprus issue became an official EC issue and required EC to formally adopt Cyprus-
specific policies. Even before the Greek accession, the Turks protested Cypriot application 
to the EEC in 1971, but the EEC did not see the issue as its own formal problem; Cyprus 
signed the association agreement in 1972 (Ҫakir, 34). The existence of Cyprus issue is not 
only related to the Turkish invasion of the island in 1974 under the guise of prevention of 
enosis or unification of Cyprus and Greece. It is related to three highly complex factors 
that involve EU, Turkey and Greece: 1. Turkish-Hellenic relations, the EU membership 
negotiations of the Turkey-Greece-Cyprus triangle, and Cypriot-Turkish relations. In order 
to present the issue properly, I must start with explaining the reason why Turkey invaded 
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Cyprus in 1974 and why Cyprus, a small Mediterranean island, is so important to Turkey. 
Cyprus was created in 1960 after signing of the Zurich-London Accords among UK, the 
Republic of Turkey and the Hellenic Republic (Camp, 46/7). Under the accords, Cyprus 
was to be an independent and sovereign state, allied to both Greece and Turkey, but not to 
NATO (Camp, 47). By signing the agreement, both Turks and the Greeks legally bound 
themselves not to create an enosis (unification) or a taksim (division) of Cyprus (Camp, 
46). The Republic was created, but it soon entered existential troubles. The first president 
of Cyprus was Archbishop Makarios who had a hard time leading a state composed of 
around 80% Greek Cypriots and around 18% of Turkish Cypriots (Solsten, 1991). Before 
the Turkish invasion of Cyprus there were three Cyprus crises, one of which was resolved 
by the Zurich-London Agreements and the creation of Cyprus, and other two in 1964 and 
1967, which were a pretext to Turkish invasion in 1974 (Camp, 54). Peace negotiations, 
such as the one in 1968, ultimately failed and the impending enosis, as requested by Greek 
officials, was irking the Turks who most surely did not wish to see Cyprus fall under Greek 
control (Camp, 56). In 1974, a coup d’etat happened and Makarios was ousted from the 
office thus providing a genuine reason for Turkish invasion of Cyprus. 
The pretext for Turkish invasion of Cyprus in July of 1974 was, according to Semin 
Suvarierol, a strategic move on part of Turkey (Survarierol, 56). The (in)auspicious 
strategic location of Cyprus close to the Anatolian coast (about 40 nautical miles away 
from it) was always a problem for the Turkish state as it indicated that the Greeks control 
almost the entirety of waters surrounding Turkey (Suvarierol, 56). The location of Cyprus 
and the natural extension of Karpaz Peninsula (a tail-like northern peninsula of Cyprus) 
would allow Cyprus to block the gulf of Iskenderun thus endangering Turkish naval 
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abilities (Suvarierol, 56). If Cyprus fell into Greek hands (i.e. if enosis happened), then 
Turkey would be disadvantaged strategically not only because of the danger this would 
pose for Turkish navy but also because Cyprus is, in Suvarierol’s words, a “stationary 
aircraft carrier”, therefore a potential threat to Turkish sovereign territory (Suvarierol, 57). 
Indeed, if one looks at the map of the border between Greece, Cyprus and Turkey, one can 
see why Turkey has serious strategic interest in either maintaining the full sovereignty and 
independence of Cyprus or it’s division in two parts. Turkey is surrounded by Greek islands 
which extend from Greek-Turkish border in the Balkans all the way down to Turkish region 
of “Southern Anatolia” (Wordpress, 2011). Cyprus remains the only large island in that 
territory which finds itself under its own authority and as such remains relevant for Turkish 
politics (Suvarierol, 57). Although today all three countries (Cyprus, Greece and Turkey) 
are bound by EU law not to interfere with each other’s sovereignty (which means Cyprus 
will not disturb Turkey’s naval ability), the issue of territory was probably the main reason 
for the invasion. To demonstrate how important Cyprus is to Turkish national interests, I 
will paraphrase the former PM of Turkey Bülent Ecevit who: “Is said to have claimed in 
1998 that Cyprus is so indispensable for the strategic interests of Turkey that Ankara would 
not withdraw its troops even if there were not a single Turkish Cypriot living on the island” 
(Suvarierol, 57). The Cypriot territory, in combination with the history of enmity between 
Turkey and Greece, represents the first aspect of the Cyprus issue.  
Turkish-Greek enmity is a far-reaching socio-political issue. In modern history of 
Turkey, it stems directly from the Greco-Turkish War (1919-1922). The Greco-Turkish 
War started when Greece invaded Turkey (or post-Ottoman province of Turkey), in 1919. 
It ended with the Turkish victory in 1922 paving the way for the establishment of the 
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Republic of Turkey in 1923. From 1923 until the present, multiple issues have encumbered 
the Greek-Turkish relations out of which Cyprus and EU integration stand as the most 
important ones. When Greece applied in 1959 for the EEC membership, Turkey did not 
hesitate a moment and has submitted its own application just two weeks later. EU 
integration became especially cumbersome for Turkey when Greece joined the EC in 1981 
and pushed for the Cyprus’ membership bid. When Cyprus applied for the membership in 
1990, a result of strong Greek lobbying in the EC and Cypriot acquiescence to the criteria, 
Turkey was bedeviled. The Turks feared that when Cyprus enters the Community, the 
Greeks would gain another veto in the Council of the EU and thus manage to prevent 
further Turkish accession to the EC (Suvarierol, 57). This did not happen, as we can see, 
because the countries that do wish to prevent a full-membership of Turkey in the EU are 
far more powerful in the Council than Greece or Cyprus, and are intent on stalling the 
negotiations as much as possible. However, the issue of Cyprus did incentivize member 
states to block certain negotiation chapters in 2006 (Dismorr, 62). The Cyprus issue truly 
is a remarkable aspect of the relationship between the EU and Turkey and as such deserves 
more attention. It will be further analyzed in the second chapter named “Cyprus: Identity, 
Security, and the EU-Turkey Relationship”. 
3.  The 1980 coup d’état: Reform, the Kurdish Issue and the Council Decision of 1989 
The 1980 coup d’etat remains a particularly important period in Turkish modern 
history. After the setback caused by the Cyprus issue, the coup of 1980 marked the first 
time the EC froze the Ankara Agreement due to violations of human rights, democratic 
principles and sheer violence that swept over Turkey (Aksu, 8).  
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In September of 1980, the Turkish military conducted a military coup in order to 
restore stability to the in-fighting in Turkish politics (Dismorr, 41). The coup followed a 
decade of changing governments and political squabbles which left a great nation 
struggling both economically and socially. To put matters in perspective, from 1971 to 
1980, Turkey had ten different governments (with Bülent Ecevit being a PM three times 
and Süleyman Demirel two times) indicating a kind of “revolving door government” crisis 
often occurring in European countries like Italy. The coup was preceded by deaths of 
approximately 5,000 people throughout Turkey which testifies to the level of political 
instability in the country (Dismorr, 41). The coup impacted Euro-Turkish relations heavily 
and for the fourth time in just twenty years, with the memory of Menderes’ execution, the 
coup of 1971, and the Cyprus invasion, the relationship between the EU and Turkey was 
in a precarious position. European integration was put on hold until 1983 when Turkey got 
a new constitution, still in effect, and the first post-coup multiparty elections were held. 
Turkish democracy was revived with the formation of the Motherland Party (ANAP) and 
the election of Turgut Özal as the Prime Minister. Özal was the first Turkish Prime Minister 
who held office for his entire mandate, and more, after 1971. He held office for 6 years, 
from 1983 to 1989. During his leadership, Turkey made impressive strides on its way of 
becoming a stronger democracy as well as a more credible associate member of the EC.  
 The 1983 Turkish Constitution did not only allow for multi-party elections to 
happen, it was also a result of twenty years of post-Menderes policies and strategies 
initiated by the Turkish military. Turkish military, often cited as the defender of Turkish 
secularism, interfered with the political system numerous times, but even more than that, 
it instituted several critical changes and policies which would permanently alter Turkish 
25 
 
socio-political landscape. In the 1960s, during the period of military control, a concept of 
“Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” was developed (Rabasa and Larrabee, 37). The military, 
aware of how powerful Islam still is in Turkish society, was insistent on using it as a tool 
to fight the appeal of communism and socialism in Turkey while at the same time 
protecting the well-instituted principle of secularity. This went hand in hand with the 
principle of Turkish laicite which saw government as absolute governor of religion on 
Turkish territory. In that sense, Turkish military created a “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” 
whereby Islamic teachings were allowed, for the first time since Atatürk’s death, to be 
taught in public schools (as a matter of fact, they became compulsory in the national 
curriculum) (Rabasa and Larrabee, 37).  
Furthermore, state-controlled moral and religious education was promoted not only 
in schools but in all spheres of public life (Rabasa and Larrabee, 37). The idea behind the 
“Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” was essentially “islamization from above”; the military 
wanted to homogenize Islamic political community and introduce more nationalist 
elements to it to be able to manipulate Islamic communities in Turkey so as to fight the 
communist and Islamist appeal (Rabasa and Larrabee, 38). This backlashed on the military 
as it helped the Islamic political community gain more legitimacy in Turkish political life 
while at the same time promoting Islam as an important socio-political element of Turkish 
identity (Rabasa and Larrabee, 38). The culmination of the “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” is 
found in the 1983 Constitution which opened the doors to more religious freedoms albeit 
still under strict control from the state. The end-result of the “Turkish Islamic Synthesis” 
is the current state of Turkish politics with AKP as a leading party. The AKP party’s credo 
is combining both Turkish nationalism and profound Islamic teachings with modern liberal 
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democratic principles. Nominally, this seems as a positive development, but in reality, the 
authoritarianism expressed by AKP and its leader Erdogan is worrying. This issue will be 
entertained in later chapters (see Chapter “Issues”). 
 In the period after 1983, when the first post-coup multiparty elections took place, 
Turkey made significant progress on its EU path. There are instances in the history of 
relations between Turkey and EU where Turkish zeal for reform outweighed any 
opposition to its membership. The period from 1983 to 1989 seemed to be such an instance. 
However, unlike the period between 2001 and 2004 which is often referred to as the 
“golden age” of the relationship, the period of reforms lasting from 1983 to 1989 was, in 
the eyes of EC, not enough to commence accession negotiations. Although Turkey 
managed to pull through many reforms in accordance with the EC guidance and 
requirements, the EC rebuffed its application for membership in 1989. This caused a period 
of strained Euro-Turkish relations which ended in 1996 with the institution of the Customs 
Union (the second step as outlined by the Ankara Agreement).  
In order to illustrate why EC’s decision negatively impacted Euro-Turkish 
relationship, we have to gain a deeper understanding of Özal’s reforms and the changing 
European political landscape. Prime Minister, and later President, Turgut Özal came to 
prominence in political life as a founder of the ANAP (the Motherland Party) in 1983. Prior 
to that, his career was truly remarkable. He worked as a World Bank employee and was 
educated both in Turkey and in the USA (Rabasa and Larrabee, 39). Apart from the World 
Bank, he worked in the private sector and was assigned as the Undersecretary of the Prime 
Ministry (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey). However, even though he was a 
westernized man due to his training and life experience, Mr. Özal was also a religious man 
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(Rabasa and Larrabee, 39). In that sense, by being religious and western-oriented, Özal 
personified a “modern” Turk (Rabasa and Larrabee, 39). Furthermore, Özal was of Kurdish 
origin and he was open about his ancestors thus bringing a positive momentum to public 
discussion of the “Kurdish Issue” (Rabasa and Larrabee, 39). His reforms were profound 
as they moved Turkey towards a free and liberal financial market. Özal firmly believed in 
economic liberalism and small government, so he instituted policies aiming to open up 
Turkish markets to the global free trade. This made a profound social impact on Turkey 
and remains quite relevant today. Rabasa and Larrabee explain it this way: 
Özal’s reforms also resulted in an inflow of capital, much of it from the 
Arab world. This allowed the Islamists to organize politically. Under Özal’s 
more tolerant approach to religion, Muslim groups and brotherhoods were 
given greater freedoms and were allowed to finance the construction of 
private schools and universities. The reforms also opened greater political 
space for new political groups—including the Islamists. Islamist groups 
gained access to important media outlets and newspaper chains, which 
allowed them to reach a much broader political audience. Television, in 
particular, provided an important means of propagating their message 
(Rabasa and Larrabee, 39).  
 
The period of Özal’s reforms was followed by a trend of rural, predominantly 
Anatolian, population moving away from the rural areas and into larger cities such as 
Istanbul and Ankara where they were seeking better lifestyle and financial security (Rabasa 
and Larrabee, 39). Many of them never integrated in the urban cultures of great Turkish 
urban centers so they lived in gecekondu mahallesi (shanty-towns) thus creating a large 
body of urban electorate outside of city centers (Rabasa and Larrabee, 39). This kind of 
social change had a profound impact on Turkey’s urban culture as well as Turkish 
electorate. Today, parties such as AKP (and, during the nineties, parties such as the Virtue 
Party) take a lot of their democratic legitimacy precisely from the more religious, and 
socially mobile, middle classes of Anatolia (Rabasa and Larrabee, 39). This means that, 
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due to Özal’s reforms, and the reforms of successive Turkish governments after ANAP and 
Özal, the development of social mobility in Turkey resulted in greater influence of Islam 
as a religion on the public sphere. This social mobility brought many issues to public; rights 
of religious minorities, the role of religion in public sphere, and the vision of more religious 
Turkish politics. These issues still encumber Turkish politics today. One of such issues is 
definitely Turkish relationship with its minorities, Kurds in particular.  
Even though PM Özal was of Kurdish origin, during tenure as a Prime Minister not 
much was done to improve the Turkish-Kurdish relations and to satisfy the demands of the 
large Kurdish population in the country. Starting in 1984, the armed conflict between the 
Turkish military and Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), a terrorist organization founded in 
1978, caused great harm to Turkey’s international reputation as well as its EU accession 
negotiations. As aforementioned, one of the main reasons why Turkey was rebuffed by the 
Council in 1989 was justified by the issue of violence happening in parts of the country. 
The reason for Kurdish insurgency stems from decades of discriminative laws implemented 
by the Turkish government against the Kurds. These laws should be understood in the 
context of creation of Turkish identity and Turkish nationalism. Early in the making of the 
nation, people like Kemal Mustafa Atatürk believed that a strong national, Turkish, identity 
needs to take precedence over ethnic or religious identity (Yildiz, 16). With that in mind, 
in 1924, the use of Kurdish language, national clothing and music were banned in the public 
(Yildiz, 16). The relatively peaceful3 or controlled “Kurdish Issue” exploded after the 
1980s coup when the 1983 Constitution reiterated the ban on Kurdish language (Yildiz, 
16). Moreover, after the coup, the Kurdish villages were renamed with non-Kurdish names 
                                                 
3 I use the word advisedly, for there were instances of conflict in the period leading up to the 1984 
escalation. 
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thereby further ostracizing Kurdish heritage in Turkey (Yildiz, 16).  The Turkish-PKK 
armed conflict began in 1984 and by its end with the capture of PKK’s leader Abdullah 
Öcalan in 1999, it caused 37,000 mostly Kurdish deaths and the displacement of three 
million people (Yildiz, 16). Turkish government proclaimed in 1987 the State of 
Emergency lasting until 2002 (Yildiz, 16). The State of Emergency Legislation provided 
great powers to the newly established civil control for the Kurdish regions in Turkey 
(Yildiz, 16). These powers, as would later become known, were intended to intimidate 
local Kurds by arbitrary arrests, looting, beatings and “disappearances” (Yildiz, 16).   
Regional governors who administrated the civil control over areas in state of 
emergency used their power in order to gain more information about PKK’s activities in 
any way possible (Yildiz, 16). The Kurdish areas of the southeast and eastern parts of the 
country became seriously underdeveloped after the conflict thus contributing to higher 
levels of radicalization, frustration, and child marriages (Dismorr, 116). Even before the 
civil war, the Kurdish areas of Turkey were largely traditional and agricultural, so the 
conflict only brought more socio-economic troubles for those regions (Dismorr, 116). In 
1991, however, there was a small but important legislative change which signaled the 
opening of the long peace process. The public speaking of Kurdish language (Article 2932) 
after many decades of prohibition was finally allowed (Dismorr, 125). Although a very 
small step, this piece of legislation would prove to be crucial for greater visibility of Kurds 
in Turkey. This happened as Turgut Özal, who was of Kurdish ancestry himself, became 
the new president of the Republic. The opening was rather short-lived as Özal died 
suddenly in 1993. Not much would change on the issue of Kurdish integration until AKP 
came to power in 2002 (Dismorr, 125). The shift in Turkish policy immediately after Özal’s 
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death is striking. In 1994, Leyla Zana, a Kurdish member of Turkish parliament, was 
imprisoned alongside several of her colleagues for wearing Kurdish colors and speaking 
Kurdish language before the Turkish parliament (Dismorr, 125).  
Zana, who would not be released until 2004, became a sort of a symbol of the fight 
of Kurds for their rights (Dismorr, 125). She is still active in Turkish political life today, 
being a member of the Turkish National Assembly (Turkish parliament). The capturing of 
Zana and other parliamentarians provoked strong response from the European Union, but 
it did not halt the relations as we will see in the later chapters. Today, the relations of Kurds 
and Turkey are still rather ambivalent. After a period of serious détente from 2001 to 2007, 
strengthened by AKP’s reforms and progressive laws against torture and capital 
punishment, the Kurdish issue became less of an issue and more of a challenge. This brief 
period saw Kurdish, and other minority languages, being supported by TRT (Turkish 
Radio-Television, a public channel) in 2004 when it started broadcasting in those 
languages. Unfortunately, with the Arab Spring and the Syrian Civil War, the Kurdish 
challenge became more complicated. Strong role played by Kurds in Iraq in fighting 
against the Islamic State brought international attention to their issues, especially in 
Turkey:  
The PYD/YPG has recently gained a degree of international support, 
becoming a key ally to the anti-IS coalition. The YPG represents the 
coalition’s most successful partner on the ground in northern Syria, in part 
because persistent doubts about the nature of many other opposition groups 
have precluded the provision of comparable coalition support to those 
groups. The combination of US airstrikes and YPG intelligence and follow-
up on the ground lies behind the most significant battlefield defeats that IS 
has suffered in Syria, including in Kobani and Tel Abyad (Salih, 4).  
The breakdown of the Turkish-PKK peace process which started in 2012, after a 
period of escalation from 2008, does not bode well for an international coalition fighting 
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the IS. In this sense, the European Union and Turkey’s relationship should make a stronger 
emphasis on how Turkey (and most importantly, AKP) need to work with PKK in order to 
restart the peace process. At this very moment, a strong nationalistic campaign by president 
Erdoğan, followed by the attempted coup in July of 2016, is further harming the relations 
between ethnic minorities, especially the Kurds, thus making it harder to make progress on 
the Kurdish Issue as well as on Turkish EU integration.  
We can see that Turkey, although making economic progress during the 80s, faced, 
and is facing, challenges that seem out of her control. During Özal’s time both as PM and 
as President we can see both worsening and relaxing of relations between the government 
and Kurds. However, the socio-political instability did not prevent Turkey from hoping 
that it would receive a positive answer (that is, candidacy for the EU membership) during 
the 1989 European Council. The upswing in Turkish social mobility and greater 
liberalization of its economy strengthened Turkey’s wishes for further integration into the 
Western political and economic bloc. That is why the government submitted the application 
for the candidacy to the EC Commission in 1987, four years into Özal’s mandate. The 
submission of the application for candidacy in 1987 was an exhilarating moment for 
Turkey. Carried by Özal’s reforms and the new-found political stability, Turkey hoped for 
a reward from the EC. In 1989, Turks were disappointed to realize that their application 
was rejected by the European Commission and that they’d have to wait in line longer in 
order to achieve their political, and increasingly, social goal of European integration. The 
reasoning behind the rejection was quite multifaceted. The Council rejected the application 
on the grounds that Turkish economy was not sufficiently developed and that Turkish 
democracy did not guarantee sufficient civil and human rights (Bogdani, 23). Furthermore, 
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the memory of Turkish invasion of Cyprus was still fresh and the lack of progress on that 
issue was particularly problematic for EC (Bogdani, 23). The human rights record, as we 
could see earlier, of Turkey has indeed not been well-adjusted to the EC’s standards (the 
capital punishment, for example, was still allowed) thus giving further reason for EC to 
rebuff the application.  
However, apart from Turkish internal reasons, it is also important to note that 
Europe itself was, coincidentally, on a threshold of great political, social and economic 
change. In 1989, after 28 years, the Berlin Wall came down. The Soviet Union (USSR) 
disintegrated in 1991 and with it the Warsaw Pact was dismantled. This had strong 
repercussions for Turkey, a loyal and strong NATO ally, whose plea for westernization lost 
substance in the eyes of Europeans who now had less interest in Turkish accession. Turkey 
was no longer needed to fight the communist appeal and the Soviet influence, so it was 
easier to sidetrack it in the European integration process. Starting from the 90s, Europe has 
generally positioned itself more normatively as well as more politically against Turkish 
membership. Camps such as Austria, Germany and France are still leading the blockade of 
chapters of the acquis communautaire while UK, Spain and the Netherlands are looking 
more positively at the prospect of Turkish membership. One thing is for certain, the long 
wait of Turkey at the gates of Europe has saw the bipolar world order end and that has 
made the matters harder for Turkey. Özal’s reforms and the general feeling of euphoria did 
not help, but the ever-changing political landscape of the Middle East today (more than 
twenty-five years later) might just be a stimulus Europe needed to realize how important 
Turkey is for its strategic interests.  
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4. Turkey and EU during the 1990s: Customs Union and Candidacy 
The 1990s were a period of great, international, political, and social change. The 
further integration of the EU following the fall of the Berlin Wall and disintegration of the 
USSR was anticipated enthusiastically. Furthermore, the creation of the European Union 
in 1993 signaled to the world that Europeans are serious in advancing the ideas expressed 
by the Schumann Declaration4 of 1950 and subsequent treaties signed by European 
officials. Turkey found itself divided over the issue of European integrations after the 1989 
Council decision, but it had its hopes high because it was aware of the strategic importance 
of European integrations. Turkey sensed hypocrisy on the part of EC which deemed 
Turkish progress so far as not enough to start accession negotiations (Dismorr, 43). Turkey 
believed that in comparison to countries such as Portugal and Spain who got positive 
answers in 1978, despite being democracies for only three years, it deserved more 
acknowledgment (Dismorr, 43).  
 Although Turkish application was rebuffed by the European Council, the 
negotiations between Turkey and EC on other important aspects of the Ankara Agreement 
continued undisturbed. In 1990, a landmark agreement on customs union was negotiated 
between the two. The customs union between Turkey and the EC came into effect in 1995 
thus further connecting economies of the two (Dismorr, 44). Not long after the customs 
union came into effect, another crisis encumbered the relationship. In 1996, the new 
Turkish government headed by a well-known politician Necmettin Erbakan (Welfare 
Party) held a weak, coalition-based, incumbent which, surprisingly, ran on a more pro-EU 
                                                 
4 The declaration is viewed as one of the foundational moments in EU’s history. Made in 1950, it marked a 
revolution in post-WWII Franco-German relations and it called for economic integration of the EU states 
(thus providing raison d’etre for the European Coal and Steel Community, EEC’s predecessor, to be formed 
in 1951). 
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platform (Erbakan was an anti-EU, openly Islamist politician) (Dismorr, 44). Erbakan’s 
political engagement was viewed unfavorably, to say at the least, by the military 
establishment. Not long after Erbakan’s government entered office, the military threatened 
to oust it from power. The way Erbakan’s government was removed stands as an example 
of volatility of Turkish political system, but also of the strength of the Turkish military. In 
an event commonly known as the “Post-Modern Coup”, the Turkish military, aware of 
strong pro-Islamic tendency of Erbakan’s politics, pressured the PM into leaving office: 
 On February 28, 1997, the National Security Council—which was 
dominated by the military—presented Erbakan with a list of 
recommendations to curb anti-secular activity. When Erbakan balked at 
implementing the recommendations, the military held a series of briefings 
and mobilized the secular establishment against him, eventually forcing him 
to resign in June 1997 in what has been termed a “silent” or “post-modern” 
coup. In January 1998, the Welfare Party was closed down, and Erbakan 
and his key lieutenants were banned from politics for five years (Rabasa 
and Larrabee, 44).  
The ironically titled “soft”, or post-modern, coup ushered a new, and important, era 
in the Turkish politics. An era during which Turkey will experience the stabilization and 
reorganization of Islamic political activity resulting in creation of AKP in 2001 and 
stronger incentives for EU membership.  
Although the 1989 Council decision not to accept Turkish application for candidacy 
stipulated that candidacy and the membership are goals of the EU-Turkey integration 
process, it did not elaborate on how long it would take before Turkey crossed another 
threshold on its road to EU. (Bogdani, 23). In 1997, Turkey believed that it would be 
included in the packet of EU’s “Eastern Enlargement” with countries of the former eastern 
bloc. The Luxembourg Summit of 1997 did not see Turkey acknowledged as a candidate 
which shocked Turkish high officials (Bogdani, 23). The main reason for shock was that 
the countries that were members of the Warsaw Pact only seven years earlier were 
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proclaimed by the EU to be candidate states. Turkey, after 34 years of accession, was cast 
aside. The Luxembourg Group of states became members in 2004 in the EU’s largest round 
of enlargement. These countries are: Malta, Cyprus, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and the Czech Republic. In the aftermath of the 1997 Council 
decision, the top EU-Turkey dialogue was effectively frozen and the atmosphere of distrust 
veiled the talks on integration (Dismorr, 49). However, in a fortuitous turn of events, the 
stimulus for further integration came in 1999 at the Helsinki Council of the EU where 
Turkey was finally given the status of a candidate state. There were four main 
developments which allowed Turkey to be accepted as a candidate state at the Helsinki 
Council: the capture of PKK’s Öcalan in 1999 and the subsequent end of the Civil War in 
Turkey, a thawing in Turkish-Greek relationship caused by mutual assistance during 
earthquakes in both countries, election of Tony Blair as the Labor PM of UK and, finally, 
the agreement of Turkey and EU on accession of Cyprus to EU. Abdullah Öcalan was 
captured in 1999 in the Greek embassy in Kenya. His capture brought further deterioration 
in Greek-Turkish relations, but it also brought an end to Civil War in Turkey (Dismorr, 
45). When Öcalan renounced the use of violence for political means, Turkey and the world 
sighed in relief (Dismorr, 45). The Greek-Turkish deterioration was not long as a series of 
unfortunate events ended serendipitously. Later in 1999, an earthquake hit Istanbul killing 
20,000 people (Dismorr, 45). Greece was among the first countries to provide extensive 
humanitarian aid to Turkey which Turkey reciprocated only few weeks later when an 
earthquake hit Greece as well (Dismorr, 45/46). This led to a series of “taverna diplomacy” 
meetings between the Turkish foreign minister Cem and the Greek foreign minister 
Papandreous (Dismorr, 46). The meetings yielded a so called “U-turn” in relations between 
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Greece and Turkey which ultimately proved helpful for Turkish bid in the EU (Dismorr, 
46).  
Furthermore, the elections of Tony Blair, Gerhard Schröder and Jacques Chirac as 
the new leaders of UK, Germany and France, respectively, brought additional stimulus for 
Turkish EU candidacy bid (Dismorr, 49). Blair, Schröder and Chirac supported Turkish 
integration and viewed it as a strategically important European partner, something that 
would change just a few years later when a new generation of politicians entered their 
respective offices. Finally, the 1999 last-minute compromise on Cyprus put an end to 
doubts of whether Turkey should become a candidate. The deal came after months of 
negotiations. High EU officials (such as Javier Solana, the EU Foreign Policy Chief) 
abruptly flew to Istanbul on the day of the Council to convince the PM Ecevit to accept the 
deal (Dismorr, 51). As Ecevit was an old-school Turkish politician who also ordered 
Turkish invasion of Cyprus, he viewed the agreement as a betrayal of Turkish interest and 
weakening of Turkish position in Europe.  The agreement on Cyprus stated that Turkey 
will not require the solving of the Cyprus issue (i.e. the reunification of the island) before 
Cyprus’ accession to the EU (Dismorr, 51). In return for Turkish acquiescence on this, the 
Greeks would not block Turkey at the Helsinki Council (Dismorr, 52). Even though many 
serious reforms still had to be implemented in Turkey (e.g. the abolition of the death 
penalty was not enacted until 2004), the EU Council was satisfied with Turkish progression 
towards the EU and the recently-achieved end of the Civil War. This, in combination with 
Turkish “yes” on Cypriot accession was a good reason for accepting Turkey as a candidate 
state at the 1999 Helsinky Council (Dismorr, 52).  However, even though Turkey became 
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a candidate state in 1999, the EU-Turkey relationship did not progress steadily but 
continued on being a political rollercoaster. 
5. Turkey and the EU post-Helsinki: Progress, Stagnation and AKP 
The period after the Helsinki Council saw EU-Turkish relationship reach a new and 
reinvigorated phase. The backdrop of the Council’s decision helped improve the 
relationship. However, it also made it much more precarious as the dialogue now revolved 
not around Turkey becoming a candidate state, but about Turkey becoming a member state 
of the EU. Gamze Avci writes: 
Before Helsinki, Turkey’s focused on becoming an official candidate 
without any particular strings attached and on an equal footing with the 
other 12 candidates. Naturally, after the Helsinki summit, with the granting 
of the candidacy, the issue of EU membership acquired a somewhat higher 
profile (Ҫarkoglu, 156).  
Intricate diplomatic games and last-minute deals saw Turkey and EU increasingly 
frustrated with each other thus contributing to further disillusionment of elites. Fortunately, 
the post-Helsinki era also saw a rapid change in Turkish society where during the 2002 
elections a new party emerged as an indisputable political champion thereby providing a 
strong reformist stimulus which the EU welcomed. Development and Justice Party (the 
AKP), led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, came to power in 2002. It marked a new phase in 
Turkish political life. With AKP’s rise to power, the potential coming of a post-Kemalist 
era in Turkey gained stronger footing in Turkish politics (Dismorr, 216). The emancipation 
of a religious, albeit secular, party in the Turkish electorate, and without military 
involvement, marked a profound and still ongoing change of political culture in Turkey. 
Strong and practical reforms conducted by PM Erdogan from 2002 to 2005 resulted in 
Turkey getting the date for the start of accession negotiations: October 3rd, 2005. The start 
of accession negotiations finally lifted Turkey to the status of a full-fledged candidate and 
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normatively strengthened its political position within the EU (Bogdani, 24). Looking back 
from 2005 to 2000, Turkey managed to overcome many issues and provide concrete 
reforms in the fields of human rights and economics. For example, in the early 2000s, under 
Ecevit’s government, Turkey experienced an economic crash follower by a historic 
contraction of Turkish GDP by 9.5% (Rabasa and Larrabee, 48). This was one of the main 
causes why Ecevit’s coalition government fell apart and new elections were called.  
After AKP’s election, in only four and a half years, Turkey’s political landscape 
changed completely with the reforms implemented that saw the limiting of the use of death 
penalty and granting further rights to religious minorities (Dismorr, 64). The EU 
complimented the progress done after the 1999 Helsinki Council, but it did not view the 
progress as enough. The thirty-seven constitutional amendments passed in 2001 brought 
significant change to Turkish system, but they were not fully satisfying to the EU (Dismorr, 
55). The Turkish government limited the use of capital punishment, but it did not abolish 
it even though the EU rules clearly demanded its prohibition (Dismorr, 55) Turkey made 
significant improvements on the rights of religious minorities as well as the 2002 reform 
of the National Security Council which saw the decrease in the number of military officials 
and an increase of the number of civilian officials (Dismorr, 55, 59). Despite hopes, the 
2002 Copenhagen summit did not provide concrete conclusions for Turkey, however, the 
French-German proposal at the Council stated clearly that the decision on the date would 
be made in 2004 and that the negotiations should start a year after that (i.e. 2005) (Dismorr, 
59). This disappointed Turkish officials, but it also encouraged them as it signaled stronger 
EU involvement and support in the process. The Copenhagen decision also alluded to the 
fact that the reform process is long and difficult, and that deeper reforms had to be enacted 
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in order to advance to a new stage of integration. The government did not hesitate a moment 
and pushed for further reforms on the way, with Erdogan declaring that if the EU did not 
give Turkey a start date for negotiations, Turkey would move forwards with reforms even 
if that meant renaming them “Ankara criteria” (Dismorr, 91). Erdogan’s enthusiasm was 
not for naught, for many important public issues were brought to spotlight. The Kurdish 
issue was very important and the broadcasting on Kurdish and other minority languages in 
2004 created positive impact in the EU thus confirming Erdogan’s reformist appeal 
(Dismorr, 62). The arrival of AKP on the political scene also marked a Turkish policy shift 
on Cyprus. Erdogan, upon assuming the office, stated that:” No solution on Cyprus is no 
solution!” thus indicating a more active Turkish involvement with the issue (Dismorr, 62). 
This led to massive Turkish Cypriot support for the 2004 Kofi Annan Plan on the 
reunification of Cyprus (Dismorr, 62). Unfortunately, all hopes on the reunification were 
quenched when Greek Cypriot voters rejected the peace plan on a referendum thus halting 
the process (Dismorr, 62). Regardless, Erdogan’s energetic and constructive role in the 
early years of his incumbent was noted by the EU.   
In the lead-up to the October 2005 accession negotiations, we also must consider 
the political shift that were happening in Europe. During 2005, both France and 
Netherlands rejected the proposed EU Constitution in referenda. The EU Constitution was 
an unsigned treaty aiming to unify the legal basis of the EU. In that vein, the proposed EU 
Constitution would replace all the treaties (such as the Treaty on European Union from 
1993) and create a single text that would be EU’s Constitution. Although the issue would 
be somewhat resolved in 2007 with the signing of the Lisbon Treaty (in effect from 2009), 
in 2005 this started a kind of existential crisis within the EU. Without a clear path forwards, 
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the EU lost vigor and strength to push Turkey to enact more reforms to advance further in 
the integration process. In addition to that, unlike 1997/8, when people like Tony Blair, 
Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder led the three strongest EU countries, 2005 saw a 
political shift in two of them. Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy won elections thus 
becoming the Chancellor and the President of Germany and France, respectively. Both 
politicians opposed Turkish membership in the EU, with Angela Merkel proposing a kind 
of “privileged partnership” that would create a special association of EU with Turkey but 
without full membership (Dismorr, 65/66).  
By 2005, the reforms in Turkey were stalling and EU was growing increasingly 
frustrated with this. For example, PM Erdogan’s proposal for the ban of adultery in 2004 
sent shockwaves across Europe (Dismorr, 90). Banning adultery unveiled a deeper 
religious orientation cultivated by the pro-EU reformer. This will prove to be of crucial 
importance for the integration process later. The accession negotiations, however, 
continued as arranged; they commenced on October 3rd, 2005. Since then, the relationship 
in itself has become more normative but, paradoxically, even more unstable. Turkey has to 
satisfy the most rigorous accession criteria of all the former and current candidate members 
(Dismorr, 66). Turkey’s accession to the EU does not only rest on its compliance to the 
Copenhagen criteria, it is also contingent on Turkey’s human rights performance (Dismorr, 
66). EU warned Turkey that in the case that its human rights situation worsened, the EU 
would freeze the negotiations immediately (Dismorr, 66). This only testifies to the level of 
scrutiny Turkey must undertake in order to become a member of the EU. Today, with only 
14 out of 33 negotiation chapters opened in 11 years since negotiations started, Turkey 
remains the slowest-progressing candidate ever (Commission Report 2015, 86). This 
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further testifies to the level of internal and external obstacles Turkey is facing during 
negotiations.  
There are plenty of reasons for why Turkey only opened 14 out of 33 negotiation 
chapters. One of them is the fact that some member-states, like France, froze negotiation 
chapters on account of their unwillingness to accept Turkey as a future member-state 
(Dismorr, 67). Cyprus issue, unsurprisingly, was the main reason for such a reaction. In 
2006 Turkey banned the free movement of Greek Cypriots on its own territory (Dismorr, 
67). Turkey refused to allow Greek Cypriots to enter Turkish airports and ports thus 
directly violating terms and conditions of the customs union (Dismorr, 67). This resulted 
in Council freezing eight negotiation chapters permanently (Dismorr, 67). Apart from the 
blockade, an additional issue which bothered EU was harsh Turkish reaction to public 
recognition Armenian genocide. The prosecution of Orhan Pamuk, Turkey’s first Nobel 
Prize winner, and murder of Hrant Dink, a journalist-campaigner, for recognizing the issue 
of Armenian genocide, sparked worldwide outrage and seriously harmed Turkey’s 
reputation (Dismorr, 103).  
Turkey-EU relations since 2007 AKP multiparty elections victory have been rather 
unstable. With most of the chapters blocked by member-states until 2014, Turkey’s ability 
to progress in negotiations is seriously limited. Furthermore, the complicated situation 
arising from the government’s response to 2013 Gezi park protests, the Refugee Swap Deal 
and the coup attempt of 2016 has put the relations on an unofficial hold. The distancing 
between Turkey and EU is obvious. When addressing the AKP Congress in 2012, the then-
PM Erdoğan did not include EU membership in his Turkey 2023 vision speech (Tocci, 4). 
This bodes well for many European politicians who hope that Turkey will quit the 
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negotiation process and accept the “privileged partnership” offer, but it does not bode well 
for all of those who see Turkish strategic importance for the EU. In 2014, Erdoğan became 
the President and in 2015 AKP won the multiparty elections thus signifying Turkish 
support for his politics. The AKP has become largely overshadowed by Erdoğan whose 
increasingly authoritarian and religious-oriented style of leading is diminishing all the 
reforms his party, and government, undertook in the early 2000s. From an early reformist, 
under the guise of stability of the state, Erdoğan became a more authoritarian ruler. This 
only made EU and Turkey grow more apart. In addition to that, Erdogan’s more public use 
of religion is scrutinized heavily in Europe. There is a strong political camp in the EU 
which does not see Turkey as a viable candidate due to its location, culture and religion, 
and it is growing stronger because of Erdogan’s public appearance (this will be discussed 
in later chapters- see “Refugee Crisis: The New Frontier?”).  
 However, even though they’ve grown distanced in recent years, both EU and 
Turkey are aware that they strategically need each other. The Refugee Swap Deal of March 
7th, 2016, demonstrates this strategic need. The refugee crisis in Europe is causing a 
nationalist and populist backlash threatening the European order and its liberal democratic 
institutionalism. With people, such as Geert Wilders from Netherlands (leader of the PVV 
Party) and the UKIP party members in Britain on the rise, Europe’s own human rights 
credo is under threat. The refugee crisis moved EU to rethink its asylum policy as well as 
its cooperation with gateway countries such as Turkey, but it also challenged traditional 
European political establishment. Under the refugee swap deal, Turkey would receive 6 
billion Euros in installments from the EU to manage the crisis internally (Toaldo, 2016). 
Furthermore, the agreement stipulated the “one in, one out” principle by which every 
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irregular migrant crossing from Turkey into EU (mainly Greece) would be repatriated by 
using EU’s funds, while Europe would, in exchange for that one, resettle one refugee from 
Turkey to EU (Toaldo, 2016). In addition to that, the EU guaranteed Turkey visa free travel 
regime in exchange for Turkey’s reform of its anti-terrorist law (Toaldo, 2016). However, 
due to the terrorist threat in Turkey, and the recent coup attempt, Turkish government is 
refusing to reduce the scope of the anti-terror laws (Aljazeera English, 2016). Namely, 
Turkey’s anti-terrorism law is much stricter and broader than EU’s and as such it impinges 
on certain human protected by the EU laws. For example, during the immediate aftermath 
of the attempted coup, Turkey arrested and imprisoned more than 35,000 people (the full 
extent of arrests is yet fully unknown as the situation is developing). Under the provision 
of Turkish anti-terrorism law, the state can imprison anyone deemed highly critical of its 
policies; targets usually being journalists or academics (Gotev, 2016). Turkey’s 
uncompromising attitude over the visa-free traveling is putting the refugee swap deal into 
question and is harming EU-Turkey relations daily; President Erdogan said in May that 
Turkey will not change its anti-terror laws for visas and that, if EU keeps on insisting on 
the change, both EU and Turkey can go their own way (Gotev, 2016). In the context of 
EU-Turkey relationship, this statement may prove to be prescient. More on Turkey’s and 
EU’s current state of play can be found in the next chapter titled “Current Situation”.  
Chapter 2. Current Situation 
1. Recent Developments 
A complex and explosive mixture of misunderstandings, bad blood and unrecognized 
but shared interests has brought EU-Turkey relationship to a critical juncture 
(Aydɪntaʂbaʂ  Leonard and Tcherneva, 2016).  
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 This chapter will focus on the immediate, and largely unexpected, turn in the 
relationship between EU and Turkey during 2016. For quite some time now, Turkey and 
the EU have not been communicating well. Despite the plethora of mutual interests, it 
seems that both sides have developed a sense of each other, an intersubjective perception, 
which seriously hinders any kind of progress not only on the accession negotiations, but 
also in general cooperation on issues like Syria and IS. Whereas Turkey is trying to carve 
out a new, leadership, role in the Middle East for itself, the EU is trying to show itself as a 
strong ally in the war against IS, but also as a helper, a donator, and a factor of stability in 
the turbulent Middle East and its neighborhood. This, among other developments, has 
caused great frustration in Brussels with Ankara, and vice versa. The year 2016 brought 
three new significant developments that are impacting the relationship quite negatively: the 
slow implementation of provisions of the Refugee Swap Deal, the attempted coup in 
Turkey and its aftermath, and the rapidly changing situation in the Middle East, particularly 
Turkish involvement in containing Kurds in northern Iraq which goes against the West’s5 
strategy. For the purposes of this chapter, I will focus on the refugee crisis and the post-
attempted coup, because they have a direct relationship to the accession negotiations. 
i. The Refugee Swap Deal 
 In the previous chapter (Chapter 1, “History”), I have briefly outlined the refugee 
swap deal signed in March 2016. The deal itself was negotiated by the Chancellor of 
Germany Angela Merkel and her Turkish counterparts (the then-PM Davutoğlu and, 
unavoidably, President Erdoğan). It signals a new turn in the relationship where both the 
EU and Turkey become more reliant on each other due to strategic interests (such as solving 
                                                 
5 By the West in this context I mean the allied forces the US, EU and NATO 
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the refugee crisis). Furthermore, this deal signaled that Turkey is increasingly cooperating 
more with individual member states than with Brussels (the “capital” of the EU). The 
impasse of EU and Turkey after the signing of the deal further increased the divide between 
Ankara and Brussels with President Erdoğan remarking that if the EU keeps on insisting 
on the change in Turkish anti-terrorism laws, in exchange for the visa free travel of Turks 
to EU, both sides can go their own ways (Gotev, 2016). Since March of 2016, the 
implementation of the deal stalled, but it did not stop. The European Commission factsheet 
states: 
So far, around 1, 614 Syrian refugees have been resettled from Turkey to 
Europe and around 578 irregular migrants have been returned from Greece 
to Turkey, in full respect of EU and international law (European 
Commission, 2016).  
This is viewed as a disappointment given that the Commission forecasted 
relocations of more than 60,000 people (Toaldo, 2016). On the other hand, the deal was 
created under a lot of controversy between EU and Turkey on the visa free regime. As 
stated in Chapter 1, the benchmarks for the visa free travel set by the EU stipulate that 
Turkey must change its anti-terrorism laws in order for the visa free regimen to be 
activated. This, per Turkish officials, is unacceptable due to the situation Turkey is in, 
especially given the state of emergency introduced in July which has been extended from 
three to six months- that is, from July, 2016 until January, 2017 (Peker, 2016). It is both in 
the interest of Europe and Turkey that Turkish nationals get a visa free travel, but the crisis 
around the whole visa free regimen stymies the whole integration and cooperation process 
for not much gain. Only about 5 percent of Turkish nationals hold a biometric passport 
required for visa free travel to the EU, and it seems that the number of holders of biometric 
passports will not extend rapidly in the future (Aydɪntaʂbaʂ, Leonard, and Tcherneva, 
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2016). Indeed, 5 percent out of approximately 80 million people is a significant number, 
but it still seems unsuitable that for the past six months, the visa free regimen has become 
one of the main stumbling rocks of the relationship and progress. This testifies to the 
fragility of the relationship. 
ii. The Aftermath of the Attempted Coup 
 Another issue which impacted the relations greatly is the attempted coup of July 
2016 and its aftermath. On July 15th, 2016, the segment of Turkish military, allegedly under 
the control of controversial Turkish Islamic cleric Fetullah Gülen, the leader of the Gülen 
(Hizmet) movement, attempted to overthrow the Turkish government. The President, 
Erdoğan, was not in Ankara or Istanbul, he was in a Turkish resort of Marmara on vacation 
when the attempted coup happened (Srivastava, Guler, Solomon, and Pitel, 2016). The 
non-presence of the President did not weaken the immediate governmental response to the 
coup attempt. The coup plotters aimed at either imprisoning or kidnapping the President, 
however, they failed with Erdoğan barely flying from Marmara into Istanbul (Srivastava, 
Guler, Solomon, and Pitel, 2016). Before flying to Istanbul, the President managed to 
contact Turkish media via FaceTime and call on the people to take the defense of Turkish 
democracy to streets (Arango and Yeginsu, 2016). The rest is history.  
Today, the Turkish government maintains a firm grasp on political power in 
Turkey. The impressive way it mobilized the Turkish people in its support awoke further 
Turkish nationalism and support for the AKP government. During the time of the coup, 
even the opposition parties (CHP and MHP) supported the government with their leaders 
meeting the President and denouncing the coup (Aydɪntaʂbaʂ, Leonard, and Tcherneva, 
2016). The EU reacted lukewarmly and belatedly; no high EU official visited Ankara and 
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it took EU one day to even address the alleged conspiracy and the failed coup (Aydɪntaʂbaʂ, 
Leonard, and Tcherneva, 2016). The Turkish government and the AKP leadership 
interpreted this slow and lukewarm reaction as support for the plotters (Aydɪntaʂbaʂ, 
Leonard, and Tcherneva, 2016). This further deteriorated the relationship. Turkish 
government began the swift resistance against the coup plotters. It blamed the controversial 
cleric for infiltrating the Turkish system (judiciary, military, government, bureaucracy) in 
order to create a “parallel state” with which he would then try to crush the existing Turkish 
political system and bring himself to power (Aydɪntaʂbaʂ, Leonard, and Tcherneva, 2016). 
The way the government prosecuted people it branded Gülenists sent shockwaves around 
the world. The counter-coup purge lasted intensively for about a month, but continues up 
to date; more than 100,000 people have been detained or fired, many media outlets closed 
and companies confiscated (Aydɪntaʂbaʂ, Leonard, and Tcherneva, 2016). Many people 
who even dared to criticize the governing regime6 were arrested or interrogated; this is 
where Turkish anti-terror laws come into play for they define terrorism quite broadly as 
discussed in Chapter 1.  
 Euro-Turkish relationship after the coup has been on the verge of a breakdown. At 
one point, Preisdent Erdoğan indicated that he would support the reintroduction of the 
penalty as a form of punishment for the coup plotters were Turkish National Assembly to 
vote affirmatively on it (BBC, 2016). The European Commission threatened that if Turkey 
legalized death penalty as a mechanism for punishment of coup-plotters, the Commission 
would immediately suspend all accession negotiations (BBC, 2016). Luckily, this did not 
happen, but the relationship remained quite strained regardless. Turkish foreign policy after 
                                                 
6 I use the word regime advisedly to describe a governing system, not a particular authoritative government. 
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the coup has taken up a new direction, argue Leonard, Aydɪntaʂbaʂ and Tcherneva. This 
direction focuses solely on containing and cracking down on the network of Gülenists in 
Turkey and around the world (Aydɪntaʂbaʂ, Leonard, and Tcherneva, 2016).  
The EU integration process is no longer the most important thing in Turkey’s 
foreign policy. On the other hand, it seems like Turkish integration is no longer on the list 
of priorities for the EU as well.  The EU did not respond vociferously against the coup 
plotters, probably because of great mistrust it has in current Turkish regime and its 
allegations against “FETO” (the Gülenist movement). This caused great diplomatic 
backlash from Turkey which moved towards resuming its relations with Russia in order to 
gain more support. Russian-Turkish relations have been strained in the past year due to 
Turkish shooting down of a Russian warplane on its border  in November 2015 
(Aydɪntaʂbaʂ, Leonard, and Tcherneva, 2016). President Erdoğan officially apologized to 
President Putin in the aftermath of the coup and Turco-Russian relations entered a period 
of a detente. Turkish and Russian thaw definitely did not sit well with EU officials who 
tend to view it as further evidence of Erdoğan’s increasingly authoritarian style of ruling. 
This makes EU distance itself even more from Turkey.  
The misjudgment of EU towards Turkey and vice versa is caused not only by 
geopolitical and internal factors. Turkey tends to misjudge European Union in three crucial 
ways. First, Turkey seems to misunderstand that internal processes of the EU have to be 
regulated by the principle of intergovernmental cooperation where all 28 members must 
agree on proposed legislation (Aydɪntaʂbaʂ, Leonard, and Tcherneva, 2016). Second, 
Turkey seems to view the international system, particularly its surrounding, through a 
prism of power-politics, something argued in subsequent chapters (Aydɪntaʂbaʂ, Leonard, 
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and Tcherneva, 2016). It increasingly perceives itself as a powerhouse and takes aggressive 
stances, personified in President Erdogan’s public speeches, to achieve its interests. 
Thirdly, Turkey appears to misunderstand EU’s normativism, particularly when it comes 
to the visa free regime negotiations (Aydɪntaʂbaʂ, Leonard, and Tcherneva, 2016). This in 
particular causes frustration on the part of Turkey with the EU, but it also causes greater 
mistrust the EU has in Turkish foreign policy. If Turkey cannot follow EU’s benchmarks, 
then it cannot expect the visa free regime to function. On the other hand, the EU has to be 
aware that the Turkish integration process has become a great frustration for Turkey 
because of its duration (more than 50 years now). The EU must be aware that Turkey is a 
powerful state with significant soft power influence in the region and cannot be treated 
solely like a candidate nation but also like a strategic partner. Turkey must accomplish the 
EU norms in order to advance further to EU, but EU must also be more cooperative and 
unified in its positioning towards Turkey. 
 Finally, the current situation in Turkey is highly unstable. Even though both 
partners have a strategic interest in cooperating with each other, general frustration and 
misperception of each other’s goals seems to have further damaged any kind of 
diplomatic/political process. The accession negotiations are essentially stalled but not 
officially stopped which gives hope for their revitalization.  
2. The EU Commission Report 2016 
The EU Commission Report is a tool allowing the EU to assess the state of play 
between EU and Turkey, and provide guidelines for all potential candidate and candidate 
countries. It is a part of the annual Communication on Enlargement which presents an 
overview in one of the most crucial aspects of the EU’s politics; the enlargement process. 
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Although seemingly technical, the report is of crucial value not only for the EU to know 
what is the state of play when it comes to perspective member states but also for the 
perspective member states to understand their position in the whole process.  
In Turkey, the report has had great significance not only politically, but also 
socially, on its path towards the EU. As the relationship between the EU and Turkey has 
two sides: a normative one (the accession process) and the constructive one (Turkey’s 
alignment with the West), the Commission report is an important element for assessing 
both parts because it tackles normative and constructive prospects of the relationship. The 
first such report for Turkey was created in 2000, the year after Turkey was accepted as a 
candidate state during the Helsinki Council, and the latest one was created in November of 
2016. However, before proceeding on analyzing what the conclusions from the 2016 
Report tell us about the relationship between Turkey and the EU, it is necessary to ponder 
on the role the report has had in forming the relationship during the past years.  
The dynamic of Turkey-EU relations has always been uncertain at best, so the 
Commission report has often had positive or negative impacts on it. Anne Dismorr writes 
that after the first commission had been published in 2000, the report and the association 
have become a sort of a national obsession in Turkey (Dismorr, 56). Although the relevance 
of the report itself faded throughout the years as the relationship stagnated progressively- 
in the period between 2000 and 2005- the report was one of the most wanted documents 
by the Turkish press, and by Turkish population (Dismorr, 56/7). Today, the Commission 
report is largely ignored in Turkey, especially after the European Parliament’s legally non-
binding decision to break off the accession negotiations (Aydɪntaʂbaʂ, Leonard, and 
Tcherneva, 2016).  
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The Commission report is a (de)constructive element in the relationship which 
juxtaposes two sides against each other; it reviews what is needed to continue the accession 
process, and it refers to the problems in the relationship. In this sense, the Commission 
report is of great help for two reasons: it helps us grasp the state of play in the relationship 
and it confirms the extent to which the relationship between Turkey and the EU is 
normatively constructed. As this thesis intends on analyzing the relationship from a 
constructivist approach, the report is crucial to understanding the nature of interaction 
between Turkey and the EU, for it allows us to measure Turkish reaction and to see EU’s 
expectations. In order to concisely analyze and present the report which spans more than 
ninety pages, this sub-chapter will focus on a part of the report called “Political Criteria 
and Enhanced Political Dialogue” which assesses the internal political processes and 
development of rule of law and democracy in Turkey.  
 There are three main conclusions in the 2016 Commission report on Turkey. The 
first one is related to report’s analysis of the situation in Turkey post-coup. The report not 
only condemns the coup, but also makes it clear that there are norms and standards Turkey 
needs to uphold in the aftermath of the coup as a candidate member and as a democratic 
country. The report constantly refers to the situation in Turkey after the attempted coup 
which is very interesting since EU has had a very lukewarm reaction to the coup itself (i.e. 
no high-ranking EU officials visited Turkey immediately in the aftermath of the attempted 
coup). Second conclusion is that the relationship between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey is 
still strongly observed by the EU. It is EU’s interest not to implicate Turkey directly in the 
matters of its member states, but it is also in its interest to let Turkey know that its position 
on issues related to Cyprus is important for the relationship as well as EU’s stability. The 
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third, and final, conclusion of this section is that the parliamentary system in Turkey is 
backsliding and that there has been a significant slowdown of parliamentary activity in the 
past year, especially after the coup.  
 The first conclusion of the “Political Criteria” section of the report is outlined as 
follows: 
Following the attempted coup, very extensive suspensions, dismissals and 
arrests took place over alleged links to the Gülen movement and 
involvement in the attempted coup. There were reports of serious human 
rights violations, including alleged widespread ill-treatment and torture of 
detainees. The crackdown has continued since and has been broadened to 
pro-Kurdish and other opposition voices. The measures affected the whole 
spectrum of society, with a particular impact on the judiciary, police, 
gendarmerie, military, civil service, local authorities, academia, teachers, 
lawyers, the media and the business community. Overall, as of the end of 
September 2016, some 40 000 people had been detained and more than 31 
000 remain under arrest, including 81 journalists. 129 000 public employees 
remain either suspended (66 000) or have been dismissed (63 000). Over 4 
000 institutions and private companies were shut down, their assets seized 
or transferred to public institutions. Additional 10 000 civil servants were 
dismissed by decrees under the state of emergency at the end of October 
and further media outlets closed and journalists detained.  Turkey also 
reached out to a number EU Member States concerning, for example the 
closing of schools and other institutions allegedly linked to the Gülen 
movement. In this context, there are reports of members of the Turkish 
diaspora living in these Member States being under pressure to report on 
other members of these communities (Commission Report 2016, 9).  
Although the EU is strongly condemned the coup in the report, the tone of analysis 
of the situation post-festum is wary and watchful. The analysis of situation is, however, not 
only directed at the government’s interference across different levels of government, which 
goes against the constitutional separation of powers, but also at the stability of democracy 
in Turkey in the context of President’s amassment of power. Through very diplomatic and 
seemingly disinterested tone, the EU report criticizes the government for reprimanding 
Kurdish parliamentarians in November. This is seen as a crucial aspect of Turkish 
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government’s emphatic breakdown on Kurdish office holders in Turkey and a crucial 
aspect of abrogation of the rule of law in the wider political context: 
The adoption in May of a law allowing the immunity of a large number of 
deputies to be lifted and the ensuing detentions and arrests of several HDP 
Members of Parliament, including the two Co-Chairs, in November is a 
matter of grave concern. (Commission Report 2016, 5).   
Not long after HDP’s representatives in the Turkish National Assembly were 
arrested, the EU Parliament promulgated a groundbreaking, although legally non-binding, 
resolution to halt accession negotiations with Turkey thus sending strong signals to Turkish 
government (Aljazeera English, 2016).7  
 Second conclusion of the report which is important for our analysis refers to 
Cyprus, Greece and Turkey relations. Cyprus, as mentioned in “Introduction” (See Chapter 
“History”, section two), is an important part of Turkish foreign policy and national security 
not only because of its strategic location but also because of position of Turks outside of 
Turkey and Turkish relations with its neighbor, Greece. The report sends a strong message 
to Turkey to respect international law and agreements it signed, but also warns Turkey of 
its volatility towards Cyprus: 
 Turkey continued to express support for the talks on a comprehensive 
settlement between the leaders of the two communities, and for the efforts 
of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Adviser. However, in March and 
August Turkey made statements challenging the right of the Republic of 
Cyprus to exploit hydrocarbon resources in the Cyprus Exclusive Economic 
Zone for the benefit of all Cypriots. The EU has repeatedly stressed the 
sovereign rights of EU Member States, which include inter alia entering 
bilateral agreements and exploring and exploiting their natural resources in 
accordance with the EU acquis and international law, including the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea. The EU has also stressed the need to 
respect the sovereignty of Member States over their territorial sea and 
airspace (Commission Report 2016, 30).  
                                                 
7 Tascier, I. Turkey Detains HDP Leaders Demirtas and Yuksekdag, Aljazeera.com  
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/11/turkey-detains-hdp-leaders-demirtas-yuksekdag-
161104042853124.html, Accessed: December 27th, 2016 
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As we can see, EU’s policy on Cyprus is unchanged and is crucially supportive of 
Cyprus’ sovereignty over its entire territory. To Turkey, the idea of taksim (division), is 
still on the table because it sees Cypriot Turks as its national responsibility. In the same 
sense, Greece has a very strong influence on Greek Cypriot politicians and has used that 
political leverage many times during the unification negotiations (i.e. the Cyprus 
referendum on the Annan Plan in 2004- see chapters “History”, section 2 and “Cyprus: 
Identity, Security, and the EU-Turkey Relationship”). On the other hand, a quick and 
sustainable solution to the Cyprus issue is very important for Turkey’s accession to EU 
because it would ensure Greek and Cypriot support in the Council (or, at least, it would 
ameliorate their opposition) which is crucial for opening accession negotiations on eight 
chapters closed provisionally in December of 2006 due to bilateral relations between 
Cyprus and Turkey (Commission Report 2016, 7). Therefore, even though Turkish 
accession to EU is a complicated process in its own right, Turkish relations with Greece 
and Cyprus add another complex dimension to the whole process of accession negotiations 
as well as the EU-Turkey relationship (see “Cyprus: Identity, Security, and the EU-Turkey 
Relationship”). 
 The final conclusion of the report relevant for this analysis is that the Turkish 
National Assembly is not working properly, and that the parliamentary procedures, as 
outlined in the Constitution, are being hastened or stalled according to the needs of the 
ruling garniture. Such an assessment by the EU Commission speaks volumes of the 
visibility of the process of the disintegration of the rule of law in Turkey, under the 
leadership of AKP: 
 There was no progress in aligning the legal framework on elections and 
political parties with European standards. The 10 % threshold for parties to 
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be represented in Parliament is still in place. There were no further 
improvements to the rules on the closure of political parties following the 
2010 constitutional amendments. Funding for political parties and election 
campaigns remains to be addressed in line with the recommendations of the 
Council of Europe's Group of States against Corruption (GRECO). 
Following the general elections in November 2015, four parties obtained a 
representation in parliament. 82 women members were elected in the 550-
seat Parliament. A law aiming at comprehensive ethical regulations for 
members of Parliament, such as declarations of assets and rules on conflict 
of interest, has yet to be adopted (Commission Report 2016, 10).  
 Furthermore, the report states that corruption in Turkish political system is 
prevalent and that, when it comes to the members of the parliament, the parliamentary 
immunity is not being repealed for corruption accusations but rather for other issues 
deemed more important by the ruling garniture (such as the removal of immunity for 
HDP’s parliamentarians): 
 Parliament’s ability to perform its key functions of law-making and 
oversight of the executive continued until 15 July to be affected by political 
confrontation. Legislation was often prepared and adopted without 
sufficient debate in Parliament and without consultation with stakeholders. 
Following the declaration of the state of emergency and its extension, 
Parliament's role in the law-making process was limited. The influence of 
the Committees on Human Rights Inquiry and on EU Harmonisation 
remained limited even on draft laws with a significant impact on 
fundamental freedoms. There was no progress on reforming parliamentary 
rules and procedures. Media accreditation and the rules for inviting 
stakeholders to committee meetings continue to be applied selectively 
(Commission Report 2016, 11/12).  
 The 2016 EU Commission Report did not make noticeable impact in the EU-
Turkey relationship this year. In fact, it was received lukewarmly and was not given much 
attention (and, therefore, importance) in the public. This is because EU and Turkey are 
probably in the most precarious moment in their entire relationship. Europeans didn’t give 
much attention to the report because it did not surprise them and Turks because they are 
giving less and less importance to the EU matters and are turning their political focus on 
Syria, Russia, and the US. The accession negotiations have been replaced fully in the 
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discourse by high politics (the Refugee Crisis, ISIS, Russia and Syria) and are mentioned 
often as a nuisance, a process that has been weighing down on both Turkey and the EU. 
Turkish President Erdoğan is keen on reminding Europe that he has other options but EU 
integration and EU is keen to stress to Turkey’s officials that they don’t feel threatened by 
Erdoğan’s rhetoric and continue with the “business-as-usual” approach to bilateral 
relations. However, this incongruous public rhetoric is a manifestation of various problems 
in the relationship- when two approaches to EU integration are so divergent, a process, 
which is in itself social, stalls. In the case of EU and Turkey, the process is almost dead, 
even though both sides are aware of its strategic relevance.  
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Chapter 3. Constructivism and IR: EU-Turkey Relationship is What Agents Make of It 
1.  Constructivism: Overview, Methodology, and Implications for the EU-Turkey 
Relationship 
i. The Main Tenets of Constructivism 
Constructivism is a theoretical approach within the discipline of International Relations 
Theory (hereafter referred to as IRT). Constructivism, argues Ted Hopf, explains a number 
central themes in IRT such as the meaning of anarchy, balance of power, elaboration of 
power, and the prospects for change in international politics (Hopf, 102). Constructivism 
focuses on the role of ideas, norms, knowledge, culture, and argument in politics while 
stressing the role of collectively held (intersubjective) ideas and understandings of social 
life (Finnemore and Sikkink, 392). Therefore, constructivism is a view: “that the manner 
in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends 
on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world.” (Adler, 322)  
This subchapter aims at explaining the development of constructivism, accounting for 
its main tenets, and positioning it with regards to the research question of this thesis. 
Furthermore, we will contrast constructivism with leading rationalist theories such as neo-
realism and neo-liberalism in order to establish the conceptual difference between these 
theoretical approaches. 
Christian Reus-Smit identifies four main factors that have caused the emergence of 
constructivism in IRT: 
First, motivated by an attempt to reassert the pre-eminence of their own 
conceptions of theory and world politics, leading rationalists challenged 
critical theorists to move beyond theoretical critique to the substantive 
analysis of international relations. While prominent critical theorists 
condemned the motives behind this challenge, constructivists saw it as an 
opportunity to demonstrate the heuristic power of non-rationalist 
perspectives. Second, the end of the Cold War undermined the explanatory 
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pretensions of neo-realists and neo-liberals, neither of which had predicted, 
nor could adequately comprehend, the systemic transformations reshaping 
the global order. It also undermined the critical theorists’ assumption that 
theory drove practice in any narrow or direct fashion, as global politics 
increasingly demonstrated dynamics that contradicted realist expectations 
and prescriptions. The end of the Cold War thus opened a space for 
alternative explanatory perspectives and prompted critically inclined 
scholars to move away from a narrowly defined meta-theoretical critique. 
Third, by the beginning of the 1990s a new generation of young scholars 
had emerged who embraced many of the propositions of critical 
international theory, but who saw potential for innovation in conceptual 
elaboration and empirically informed theoretical development. Not only 
had the end of the Cold War thrown up new and interesting questions about 
world politics (such as the dynamics of international change, the nature of 
basic institutional practices, the role of non-state agency and the problem of 
human rights), the rationalist failure to explain recent systemic 
transformations encouraged this new generation of scholars to revisit old 
questions and issues so long viewed through neo-realist and neo-liberal 
lenses (including the control of WMD, the role and nature of strategic 
culture and the implications of anarchy). Finally, the advance of the new 
constructivist perspective was aided by the enthusiasm that mainstream 
scholars, frustrated by the analytical failings of the dominant rationalist 
theories, showed in embracing the new perspective, moving it from the 
margins to the mainstream of theoretical debate (Reus-Smit, 196). 
At the outset of this quote, Reus-Smit identifies the division between the “leading 
rationalists” and “critical theorists”. The academic divide between the rationalist and 
interpretivists, or reflectivists, (postmodernists, critical theorists, poststructuralists, and 
feminists) was the most important struggle within International Relations Theory before 
the emergence of constructivism. However, the rationalists (that is, adherents to rational-
choice theories such as neo-realism and neo-liberalism) initially took precedence in 
academic work because their theories seemed to account best for behavior of states in an 
international system. When constructivism emerged, the initial conceptual fog around it 
made it hard to discern from interpretive theories. Adler states that: 
The reliance of constructivist International Relations Theory on interpretive 
social theory and vocabulary; the mistaken belief that constructivism, 
poststructuralism and postmodernism are all varieties of the same 
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‘reflectivist’ approach; the relative scarcity of early constructivist empirical 
research; and, most important, the debates within constructivism itself as to 
‘what constructivism is really about’- all these have tended to obscure 
constructivism’s scientific basis, its preference for ontology and 
epistemology over methodology, and its potential contribution to a better 
understanding of International Relations (Adler, 320). 
In that vein, constructivism was conflated with other interpretivist/reflectivist 
approaches in IRT. However, with time, it emerged to be one of the leading IR theories. 
We established earlier that constructivism relies on ideas, norms, knowledge, and ontology 
in order to contribute to International Relations. Because of its focus on ontological and 
epistemological categories in International Relations, constructivism is also referred to as 
“idealism” by academics. Therefore, constructivism’s conception of IR as a social science 
is essentially as ‘social’ rather than ‘natural’ (Adler, 320). Here lies the main distinction 
between constructivism and rational choice theories. Rational-choice theories focus on 
analyzing the IR through the lens of positivist, natural-scientific research. They assume 
that actors’ (individuals or states) interests in a system are exogenously determined 
meaning that they are pre-social in that they already have a formed set of preferences before 
meeting each other (Reus-Smit, 197). Therefore, in rationalist terms, society is shaped by 
material preferences and operates in a strategic domain (Reus-Smit, 197). The concept of 
strategic domain implies that, apart from being pre-social, actor’s nature, interests, and 
preferences are not altered in a society they live in (be it national or international) because 
they already have their interests embedded in them (Reus-Smit, 197). 
In contrast to rationalists, constructivists argue that society constantly shapes actor’s 
interests, identities, ideas, and preferences in a process of mutual constitution of 
knowledge. That is, because actors in a system are of social nature, their preferences are 
constituted within that social domain. Adler concludes that: 
60 
 
Constructivists believe that International Relations consist primarily of 
social facts, which are facts only by human agreement. At the same time, 
constructivists are ‘ontological realists’; they believe not only in the 
existence of the material world, but also that ‘this material world offers 
resistance when we act upon it’ (Adler, 323). 
What Adler infers here is that while upholding social reality as crucial for 
understanding preference and behavior-formation, constructivist argue that material things 
also help shape actors’ preferences and behaviors. Even though we have social facts, agreed 
upon by humans, material things matter in that they help form our preferences by resisting 
our socially constructed world. Rationalists do not acknowledge this. Therefore, 
constructivism offers itself as an approach that is not analyzing international politics per 
se (that is, it is not a theory of international politics only) but is trying to understand how 
society informs and influences the formation of international politics (Adler, 323). 
In an earlier quote by Reus-Smit, we have acknowledged that the Cold War and its end 
was crucial for formation and establishment of constructivism. With that in mind, the slow 
thawing of the Cold War starting in 1970s and its end with the disintegration of USSR, 
stimulated alternative ways for explaining International Relations. Because the failure of 
the Cold War came so abruptly, many critics established that dominant IR theories during 
Cold War, such as neo-realism, could not account well enough for changes within 
International Relations (Fierke, 178). The static material assumptions about International 
Relations were challenged and those that centered around social dimension of international 
politics started gaining foothold in academia (Fierke, 178).  
The static material assumptions about International Relations in neo-realism are as 
follows: the ordering principle of International Relations is anarchy meaning that there is 
no overarching body that moderates state behavior (Mearsheimer, 79). Because we live in 
anarchy, preferences of states are formed by its structure- that is, they are exogenously 
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given (Mearsheimer, 79). In that sense, because states live under anarchy, their behavior 
will be constrained, and stimulated, by its structure. Therefore, the main assumption of 
realist theories is that: “International structure emerges from the interaction of states and 
then constrains them from taking certain actions while propelling them towards others” 
(Donnelly, 35). Consequently, because states live in a self-help system, a logic of 
consequences models their behaviors. Logic of consequences is a principle which states 
that a rational act is one that will produce an outcome that maximizes the interests of the 
individual unit (Fierke, 181). Because states live under a self-help system in which the 
logic of consequences operates, they wish to secure their survival by amassing power for 
the sake of security (Mearsheimer, 79). States are, in a way, rational egoists able to create 
strategies for their survival while maintaining that their survival is dependent on the amount 
of power they can amass (Mearsheimer, 79-80). Finally, states form their preferences 
according to the principle of “relative gains” (Burchill, 65). This means that, because states 
under anarchy are rational-egoist actors, the only way for them to cooperate with other 
states is when they benefit more from that cooperation than other states do (Burchill, 65). 
In that sense, they will refuse to cooperate if they see that, relative to other states, they 
would not gain more from cooperation: 
Anarchic pressures towards balancing and against cooperation are 
reinforced by the relativity of power. Power is control over outcomes, ‘the 
ability to do or effect something’. It is less a matter of absolute capabilities 
– how much ‘stuff’ one has – than of relative capabilities. Facing an 
unarmed man, a tank is pretty powerful. The same tank facing a squadron 
of carrier-based attack jets is not very powerful at all. The relativity of 
power requires states to ‘be more concerned with relative strength than with 
absolute advantage’. Bandwagoning seeks absolute gains, aligning early 
with a rising power to gain a share of the profits of victory. Balancing 
pursues relative gains (Donnelly, 38). 
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As states are utility-maximizers, this means that all they see in cooperation is utility for 
themselves and benefit for themselves. Neo-realists, then, reject the idea of morality in 
International Relations. For them, the logic of consequences is the main reason for why 
morality is unable to develop, or for why it is so fragile.  
Although these principles are more prominent under structural realism (or neo-
realism), neo-liberal institutionalism accepts them as its main principles as well. However, 
because neo-liberalism rests on Lockean tradition of liberal thought, rather than on 
Hobbesian one, the prospect for cooperation under anarchy is stronger. Neo-liberalism 
espouses a view of actors as rational agents whose main goal is peace (Burchill, 58). 
Following the Kantian and Lockean logics, neo-liberals assume that the laws of nature 
dictate harmony and cooperation between peoples (Burchill, 58).  
Neo-liberals, therefore, focus on the spread of liberal-democratic values in 
international system for they believe that these values espouse the rule of law, establish 
universal morality, and create an international society thereby decreasing the probability 
for conflict and increasing probability for cooperation and trade (Burchill, 60). 
Development of trade relations and commerce would increase the chances of every state to 
prosper and would further decrease the probability of conflict (Burchill, 63). Unlike neo-
realists, neo-liberals are reasoning that rational actors will opt for cooperation under self-
help rather than balancing, or even self-sufficiency, by aiming to trade with other states 
(Burchill, 63). Commerce and trade, in their view, increase interactions between different 
actors and force them to understand each other better in order to improve cooperation: 
Liberals have always felt that unfettered commercial exchanges would 
encourage links across frontiers and shift loyalties away from the nation-
state. Leaders would eventually come to recognize that the benefits of free 
trade outweighed the costs of territorial conquest and colonial expansion. 
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The attraction of going to war to promote mercantilist interests would be 
weakened as societies learn that war can only disrupt trade and therefore the 
prospects for economic prosperity. Interdependence would replace national 
competition and defuse unilateral acts of aggression and reciprocal 
retaliation (Burchill, 63). 
Therefore, because states would trade and develop connections under anarchy, they 
would be capable of forming common preferences and interests that would guide their 
behavior. Driven by this logic, leading neo-liberals, such as Keohane and Nye, have posited 
that by creation of institutions under anarchy, the states could form rules and norms that 
would reduce the importance of self-interests and self-help, and increase the importance of 
an internationalization, cooperation, harmony, and peace: 
Accepting the broad structures of neo-realism, but employing rational 
choice and game theory to anticipate the behaviour of states, liberal 
institutionalists seek to demonstrate that cooperation between states can be 
enhanced even without the presence of a hegemonic player which can 
enforce compliance with agreements. For them, anarchy is mitigated by 
regimes and institutional cooperation which brings higher levels of 
regularity and predictability to international relations. Regimes constrain 
state behaviour by formalizing the expectations of each party to an 
agreement where there is a shared interest. Institutions then assume the role 
of encouraging cooperative habits, monitoring compliance and sanctioning 
defectors. Regimes also enhance trust, continuity, and stability in a world 
of ungoverned anarchy (Burchill, 63,64,65).  
Because neo-liberals posit that states behave in the way that they do, states are by nature 
interested in “absolute gains” (Burchill, 65). For neo-liberals, absolute gains mean that 
states will desire cooperation irrespective of how that cooperation benefits other states 
(what will gain me the most?) (Burchill, 65). They argue that international relations are not 
always a zero-sum game and that states can benefit from cooperation mutually without 
needing to focus on relative gains (Burchill, 65). In that sense, the development of trade 
connections focusing on mutual development, and creation of institutions will develop 
something called “economic interdependency”. States, argue neo-liberals, who operate 
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within economic interdependency will realize that a) they are dependent on other states for 
their benefit and b) war will be destructive for everyone in the system (Burchill, 66). Neo-
liberals believe, therefore, that by mutually upgrading each other’s capacities (which is a 
rational thing to do), states will create a sense of universalism and will be able to promote 
not only economic growth but also development of human rights and rule of law (Burchill, 
66).  
Constructivism is positioned as a “middle-ground” in the neo-neo debate (that is, a 
debate of neo-realism and neo-liberalism) (Adler, 323). This means that for constructivists, 
material interests and ideational structures (such as institutions) are not irrelevant, however, 
that they have a different conception of how those are formed. One of the fundamental 
tenets of constructivism is that the ordering principle of the international system (that is, 
anarchy) is what states make of it (Wendt, 436). It follows from there that self-help and 
power politics are institutions, not features, of anarchy (Wendt, 436). Therefore, unlike in 
neo-realism where anarchy hinders any kind of meaningful interaction amongst states, and 
neo-liberalism where cooperation and state behavior under anarchy are dependent on 
micro-economic modeling, constructivism posits that the mutual constitution of interests, 
identities, and ideas within an international system is a process of learning and adaptation 
which (in)forms, guides, and institutionalizes state preferences and behavior (Weber, 64). 
Unlike neo-realism and neo-liberalism which espouse a logic of consequences, states under 
constructivist theoretical approach apply logic of appropriateness. Logic of appropriateness 
states that what is rational is a function of legitimacy, defined by shared values and norms 
within institutions or other social structures rather than purely individual interests (Fierke, 
181). In that vein: 
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It means that even if we accept the (neo)realist description of the world as 
an anarchical, self-help world, by supplementing this anarchical structure 
with the intersubjectively constituted structure of identities and interests, 
then neither anarchy nor self-help are meaningful terms prior to the social 
interactions of states. Anarchy and self-help only become meaningful once 
social interactions have taken place. And, because ‘people act toward 
objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects 
have for them’, and because the objects of ‘anarchy’ and ‘self-help’ have 
no meaning prior to state interactions, we will only know if anarchy and 
self-help will lead to conﬂict or cooperation once we know what states do 
socially (Weber, 65). 
Constructivists argue that identities and interests are mutually constitutive in 
International Relations. Identities perform three essential functions in a society: they tell 
us and others who we and they are (Hopf, 103). Because identities inform us in that way, 
they strongly imply a set of interests with respect to choices of action in particular domains, 
and with respect to particular actors (Hopf, 103). While neo-realists and neo-liberals 
understand actors as pre-social entities-that is, entities that come with a set of preferences 
that may (neo-liberalism) or may not (neo-realism) be further developed-constructivists 
argue that actors are inherently social and that their preferences/interests are products of 
their identities which, in turn, are products of mutually constituted and commonly shared 
(intersubjective) knowledge in a social system of International Relations: 
Constructivism shows that even our most enduring institutions are based on 
collective understandings; that they are reified structures that were once 
upon a time conceived ex nihilo by human consciousness; and that these 
understandings were subsequently diffused and consolidated until they were 
taken for granted. Moreover, constructivists believe that the human capacity 
for reflection or learning has its greatest impact on the manner in which 
individuals and social actors attach meaning to the material world and 
cognitively frame the world they know, experience and understand. Thus, 
collective understandings provide people with reasons why things are they 
are and indications as to how they should use their material abilities and 
power (Adler, 322). 
We can see how constructivism differs from rationalist approaches in IRT. However, 
we also must answer questions related to constructivist methodology and its variations in 
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order to give a well-rounded account of this theoretical approach, and to position this work 
successfully within the realm of constructivism. 
Unlike rationalists, writes Finnemore, constructivists do not engage in wars about 
various -isms in IRT (the neo-neo debate, for example) (Finnemore and Sikkink, 396). She 
writes that, on the contrary, constructivists follow prominent problems in world politics 
and debate how to approach these issues and how to determine what drives them 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 396). Therefore, constructivism has a certain methodological 
flexibility when it comes to studying International Relations. 
 However, there is a distinction between different directions within constructivism, 
although these directions are not as divisive as in rationalist approaches. Hopf introduces 
us to different variants, as he calls them, of constructivism (Hopf, 102). These are 
conventional and critical constructivism (Hopf, 102).  
Conventional constructivists, argues Hopf, desire to present an alternative to 
mainstream international relations by using reconceptualization of balance-of-threat 
theory, the security dilemma, neoliberal cooperation theory, and the democratic peace 
(Hopf, 103). Critical constructivists rely on critical social theory to substantiate their 
claims: 
Work of “critical” constructivism has intellectual roots in critical social 
theory, including such ﬁgures as Anthony Giddens, Jurgen Habermas, and 
Michel Foucault. Although it shares the core features of constructivism 
identiﬁed above, critical constructivism adds a belief that constructions of 
reality reﬂect, enact, and reify relations of power. Critical constructivists 
believe that certain powerful groups play a privileged role in the process of 
social construction. The task of the critical scholar is both to unmask these 
ideational structures of domination and to facilitate the imagining of 
alternative worlds (Finnemore and Sikkink, 398). 
As we can see in Finnemore’s and Sikkink’s statement, the work of critical 
constructivism relies on ideas, discourse, power, knowledge, and culture to analyze 
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international relations. Hopf offers a remarkable insight into the world of critical 
constructivism by stating that: 
Constructivism argues that both material and discursive power are 
necessary for any understanding of world affairs. I emphasize both because 
often constructivists are dismissed as unrealistic for believing in the power 
of knowledge, ideas, culture, ideology, and language, that is, discourse 
(Hopf, 104). 
Therefore, as a work in critical constructivism, this thesis aims at unraveling social 
constructions that influence the relationship between EU and Turkey. Finnemore and 
Sikkink write that the goal of critical constructivists is not to establish, or test, new causal 
theories but rather to reveal the power relations between dominant constructions 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 398). With that in mind, this work also aims at looking into 
different socio-historical concepts that guide the logic of appropriateness in the relationship 
between EU and Turkey. For that purpose, analyzing the language, behavior, 
representations, and constructions between EU and Turkey will be a crucial element of this 
work.  
ii. Applying Constructivism to EU-Turkey Relationship 
 Turkey found its place in Europe and the West as an ally and a friend because it 
played a significant role in the defense against the spread of Communism. Led by a 
Kemalist ideology of modernization through westernization, Turkey became a founding 
member of many important western organizations such as OECD (Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development) in 1948 as well as the Council of Europe in 1949 
(Stivacthis, 35). In 1952, Turkey also joined NATO, a fundamental western protection 
organization whose raison d’etre was countering the Soviet influence in Europe and the 
spread of communism to the West (Stivachtis, 35). Finally, its road towards EU 
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membership began in 1963 when Turkey became an associate member of the European 
Economic Community, a precursor to the EU and a fundamental organization of post-
WWII European unity (Stivachtis, 35). Through these organizations, and its internal 
process of modernization, Turkey found its place in the West, and in Europe. After signing 
the 1963 Ankara Agreement that confirmed Turkish associate membership in the EEC, 
Walter Hallstein, the first European Commission president, concluded: “Turkey is a part 
of Europe” (Rehn, 2)! Turkish officials were satisfied because Turkey had finally become 
modernized, however, without knowing that becoming fully European will be an arduous 
and long process.  
After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the USSR, European 
community downplayed the need of a security dimension:  
European identity has been usually defined against the “Others”, such as 
communism during the Cold War. As Hettlage argues, Europe has achieved 
its unity and self-definition generally in response to the “others” (Öner, 23).  
 
However, currently there is a lack of commonly recognized cultural, geographical or 
historical “other” which makes defining Europe much more complicated (Öner, 23). This 
cultural memory of Islam as a foreign, romanticized, barbaric object perhaps does not have 
a straightforward influence in political-normative terms however, its social influence is 
very important when forming political narratives of Europe (see chapter “Turkey, EU, and 
the Construction of Identities”).  
 It is precisely here that the basis for my constructivist argument lies. Alexander 
Wendt wrote that “anarchy is what states make of it” in order to convey the message of 
anarchy as a social construct (Wendt, 436). In this sense, anarchy as the ordering principle 
of the international system is not a structure but rather a process in which states interact; 
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there is no “logic” of anarchy except for the practices that create certain structures of 
identities and interests (Wendt, 436). Accordingly, the European Union and Turkey are 
social actors in the accession negotiations. Turkey perceives accession negotiations in two 
ways: a) a logical course of action for modern Turkey would be to join European and 
Western institutions; and b) acceding into the EU would help Turkey politically and 
economically, and would strengthen its democratic institutions. European Union perceives 
accession negotiations as a will of one country to join the European family. Comparing and 
contrasting these two views allows us to see why accession negotiations are what EU and 
Turkey make of it. In one hand, Turkey has identity-oriented interests (e.g. modernization 
through westernization) and has genuine material interests (e.g. financial strength and 
profit). In other hand, the European Union is a normative institution which accepted 
Turkish candidacy on the basis of rational interests. However, because the European Union 
conceives itself as a family and as a community of values, the Turkish candidacy has 
become problematic as Turkey has been an agent of otherness in Europe for centuries. 
Adler writes: 
The research agenda on security communities requires identifying those 
interstate practices and transnational forces that create assurance that states 
will not settle their differences through war. It also entails the notion that 
states will govern their domestic behavior in ways that are consistent with 
the community. Said otherwise, membership in the community is shaped 
not only by state’s external identity and associated behavior but also by its 
domestic characteristics and practices. For example, it would be very 
difficult for a European state to consistently abuse human rights and still be 
deemed to belong to contemporary ‘Europe’ (Adler, 345). 
 
 Constructivism posits that people act towards objects, including other actors, on the 
basis of meanings those objects have for them and, therefore, a state interacts differently 
with other states based on meanings those states have for it (Wendt, 437). It follows that 
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state actions depend on distribution of mutually constituted and shared understandings 
among two or more different actors. This distribution of knowledge creates an 
intersubjective image, an intersubjective understanding, the two have for each other. In 
constructivism, states are not pre-social actors who form their preference according to 
black-boxed economic models attempting to predict their behavior; they are essentially 
social players whose social knowledge (i.e. social facts) influences their behavior and, 
consequently, their interests. Although the European Union is an organization consisting 
of twenty-eight different social agents, its community of values is what makes it a unified 
social agent. These values are, for example, liberal democracy, the rule of law and respect 
for human rights. However, the European Union consists of a certain set of twenty-eight 
members who relate to a similar history, similar religion, and a similar experience with 
Islam and the Ottoman Empire.  
Therefore, this community of values has two logics embedded in its social identity; 
one is the logic of consequences which guides EU’s behavior in a rational way of 
maximizing one’s interests (Fierke, 181). Accordingly, the conflict which arises in EU over 
Turkish membership follows from both rational reasoning (i.e. Turkey’s alignment with 
the Copenhagen criteria) and the logic of appropriateness which relates to EU’s and 
Turkish identity (i.e. the concept of European family). Constructivism would state that the 
logic of consequences simply follows from the logic of appropriateness. Therefore, Turkish 
membership of EU is only apparently a technical issue and is rather an issue of the logic of 
appropriateness, the logic of culture. This assertion is supported by Yannis A. Stivachtis 
who writes that:   
Order among European states was generated by agreement on not only 
international values, but also domestic values of a social and cultural nature. 
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This alternative source of order operates at a societal level rather than the 
level of the sovereign state. As it has been suggested, the logic of anarchy 
operates differently in the international system from the logic of culture and, 
therefore, the operations of the two logics produce different outcomes 
(Stivachtis, 17).  
 
Therefore, we can see how constructivism can be utilized as an analytical model 
through which we can observe and study the EU-Turkey relations. As such a model, it 
allows us to create ideal-types which can help us analyze the relationship in a more specific 
manner. Earlier, we established that constructivism offers a “logic of appropriateness” 
explanation for relationships between the agents. Following that logic, this thesis will 
establish three essential ideal-type models that seek to demonstrate the basis for the logic 
of appropriateness in the EU-Turkey relations. The constructivist analysis of this thesis will 
rest on these three theoretical models. The three models are: Europe as a Security 
Community, Europe as a Cultural Community, and Europe as a Liberal-Democratic 
Community.  
These three models will help us to unravel the social dimension of the EU-Turkey 
relations, and its effect on the accession process. However, following conclusions from our 
earlier discussion on constructivism and its central tenets, it must be acknowledged that the 
purpose of these models is not to create a testable theoretical model (see above). Rather, 
their purpose is there to guide us and help us understand the intersubjective held beliefs 
manifesting between EU and Turkey across different issue areas as presented in these 
models. Moreover, these models are not meant to be distinct issue-areas; they are 
interconnected and will manifest themselves flexibly within one another. Their 
interdependence does not make these models less original, or less important for analyzing 
the relationship, but rather it simply testifies to the idea that the relationship between the 
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EU and Turkey is a set of complex variables which can be understood because they have a 
common, social, basis.  
 That being said, we must concede that because the goal of this research is not to 
develop new theories but rather to analyze and unravel existing social power-structures in 
the relationship between EU and Turkey, the models presented below will not offer any 
predictions regarding the relationship.  
Ideal-Type Analytical Models: Approaching the Complex Identity  
i. Europe as a Security Community 
The first analytical model, Europe as a security community, is a complex model 
because it seeks to outline how the construction of Europe as a security community affected 
the relationship between EU and Turkey. For the purposes of this thesis, this analytical 
model will present two main influences security had on the relationship between the EU 
and Turkey. 
 The first influence is the Cold War. The second influence is the recent refugee crisis 
which was conflated with terrorist attacks and resulted in securitization8 of the issues of 
refugees and securitization of Muslims in general. Through this model, we will be able to 
demonstrate how security is a social fact which can cause emergence or disappearance of 
different variables influencing the relationship between the EU and Turkey. For example, 
in the case of the Cold War, because of the security culture between 1949 and 1989, Turkey 
                                                 
8 I use the definition of securitization as developed by the prominent Copenhagen School’s theory of 
securitization: “While securitization theory must be seen in the context of the shifting agendas of security, 
and as part of the broader theoretical movement to study the social construction of security, the Copenhagen 
School has developed a distinctive position within these debates. In securitization theory, “security” is treated 
not as an objective condition but as the outcome of a specific social process: the social construction of security 
issues (who or what is being secured, and from what) is analyzed by examining the “securitizing speech-
acts” through which threats become represented and recognized. Issues become “securitized”, treated as 
security issues, through these speech-acts which do not simply describe an existing security situation, but 
bring it into being as a security situation by successfully representing it as such.” (Williams, 513) 
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was “European” and “Western.” However, after 1989, when the dominant paradigm was 
changed, Turkey’s cultural background and its historic role in Europe started emerging in 
a largely identity-based model of EU integrations.  
During the early stages of the Cold War Turkey was seen as a part of the Middle 
East colonial sphere rather than a Western nation and an important ally (Martin, 14). This 
was caused by a strong sense of disappointment the western leaders (such as Churchill) 
had with Turkey's neutrality during the World War II (Martin, 14). Turkey had a few 
sympathies in Europe, and the US seemed indifferent towards early Turkish attempts at 
becoming visible in western security agenda (it was not invited to be a NATO member in 
1949) (Martin, 14). Turkey’s case for western protection was not taken seriously and 
Soviet’s looming threat (following the British withdrawal from supporting Turkey) to 
Turkish sovereignty had made Turkish diplomatic appeals to the west stronger (Martin, 
14). As Natalie Martin writes: “As Nikita Khrushchev later said, Joseph Stalin successfully 
frightened the Turks into the arms of the Americans” (Martin, 15). The Korean War 
occurred in 1950 and Turkey finally saw a chance to prove itself to the US. After sending 
a considerable number of troops to Korea, NATO’s doors to Turkey were left open until it 
finally acceded in 1952 (Martin, 15). Given Turkey’s location, and US need to access areas 
closer to the Middle East (such as the southern flank of Anatolia), Turkey became a viable 
member of the western security umbrella (Martin, 16). However, Turkey was not only a 
member of NATO, it also became a member of other European organizations such as the 
Council of Europe (1949) thereby making itself an invaluable member of the fight against 
Communism (Martin, 16). However, Turkey’s early achievements during the 1950s were 
not enough for it to become a member of the EEC/EC/EU in the years following 1963. 
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Martin states that this was due to the fact that Turkey misunderstood the idea of the EU 
and understood that as a valuable NATO member it could get quid-pro-quo from the EU 
on its path to membership (Martin, 16). As we will see, this would cause Turkey significant 
issues in understanding the normativism of the EU. Furthermore, the Cold War element 
downplayed Turkey’s cultural and historical ties with Europe, so the issues of identity were 
not a problem: “Geostrategic considerations after World War II meant that the evolving 
European integration project saw Turkey as “European” because it was a part of “Western” 
security and integration institutions rather than any integral European nature” (Martin, 6). 
The relevance of culture and identity in relations between the EU and Turkey was not 
emphasized until after the Cold War. The end of the Cold War ushered an era of 
“culturalism” within international relations which meant that Turkish bid for integration in 
the western structures adopted a new dimension:  
The question of identity has had a crucial importance in the relations 
between Turkey and the EU since the end of the Cold War. In recent years, 
the opponents to Turkey's membership have based their arguments on 
cultural identity, although her eligibility for membership was confirmed in 
the Commission's Opinion expressed in 1989 after Turkey's membership 
application in 1987 (Öner, 123).   
In more contemporary times, Turkey's relationship with the EU is influenced by 
another aspect of security: securitization of Syrian refugees and Muslims. Jocelyne Cesari 
writes in 2009 that:  
Anti-immigrant sentiment is common in many countries facing the 
difficulties of integrating culturally diverse populations. However, in 
European countries, this can degenerate into what can be termed more 
accurately Islamophobia. Because immigration introduces such a large 
proportion of Muslims into Europe, the anti-immigrant rhetoric of extreme 
right-wing parties has become markedly anti-Muslim. The French National 
Front has adopted an electoral strategy that associates Islam with terrorism. 
Jean-Marie Le Pen described the potential radicalization of Muslim 
immigrants in terms that implicated him for inciting hatred, but his party 
still came in second in the 2002 French election (Cesari, 4).  
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Therefore, because the discourse of securitization of Muslims and Islam was 
revived in Europe in the late 20th and early 21st century, it has become conflated with 
securitization of mainly Muslim refugees, particularly those from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, 
and Morocco. This element is significant for the accession road of Turkey who has 
accepted millions of Syrian refugees on its territory. In addition to that, Turkey's accession 
road has become securitized because of the issue of immigrants through the recently-signed 
"Migrant Swap Deal" with the EU (see chapters "Current Situation" section I, and "Refugee 
Crisis: A New Frontier?"). Turkey is aware of the political leverage it has gotten by the 
deal, so it uses the possibility of opening its borders towards Europe to refugees as a threat 
in order for the EU to liberalize its visa system to Turkish nationals as well as to pursue the 
accession negotiations (Shaheen and Wintour, 2016). 
ii. Europe as a Cultural Community 
The second ideal-typical analytical model for analyzing the EU-Turkey relationship is 
Europe as a cultural community.  This model is also dichotomous: the Islamic Turk and 
Europe, and Europe as a cultural-geographic area. This model is essential as it presents the 
basis for the social dimension of research into the EU-Turkey relations. Because it seeks 
to investigate and demonstrate socio-historic roots of the causes of “othering” of Turkey in 
the EU, and vice versa, it will serve to support the most fundamental arguments of this 
thesis. 
 The first category refers to the idea stemming from centuries of tense, warlike, 
relations between the Ottoman Empire and Europe, the idea of the “Turk”: 
 The "Turk" was seen as a pernicious force sent by God to scourge 
Christendom for its sins." To fend off this evil, all that was required was for 
Christians to repent, unite and take up the defense of the faith (Stivachtis, 
25).  
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In combination with the image of Islam, developed through centuries of "othering" 
between Europe and the Islamic world, the "Turk" became a notable "Other" for Europe, a 
discursive element which is close (as Ottomans penetrated deep into the continent) to 
Europe but also far from it. The ideological unity developed by Europe in its fight against 
Muslims and the Ottomans was secularized in more recent centuries and was "culturalized" 
in a way that presented Muslim Ottomans as cultural-existential threats to Europe 
(Stivachtis, 25). As Europe grew more secular and technologically advanced, and the 
Ottoman Empire grew weaker, and "sicker", the idea of otherness was recentered from 
purely religious to civilizational dualities; Ottoman Turks were now perceived as 
uncivilized barbarians (Stivachtis, 31). This idea of the uncivilized Turks would haunt them 
even after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, hence the strong Kemalist drive to overcome 
such prejudices. Europe in the 20th century was less focused on Turkey than it was in the 
19th centuries due to its own internal divisions ("The Iron Curtain" or the Russian 
Revolution), however, after the 20th century had ended, the European identity was 
restructured in a way that de-securitized it and re-unified it under the umbrella of the value-
based European Union. In such an atmosphere: “The Turk surfaced once again as one of 
the candidate ‘Others’- and for many the one- in the European self-definition” (Stivachtis, 
35).  
Europe as a cultural-geographic area is another significant element of this ideal-
type analytical model. As we have previously established, the discourse of religious and 
cultural duality between Europe and the Ottoman Empire, and later Turkey, was a carrier 
of much of political and social strife between the two. However, this strife also created a 
self-defining momentum in Europe, which still continues today, that fundamentally, 
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although not solely, rested on the idea of being ideologically unified under the umbrella of 
Christianity, secularism, liberalism, democracy, and technology. Therefore, Europe as we 
know it today, in its geographical terms, has been different throughout the centuries 
because of differing prevalent cultural discourses on Europe. The idea of the culturally 
"Other" (Ottoman)Turk helped Europe establish its cultural-geographic area, and 
consequently its own identity in relation to the Turk:  
The first excerpt from above constructs Europe in the geographical sense of 
the words, with exclusive borders. In fact, it is through the exclusion of 
Turkey in geographic delineations that we are conveyed the idea as to where 
Europe's eastern borders lie. The second excerpt also engages in geographic 
construction ("it is not only a question of territory"), although with no 
explicit reference to borders. "European" borders, as with any frontiers, are 
hereby treated as contested social constructs that have been ascribed various 
different meanings in history. Similarly, "continents" are conceptualized as 
discursive constructions rather than fixed geographic entities that exist 
independent of the ways in which we talk about them. Hence, predicating 
Turkey as beyond the boundaries of Europe discursively constructs Europe 
as a geographically bounded area with strict delimitations as to who is in 
and who is out (Aydın-Düzgıt, 132).  
 
The notion of Europe as geographically distinct from Turkey was also aided by a 
cultural discourse on the Turk. By delineating Europe from Turkey (or Ottoman Empire) 
in both geographic and cultural terms we can see how the identity formation of Europe 
depended greatly, in binary terms, on the idea of "us" in terms of not being "them". 
Therefore, it can be concluded that:  
In addition to the discursive construction of an essentially bounded 
"European" geography, both excerpts, through the usage of the topos of 
culture and the topos of history, construct Europe as a cultural and historical 
entity that is exclusive of Turkey." (Aydın-Düzgıt, 133).  
 
Although influenced by post-structuralist ideas, this argument has important 
implications for constructivism. As agents are social players, their identities are in the 
process of construction which is influenced by their interaction: 
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The integration process within the framework of the EU have influenced the 
identities of the Member States, simultaneously European identity has been 
in an ongoing construction process among the citizens of the EU. As [first 
name] Rosamond argues, the focus of the "EU-studies constructivism" is 
different from mainstream "international relations constructivism". 
"International relations constructivism" focuses on the dynamics of 
interstate interaction, security dilemma and the nature of anarchy, "EU-
studies constructivism" focuses on the EU institutions which provide 
atmosphere of socialization, within which actors' interests are constructed 
(Öner, 41).  
In that sense, we can see how Europe as a construct in terms of culture and 
geography can play an important role when constructing EU's material interests in the 
negotiations with Turkey. If EU already perceives Turkey as "other" at the start of the 
accession negotiations, then EU's behavior will be projected onto Turkey in a way that 
diminishes, or encumbers, its ability to satisfy the EU criteria. Therefore, we can see how 
constructions of Europe influence the construction of Turkey in EU and how constructions 
of Europe affect the normativism of EU. Speaking in constructivist terms, the logic of 
appropriateness influences the behavior of the EU member states and therefore EU to 
behave in a way which treats Turkey ambiguously; as an ally and a candidate, and as the 
“other”. 
iii. Europe as a Liberal-Democratic Community 
The third, and final, ideal-type model that will be used to study EU-Turkey relations 
in constructivist terms is Europe as a liberal-democratic community. This ideal-type model 
will treat EU as essentially a community of states with liberal-democratic values which 
were normativized through the Copenhagen criteria instituted in 1993. This model treats 
liberal democracy as a:  
It has been difficult to recognize this problem because for almost a century 
in the West, democracy has meant liberal democracy- a political system 
marked not only by free and fair elections, but also by the rule of law, a 
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separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, 
assembly, religion, and property (Zakaria, 22). 
Although the EU member-states have different issues which make them more or less 
liberal democracies, I intend on treating the EU as a community harboring liberal-
democratic values. In that sense, for the purposes of this thesis, particular "illiberal" turns 
in some member-states of the EU (such as Hungary) will be omitted and a general picture, 
focused on the acquis communautaire, will be central to this ideal-type analytical model. 
There are also two aspects to this ideal-type analytical model. The first one is the 
relationship between EU's proscriptions on the rule of law and the rise of illiberalism 
amongst Turkey's neo-conservatives, primarily in the leading Justice and Development 
Party (the AKP Party). The second one deals with the rise of religiosity in Turkey and its 
influence on the secularism of the country. I intend on examining whether the ideological 
focus of the AKP party threatens the long-established practice of laicite in Turkish 
political-judicial system and as such causes shifts in Turkish political-social system which 
the emphasizes the cultural distance between Turkey and the EU.  
The relationship between the EU and Turkey has taken an abrupt and genuinely 
disconcerting turn in the past year as a result of the global events such as the refugee crisis 
and due to the recent attempted coup d’état, which significantly changed Turkish political 
life. Both, in combination with the ruling party's dubious political practices, have caused 
worries "at home", in the EU, that Turkey is becoming an increasingly authoritarian state, 
going above and beyond to centralize the power in the hands of one party and one man, 
President Erdoğan. Martin writes that:  
The current political situation in Turkey, in which power is increasingly 
concentrated around the office of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is very far 
removed from the liberal democratic ideal enshrined in the Copenhagen 
criteria. The technically correct "democracy" of Turkey is being 
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undermined in EU terms by the authoritarian tendencies of its 
democratically elected leader. Ironically, the illiberalism of the AKP is at 
least partly responsible for its electoral success. Those who have benefited 
from the policies of the AKP in terms of economic success and health, and 
social welfare reform, have limited sympathy for the Kurds and the urban 
secular elite which, they feel, had previously ignored them (Martin, 170).  
 
The technically correct "democracy" mentioned by Martin is a reference to a series 
of controversial events in Turkish socio-political life which have caused the world, and the 
EU in particular, to seriously doubt the AKP and Erdoğan, in their attempts to reform the 
Turkish society, and make it more democratic. In the aftermath of 2007, when the 
relationship between the EU and Turkey lost its vigor, Turkish political and social life has 
been hit with four main events that have confirmed her illiberal turn: the Ergenkon and 
Balyoz corruption affairs, the Gezi park protests, and finally, the aftermath of the attempted 
coup d’état in 2016. For the purposes of this analytical-model, I shall only include the last 
one as it is the most relevant one for the current relationship between the EU and Turkey. 
The aftermath of the coup, which is ongoing, has seen a serious crackdown on the liberties 
of Turks who disagree with AKP's leadership of Turkey, and who are openly critical of 
government's policies. To date, the emergency state in the country has been extended three 
times (and is still lasting), more than 40, 000 people have been arrested, out of which there 
were 194 journalists and around 1500 deans resigned from various Turkish universities 
(Aydıntasbas, 2016). The response from the EU has been highly critical. In the chapter 
"Current Situation", I outlined the most recent EU Commission Report on Turkey's 
progress towards the EU membership which concluded essentially that the most recent 
developments in Turkey are not in line with the Copenhagen criteria and that its treatment 
of prisoners is not in-line with the rule of law clauses which EU finds fundamental to its 
values (see "Current Situation", section ii). This analytical-model seeks to investigate how 
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Turkey's illiberal turn affects its membership candidacy in not only material terms, but 
rather against a backdrop of interplay between the two before-outlined models, and how 
its image in Europe is critically dependent on the state of liberalism within its democracy.  
For the second aspect of this model, I intend on investigating the ideological basis 
of AKP as a party, and how their recent actions testify not only to Turkey's growing 
illiberalism but also its growing religiosity in public and political terms. As Turkey is a 
country with a strong secular legacy which was protected by the military for more than 
eighty years of its independence, it is interesting to see how AKP party, with support of the 
European and international partners, instituted an agenda which slowly, but surely, 
changed the religious and political landscape of the Republic. Although AKP seeks to 
incorporate secularism in its ideology because it respects the principles of state-church 
separation, its increasingly using religion in daily political life to legitimize its neo-
conservative platform amongst its voters who come from mostly rural, or traditional areas 
of Turkey (Ertuğrul, 162). In that sense, the AKP party is increasingly modelling its politics 
according to the identitarian principle which constructs Europe ideally as a union which 
"others" Turkey, but also uses the same elements Europe others in order to legitimize itself 
as the defender of Turkish democracy and its peoples: 
As David Gardner wrote in the Financial Times, by 2010 Erdoğan was 
displaying a “swaggering populism” and, while this may have alienated 
some of the educated middle class who had been attracted by the initial 
promise of liberal Islam, it remained popular with the Anatolian rump of 
AKP support. Such popularity, the need to maintain it and the need to 
consolidate its power base against Kemalist onslaught encouraged the AKP 
down the path of authoritarianism that has been outlined above. With 
repeated electoral success, the AKP no longer felt the need to pander to 
liberal concerns either within Turkey or abroad. In so doing Erdoğan 
squandered “a golden opportunity to widen and deepen reform (Martin, 
179).  
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This quote illuminates perfectly the importance of studying AKP’s populism 
against a backdrop of the EU reform. By instigating stronger and stronger populism, the 
AKP legitimized itself more in the eyes of the voters, however, on the other hand, it fought 
the reform system harder in order to maintain the status quo and increase its power-hold. 
This resulted, with the aid of economic and foreign-policy successes of Turkey, in AKP’s 
being perceived as a power generator of the strong Turkey, independent Turkey, neo-
conservative Turkey, which did not need Europeans who already perceived Turks as 
barbaric, and “othered” them. This combination of pro-Western, albeit staunchly 
nationalistic, conservative, and moderately Islamic (although many would argue 
“moderately”) stances helped AKP shift political currents in Turkey away from the 
predominant Kemalist-secular political wing led by the CHP (the Republican People’s 
Party) and into a discourse of fight for neutrality of state, and military, in the face of 
religious freedoms in a country with a strong and powerful leader legitimized by people’s 
votes. The place for EU in this discourse is vague; it serves as an ideal construction against 
whose perceived hypocrisy AKP defines its legitimate Turkishness, but it is also an ideal-
construction of civilized west to which Turkey still strives to became a part of. 
I. Table Presentation of Ideal-Typical Analytical Models 
This table seeks to illustrate and simplify the meaning of ideal-typical analytical 
models presented above. It is a useful scheme to follow throughout this thesis. 
Europe as a 
Security 
Community 
Turkey presented as a member of the 
Western security umbrella as well as 
European nation due to 
security/geopolitical interests in the 
Turkey securitized through the prism of the 
refugee crisis. The securitization of 
immigrants is conflated with securitization 
of Islam. The end-result is a discursive 
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face of the Soviet/Communist threat. 
Cultural differences downplayed for 
the sake of strategic importance of 
Turkey for the West. 
struggle to attain agreements with the states 
who belong to the “other”, such as Turkey. 
Europe as a 
Cultural 
Community 
The “Turk” is “othered” in a long-
term process of Europe’s struggle 
with Islamic foes. This process was 
secularized and changed in more 
contemporary times to the idea of the 
“uncivilized” Turk. Due to the Cold 
War this aspect was downplayed, 
however, in the aftermath of the 
1990s, the “otherness” of Turkey 
became increasingly emphasized. 
Europe as a cultural-geographic area is a 
social, not a scientific construct. Because 
Europe was united in the face of the Islamic 
threat throughout the history, the borders of 
Europe were essentially the borders of the 
Christian culture. This played into the 
“othering” process which signified 
everything outside of these borders as non-
European and comparatively less 
significant. 
Europe as a 
Liberal-
Democratic 
Community 
The European Union is conceived of 
as a liberal-democratic project. This 
idea is evinced in the Copenhagen 
criteria, established in 1993. Turkey 
is a democratic state, however, it’s 
increasingly illiberal turn is pushing 
it further away from the EU and is 
playing into the process of 
cultural/social “othering”.  
AKP’s neo-conservative ideological 
template seeks to take elements of liberal-
democratic order by removing the 
“military” factor in protecting the 
Constitution and secularism, however, it is 
also legitimizing its conservative and 
illiberal power-hold by using these values in 
combination with populism. The end-result 
of this process is further distancing from the 
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EU as Turkey’s reform process stalls and 
the status quo is justified by the EU’s 
“othering” of Turkey as a non-civilized and 
non-European state/society. 
 
2. Conclusion 
 Finally, we can see how relevant and how cogent a constructive argument for 
analyzing EU-Turkey relations is. From the above-demonstrated examples, on can 
understand that the process of Turkish accession has changed over the years; as the 
paradigm shift in Europe changed from collective security to collective identity, Turkish 
candidacy has become a burden on the homogeneity of the EU. Constructivism does not 
ignore the real material issues of Turkish candidacy such as Turkey’s size, its political 
issues, and its non-compliance with certain EU provisions (i.e. the rule of law), but it adds 
a social dimension to the relationship that is a precursor to material interests. By applying 
constructivist models in studying the EU-Turkey relations, one can unravel the vast 
complexity of socio-material identities and interests in a methodological manner, and is 
also able to make a strong argument for why Turkey is not seen as a viable candidate 
member by the EU member-states. On the other hand, applying constructivism can help us 
understand certain changes in Turkey itself which have caused a political and social shift 
in the country. We can further discern the complexity of the relationship by stating that the 
above-outlined ideal-typical analytical models are simply inextricable from each other. By 
analyzing the relationship from the standpoint of the analytical model of Europe as a 
security community, we are not precluding the model of Europe as a cultural community 
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but are rather stating that both models, including the one of Europe as liberal-democratic 
community, are mutually reinforcing each other. However, we can also see that neither of 
the models takes precedence in predicting which way the relationship will go. By using the 
security-analytical model we can assume that the relationship will be securitized in the 
future, however, we cannot predict which way this securitization will go, or whether the 
securitization will have stronger influences on the accession process. In addition to that, by 
interpolating the cultural and security model with the liberal-democratic model, we can see 
that all of them indicate to a negative outcome in the relationship but without exactly 
predicting the end-result of the process. In the end, this thesis will strive to demonstrate 
that even though constructivism, and the subsequent models, cannot predict the future of 
the EU-Turkey relationship, they can be utilized to help us understand more closely the EU 
enlargement process from an aspect of socialization. 
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Chapter 4.  Issues 
Subchapter 1. Turkey, EU, and the Construction of Identities 
1. Introduction 
This chapter functions as an analysis of the issue of identity construction which affects 
the EU-Turkey relationship. This thesis is a work in critical constructivism (see chapter 
“Constructivism and IR: EU-Turkey Relationship is What Agents Make of It”) and as such 
beckons identity as the referral point in state behavior. The EU-Turkey relationship has, as 
we will see, weathered many international political changes (such as the end of the Cold 
War) that have impacted EU and Turkey in many ways. This chapter will seek to unravel 
and present one of the most important aspects of the EU-Turkey relationship- that is, the 
process of formation and reconstruction of the intersubjective knowledge EU and Turkey 
have of each other. In that sense, what this chapter will do is to present concepts of crucial 
importance for understanding EU’s and Turkey’s preference formation against a backdrop 
of their intersubjective knowledge, and meaning that that knowledge has produced.  
Therefore, this chapter will elaborate on concepts such as Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, 
Kemalism, and the other “Turk” as they pertain to the EU-Turkey relations. Furthermore, 
it will offer an insight into changing political landscape of Turkey as well as EU’s 
contemporary vision of Turkey’s role in EU integrations. This chapter will also seek to 
expand upon the role of religion in politics, especially against a backdrop of the EU-Turkey 
relations. In that sense, concepts of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and Kemalism will be 
contextualized within the historical-social patterns of change in the post-Ottoman Turkish 
society. The role of religion is crucial for understanding identity formation in the case of 
EU-Turkey relations, so it beseeches further attention.  
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When it comes to the analytical models as presented in the chapter on constructivism, 
this chapter will be most connected to the model of Europe as a cultural community. 
However, as we have established earlier, all three analytical models from the chapter on 
constructivism are intertwined, where model of Europe as a cultural community does not 
preclude the model of Europe as a security community but rather plays into that model by 
stating that the role of culture and identity-formation is crucial when forming, for example, 
security-oriented policies. 
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1. The “other” Turk 
The idea of the “other” Turk signifies the process of construction of Turks as the 
main diametrical opposites of the European self. The concept was developed in academia 
during the 20th century, its formation stimulated by studies of European identity through 
the prism of European discourses on other civilizations and cultures whom Europe 
historically interacted with. Paul T. Levin in Turkey and the European Union: Christian 
and Secular Images of Islam identifies the creation of Turk through four different phases 
of changes in meaning of Islam in Europe: 
First, Ottoman Turks gradually took over the role as Europe’s and 
Christendom’s primary Muslim ‘Other’, inheriting the roles discussed 
above that formerly were used to depict Saracens, Agarenes, and 
Ishmaelites. Second, the growing European interest in the classical heritage 
introduced ancient Greek frames of references with which the Christian 
meta-narrative could be reinterpreted and elaborated by including new roles 
such as that of the barbarian. However, this development did not constitute 
an eclipse of the Christian worldview by a radically different secular 
humanism: the mostly Christian humanists retained the basic elements of 
medieval Christian images of the Saracen even as they rearticulated them in 
classical terms and applied them to the Ottoman Turks. Third, the classical 
revival in Renaissance in Europe involved the transfer of ancient Greek 
frames but also more recent- and very hostile- Greek Orthodox 
representations of the Ottoman Turks who conquered Constantinople in 
1453 and vanquished the Eastern Roman Empire. Finally, beginning in the 
fifteenth century many European representations of Turks were shaped as 
much by the proximity of the Ottoman military threat as by the European 
context of growing theological divisions between Catholics and Protestants 
(Levin, 81). 
Therefore, the model of the “Turk” was created early on in Europe’s history to 
define its historical “other” and help build its solidarity in the face of a Muslim-Ottoman 
threat. However, although many argue that the creation of Europe’s identity goes on the 
principle of “us” versus “them”, the importance of the “Turk” is not measured in its binary 
value for creation of the European identity (i.e. “us” versus “them” being a constant 
historical variable) but rather in the degree to which “us” versus “them” matters as a model 
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allowing Europe to distinguish itself from others (Öner, 23). Therefore, distinguishing 
Europe against the model of the Turk was important-to a different degree- in different 
phases of Europe’s history for creation of the European identity. 
Consequently, representations of Turks in the European discourse have had three 
main phases. The first one was through the prism of religion where Turks were represented 
as the Islamic other to the European Christian self (Öner, 118). This period lasted from the 
Crusades until the 19th century (Öner, 118). The second one was based on the idea of 
civilization and it lasted from the 19th century until the period between the two world wars 
(Öner, 118). Because Turkey was reformed as a young nation-state, the idea of the 
Islamized Turk was recentered as a constitutive “other” of Europe (Öner, 118).  Danielle 
Kuzmanovic in Religion, Politics, and Turkey’s EU Accession identifies the civilizational 
othering of Turkey in terms of: 
The latter, among other right wing, nationalist, and conservative circles, 
argue that Turkey belongs to another civilizational realm, defined by 
cultural and political values that are fundamentally different from those 
shared by the EU member-states. The country, therefore, has no place in the 
EU. The difference, in their view, has much to do with Turkey being 
predominantly Muslim and with an Islamic historical heritage 
(Kuzmanovic, 42). 
Finally, the third prism of construction of the Turk in Europe is through culture (Öner, 
118). This period started after the Cold War when culture as a means of constituting the 
European “family” was introduced as the most important aspect of European identity.  
Today, Europe does not have such a strong “other” to distinguish itself from. The 
EU integration process has expanded Europe and the fall of the Cold War displaced the 
ideas of the Western vs. Communist East division. The concept of the “Turk” was also 
diminished because Turkey emerged as a candidate state for EU membership. Despite the 
fact that the model of the “Turk” still exists (and it could be argued that it is reinforced now 
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in the face of Turkey’s increasingly illiberal politics), its meaning for Europe was 
recentered in a way that it no longer constitutes the main opposing value to Europe’s “self”. 
In that sense, although the “Turk” seems like an outdated model and its relevance for EU-
Turkey relationship is often considered insignificant, we have to recognize that, given the 
cultural construction of Europe as a “family”, the “Turk” was simply recentered due to 
socio-political factors (such as the expansion of the EU and Turkey’s candidacy for 
membership in the EU) and still operates in the political discourse of the relationship. It 
operates most prominently on the political (center)-right in Europe, as we have established 
earlier, and the political center-right of Turkey (see “Public Opinion”, section I). For 
example, it is used in Turkey’s political discourse to legitimize increasingly illiberal 
policies of the ruling regime (concomitant with the idea of “fortress Europe”, see chapter 
“Refugee Crisis: The New Frontier?”). In Europe, it operates within the criteria of 
recognizing Turkey’s Europeanness. Levin writes that Turkey was considered to be in 
Europe but not a part of Europe which indicates the way in which its Europeanness is 
measured (Levin, 162).   
Verdicts on the cultural Europeanness of Turkey as a precondition for its EU 
membership have been centered on the basis of Europe’s historical, social, political, and 
militaristic experience with the Ottoman Empire, and later Turkey. In that sense, the “Turk” 
was always in touch with “Europe” but was never considered to be European itself. In the 
chapter on the Cyprus issue, we have described a case of French use of the “otherness” of 
Turkey for practical purposes. Citing Turkey’s incompatibility with the EU, France froze 
multiple negotiation chapters thus encumbering Turkey’s accession negotiations process 
(see chapter “Cyprus: Identity, Security, and the EU-Turkey Relationship”).  
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This only testifies to the visibility of cultural component of EU-Turkey relations. 
Although accession negotiations are simply a part of the larger EU-Turkey relationship 
structure, they are a significant part of the relationship and constitute a genuine example of 
Turkey’s becoming a part of Europe. Therefore, blocking the accession road while citing 
cultural difference is case prima facie of the political influence of the constitutive process 
of othering Turkey in Europe.  
2. Kemalism 
Kemalist state ideology is a political ideology based on the philosophies developed 
by Mustafa Kemal Pasja (Atatürk9) during his presidency of Turkey (from 1923 to 1938). 
Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (NSCG), in their report titled The 
European Union, Turkey, and Islam, establish that Kemal’s ambition was to modernize the 
Turkish nation and launch it into the mainstream Western culture (NSCG, 47). With that 
in mind, Kemal aspired to reach the accepted standards of civilization by bringing the new 
nation-state socially and culturally closer to Europe (modernization through 
westernization). He abolished the caliphate (administration of the Muslim community) and 
put ulema (religious scholars) under the control of the Diyanet (state institute for 
administering religious matters) (NSCG, 47). He prohibited movement’s outside the state 
control (such as Sufi’s), reformed the sharia-informed family law in a way that it 
represented the Swiss civil code10, banned Islamic symbols (such as the fez, traditional 
headdress of men), and closed theological faculties (NSCG, 47). He essentially established 
a strong secular state with principles of laicite:  
Turkey was thus the first Muslim-majority country to declare itself 
secular and to make the separation of politics and religion an official policy. 
                                                 
9 In Turkish, this means “the father of Turks”. 
10 A codified law in Switzerland establishing provisions for regulating relations between individuals. 
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Having demoted Islam, however, Atatürk needed some other principle to 
unify his new country, so he elaborated an ideology that sanctified six isms: 
nationalism, secularism, reformism, statism, populism, and republicanism 
(Ansary, 301). 
 Kemal’s reforms were not sui generis. They were a part of the process of 
Westernization of the Ottoman Empire before its fall in 1918. In that vein, the Tanzimat 
reforms11 which intended to modernize the ailing Ottoman Empire and save it in the face 
of nationalist upsurges in its territories. The Tanzimat reforms yielded the first written 
constitution of the Ottoman Empire in 1876 (interestingly, at the same time as most of 
Europe was experiencing its “spring”, it appears that the sick man of Europe was reforming 
as well) (NSCG, 48). After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Mustafa Kemal took the ideals 
of modernization and applied them on to the new Turkish nation citing achieving the 
standard of civilization as the raison d’etre of the new Turkish state (NSCG, 470).  
3. Turkish-Islamic Synthesis 
In the chapter on history of the EU-Turkey relationship, I portray Turkish-Islamic 
Synthesis as a political tool used by Turkish military in the aftermath of the 1980 coup 
d’état to portray secular values as inherently found within Turkish Islam (see “History”, 
section 3). Turkish military used the idea of the synthesis to ameliorate its harsh public 
image in the aftermath of the coup. Furthermore, the establishment of the Turkish-Islamic 
Synthesis as an ideology followed a fall of the “National Vision” (Mili Görüʂ), an Islamic 
political program within Turkey aiming to represent traditionally-minded citizens who 
considered themselves unrepresented in the existing political spectrum (that is, from 1960s 
until 1980s) (NSCG, 50). The National Vision focused on strengthening ethics and morals 
                                                 
11 A series of administrative reforms carried between 1839 and 1876 intending to modernize the Ottoman 
Empire. 
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in education and upbringing, fighting usury and corruption, abolishing articles in the 
constitution and criminal law that penalized the political use of religion, and freeing 
religion from state control (NSCG, 50). Turkish military viewed this kind of political 
program (spearheaded by Necmettin Erbakan- see “History”, section 4) as a dangerous 
form of populism aimed at reversing the modernizing course of the nation and its 
secularism (NSCG, 51). Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, therefore, was utilized by the military 
to counter the National Vision. Its ideology stressed strong Turkish identity, unity, 
harmony, military, and authoritarian values (NSCG, 51). While it presented Islam as an 
‘enlightened’ religion (open to science, for example), it also affirmed strong state control 
over it, unlike the National Vision program (NSCG, 51).  
The importance of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis as a political program during 
1980s and early 1990s is found in the ironic fact that it allowed economic modernization 
and liberalization of Turkey (see “History”, section 3), which further allowed many 
conservative-minded people to move into urban areas and gain more economic, and 
political power (NSCG, 51). Today, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis is credited for allowing 
AKP’s voting base, for example, to be more prominent in the face of secularist criticism. 
This has important repercussions for the EU-Turkey relationship because the changing 
socio-political landscape in Turkey influenced the state of play between the two (see 
below). 
4. Turkish Political Landscape and its Effect on the EU-Turkey 
Relationship 
The changes in Turkish political landscape are a result of three distinct social issues. 
First, the socio-political reaction to Kemalism and its authoritarian undertones. Two, 
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Turkey’s EU-integration process combined with Turkey’s increased economic 
performance and mobility of its citizens. Three, the resurgent nationalist-Islamism rhetoric 
in the AKP government as a result of accumulation of power and disillusionment with EU 
integrations.  
Traditionally, Turkish political players could have been divided on to two main 
cleavages, as identified by Meltem Müftüler-Baç in her book Divergent Pathways: Turkey 
and the European Union: Re-Thinking the Dynamics of Turkish-European Union 
Relations. These cleavages are between the secularists and the Islamists; and then between 
the nationalists and globalists (Müftüler-Baç, 88). The first cleavage was inherited in the 
Turkish Republic from the remnants of the Ottoman Empire where largely traditional 
society reacted to westernizing reforms of the political elite be invoking religion (Müftüler-
Baç, 90-91). When Turkey was created, a strong nationalist and secularist rhetoric pushed 
the Islamist into political underground by banning political parties, Islamic symbols, and 
putting Islam under state control (Müftüler-Baç, 91). After Turkey became the multi-party 
democracy in 1946, the Islamic political parties managed to be visible, and they won 
elections in 1950 with the election of Adnan Menderes of the Democratic Party as the 
Turkish Prime Minister (see “History”, section 1) (Müftüler-Baç, 92).  
Notwithstanding multiple coups (such as the one in 1980), the Islamic political 
activity in Turkey has managed to reform itself and stay relevant, and adopt pro-EU stances 
it was once critical of (Müftüler-Baç 93). In that sense, the secularist Kemalist elites in 
Turkey, after 1980s, became increasingly more nationalist and the lines between them and 
the Islamists, who were viewed as reactionaries to Kemalism, began blurring with regards 
to the process of Europeanization of society (Müftüler-Baç, 93). The Islamists adopted a 
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pro-EU agenda because it called for religious freedoms and further democratization of 
society (thereby acquiring modernizing tendencies) whereas the Kemalists feared that due 
to ideological stances (thereby acquiring nationalists tendencies): 
From the moment of political Islam’s emergence in the 1960s, it has 
polarized the political debate in Turkey. Given the Turkish state’s history 
of denying and suppressing Islam as a political force, this is not surprising. 
The Islamic-political breakthrough, both locally and nationally, during the 
1980s and 1990s, kept the temperature high on the issue, as did international 
developments in the form of the rise of Muslim fundamentalism and 
terrorism. However, the extreme reactions in Turkey against political Islam 
were not justified by events on the ground. The political manifestation of 
Islam, through its various mutations in Erbakan’s party, expressed the 
wishes of groups that did not identify with the Kemalist project {therefore, 
reactionary}. This drew new demographic groups into the public arena and 
into politics (NSCG, 55-56). 
The second cleavage was also inherited from the Ottoman Empire, according to 
Müftüler-Baç. In that vein, nationalists developed during and after the WWI with calls for 
a strong Turkish state based on a strong Turkish national identity (Müftüler-Baç, 93). 
Nationalists, according to Müftüler-Baç perceive Turkish politics through the prism of 
Kemalist ideology and authoritarian rule of Kemal himself (Müftüler-Baç, 93). They 
perceive the globalization of Turkey as detrimental to its identity (they generally are against 
the EU integrations); they are largely organized under the MHP party (Nationalist Action 
Party) (Müftüler-Baç, 93). They were especially prominent in the period of 2002 to 2005, 
when sweeping pro-EU changes led by AKP reformed aspects of Turkish politics 
(Müftüler-Baç, 94). Globalists, on the other hand, seek to integrate Turkey globally in 
political terms, however, they tend to avoid integrating Turkey into global economic order 
(Müftüler-Baç, 93).  
With the rise of AKP since 2002, the two cleavages as presented above have started 
overlapping. That is, nationalists, who are thought of as Kemalist-secularist, are 
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increasingly democratized in a sense that they are not opposed to religion whereas 
globalists, who are also Islamists, tend to adopt very nationalist rhetoric (e.g. President 
Erdoğan’s statements- see “Refugee Crisis: A New Frontier?”) to justify their policies 
(Müftüler-Baç, 95). This, according to Birol Yeʂilada and Peter Noordijk in Islamization 
of Turkey Under the AKP Rule, is a result of significant social and political developments 
in Turkey since the 1990s: 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, significant socioeconomic and political 
developments have taken place in Turkey. One of these developments is the 
emergence of Islamist-oriented political parties as a credible choice for 
voters despite repeated attempts by the military and its laicist partners to 
keep the Islamists out of power. The rise of the Welfare Party (RP) and its 
closure by the Constitutional Court {in 1998}, followed by the similar fate 
of the Virtue Party (FP) exemplify this conflict. With the split of the FP into 
two alternative political parties, the Felicity Party (SP) and the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP), Turkish electoral politics entered a new chapter. 
The AKP managed to attract many supporters from the traditional center-
right as well as the conservative elements of the traditional right of the 
political spectrum and swept into power in the 2002 national elections 
(Yeʂilada and Noordijk, 7). 
 As we can see, the socio-political cleavages in Turkey formed a fierce political 
competition, which resulted in the victory of reactionist Islamist parties (that have changed 
significantly since 1950s) over traditional Kemalist elites. All of the changes and struggles 
on the secularist-Islamist plane affected the EU-Turkey relations (e.g. the influence of 
coups of 1980 and 1997) significantly, however, as we have established, the EU shaped 
Turkish political landscape profoundly as well. 
 Turkey’s EU accession negotiations process greatly influenced the change in the 
Turkish political landscape. Starting in the 1990s, and with the introduction of the 
Copenhagen criteria in 1993, the EU-Turkey relationship (and Turkish accession process) 
was put in the framework of strong normative political system where Turkey’s reform 
progress has been actively evaluated. Although EU’s influence on Turkey’s politics goes 
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back before 1990s (for example, EU’s insistence on the return of the civil government in 
the wake of the 1980 coup d’état), this research will focus on the period of 1990s until 
today.  
 The EU enlargement process greatly impacts every potential member-state. 
Historically, most prospective member-states had to first initiate a set of deep political 
reforms to improve their state’s political, judicial, and civic atmosphere, and bring it to the 
level the EU found satisfying. For example, Croatia had to undergo significant reforms in 
political, economic, justice, and civic sectors before joining the EU in 2013. Although not 
all of these reforms have been successful, Croatia managed to accede into the EU less than 
ten years after accession negotiations started (at the same time as Turkey- 2005) and its 
socio-political, judicial, and economic system have been greatly amended and reformed. 
Therefore, the candidate states enter a social process when negotiating with the EU. By 
using the logic of appropriateness (see “Constructivism and IR”), we can argue that actors 
are guided by collectively shared understandings of what constitutes socially accepted 
behavior (Börzel, 11). In that sense, such collective understandings strongly influence the 
way actors (in this case candidate states) define their goals and interests. Therefore, the 
accession negotiations cause an emergence of Europeanisation, a process of emergence of 
new rules, norms, practices, and structures of meaning to which member states are exposed 
and which they have to incorporate into their domestic rule structures (Börzel, 11). 
Following from that is the conclusion that the EU accession negotiations are a catalyst for 
political and social change in candidate countries. 
  Turkey is an interesting state to study in terms of the EU enlargement because it 
has been trying to enter the EU for more than fifty years. During that time, and especially 
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in the last twenty years, EU’s role in Turkey was significant. EU was perceived as a natural 
path for a young Turkish nation given its history. However, Turkey’s EU road today seems 
to be increasingly viewed in the context of disillusionment with EU’s positioning on 
Turkey and in the context of the rise of AKP in Turkey’s political scene: 
This, of course, does not mean that there were not any internal political 
dynamics that led to political clashes and changes in Turkey. One could 
conceptualize the role of the EU’s political conditionality as a catalyst that 
induced change in Turkey. An important component of that change is the 
internalization of norms by the Turkish society. One should note that the 
adaptation to EU rules is a costly process that the governments that engage 
in significant political reforms have to incur and that the reception of 
European norms by various segments in the Turkish society during the 
negotiations process is a particularly problematic process (Müftüler-Baç, 
90). 
 With that in mind, Turkey’s EU accession negotiations did two things to Turkish 
political landscape. First, they diluted the social support for the Kemalist elites and 
military’s primacy in certain constitutional matters (such as the defense of secularist 
principles). Two, the accession negotiations pushed forth the liberal democratic agenda in 
Turkey which legitimized calls for relaxing the religious rules and diversifying Turkey’s 
political landscape. In that sense, the accession negotiations were one of the things (apart 
from the changes in Turkey’s society and reactions to the 1997 coup) that opened a space 
for parties like AKP to be more prominently featured as democratizers and Europeanizes 
while being religiously, albeit moderately, conservative.  
 Political parties in Turkey, most notably the AKP party, have used the EU accession 
process to legitimize their power hold in both positive and negative ways. At first, the AKP 
government instrumentalised the promotion of EU accession to widen its support base 
towards the center and to anchor its political reforms aimed at rolling back the influence of 
Kemalist forces and the military (Börzel, 17). After gaining satisfying electoral support 
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and systemic power, the AKP party stopped using EU as a legitimizer for change but rather 
started using it to promote a largely nationalist agenda (Börzel, 17). In that sense, the AKP 
party today justifies its political position as a defender of Turkish dignity in face of EU’s 
unwillingness to treat it like other candidate states (that is, on equal footing). This is most 
notable in the case of the recent refugee crisis, as discussed in later chapter on this issue 
(see chapter “Refugee Crisis: A New Frontier?”).  
 The slow fading of EU’s relevance as a legitimizing actor in Turkish politics is, 
therefore, connected to the rise of illiberal and nationalist agenda of the AKP party, headed 
by President Erdoğan. The agenda consists of: 
That is, economic and social modernity (capitalism as a system of socio-
economic relations and the bourgeois order) needs to be embedded in the 
traditional and religious values and morality of society to reproduce and 
legitimize itself (Ertuğrul, 165). 
 The slow fading of EU’s relevance as an important factor in Turkish politics is also 
followed by the increase in conservativism and traditionalism in Turkey in general. 
Yeʂilada and Noordijk conclude that a trend of rise of conservativism in Turkey has been 
happening since at least 1995, however, that it became more prominent and visible during 
the AKP rule (Yeʂilada and Noordijk, 22). In that sense, the outcome of years of political 
struggles between Kemalists and Islamists, in the context of Turkey’s historical westward 
political trajectory (that is, Turkey’s integration in the western security and political 
umbrella), is a modern conservative democrat, staunchly nationalist, authoritative, Islam-
inspired, political discourse spearheaded by the AKP party. The former Turkish PM 
Davutoğlu, considered one of the fathers of AKP’s political philosophy, wrote that Islamist 
elements in Turkey’s politics strengthen the connection between society, culture, and 
politics thus confirming the notion that AKP is a party whose political ideology not only 
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has religious undertones but is precisely embedded in Ottoman ideas of Islam as a vital 
element of Turkishness (Ertuğrul, 170). This is confirmed by Davutoğlu’s invocation of 
Sultan Abdülhamid II’s12 model of new “strategic identity and mentality” of the Ottoman 
Empire as a model that AKP should be inspired by (Ertuğrul, 170).  
 The recentering of secularism in the political discourse in Turkey, followed by an 
illiberal and nationalist turn in AKP’s policies, does not bode well for the EU-Turkey 
relationship. As we have seen, initially the AKP legitimized its political position by being 
the reformist party. Today, the AKP party is increasingly viewed as the reason for why 
Turkish politics, and society, are reverting on the EU reforms (threats to reintroduce death 
penalty which is a no-deal for the EU). As we have seen in this subchapter, the issue of 
political identity in Turkey (secularism vs. Islamism or nationalism vs. globalism) informs 
Turkey’s political preferences. By legitimizing the conservative ideas of Turkey, the AKP 
party is contributing to the process of othering of Turkey in Europe while at the same time 
contributing to the process of othering Europe in Turkey (that is, perpetuating the idea of 
the EU as a Christian Club- see “Refugee Crisis: A New Frontier?” for examples).  
5. Conclusion 
Finally, we can see that the issue of identity in Turkey-EU relationship is of 
fundamental importance for both players. In Europe, the way Turkey is seen according to 
cultural-historical patterns and constructs (such as the “Turk”) downplays Turkey’s 
significance as a candidate state in the accession negotiations. On the other hand, Turkey’s 
volatile politics are contributing not only to the legitimization of romanticized ideas of the 
                                                 
12 An Ottoman Sultan towards the end of the 19th century whose traditionalist approach to statecraft 
reverted many provisions of Tanzimat reforms and reinstated the Sultan as an absolute monarch. His rule is 
still an inspiration to many conservative-minded Turkish parties. 
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“Turk” but are also contributing to their own ideas of Turkishness (Islam as a connection 
between people and the state) which in turn other Europe. This has significant implications 
for the EU-Turkey relationship because these processes reduce the perceived importance 
of EU in and for Turkey, and vice versa. Furthermore, this leads to problems of having a 
normative-institutional relationship in the context of accession negotiations and decreases 
the possibility of political compromises on issues such as the refugee crisis or the situation 
on Cyprus.  
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Subchapter 2. Public Opinion 
1. Introduction  
Public opinion helps us understand both the perception of the relationship by Europeans 
and Turks as well as their perception on how different factors influence the relationship. 
Although positive EU public opinion is not a requirement for admitting a new member-
state, it still occupies a very important role in the EU enlargement process: 
 Firstly, EU itself has stated that citizens’ support is necessary for the 
success of the enlargement. We have therefore an acknowledgement of 
public opinion’s role, despite the lack of details or further clarifications. In 
every case, public opinion is closely related and affects the definition of 
what is called “EU’s absorption capacity. As a result, public opinion should 
be taken into consideration by policymakers. Public opinion matters due to 
the role of member-states in the accession process. If public opinion in 
member-states holds a negative attitude towards Turkey this creates 
difficulties in the accession process, mainly with regards to the ratification 
of the accession treaty. Ratification either through national parliaments or 
referendums (e.g. France has said that will hold a referendum on Turkey’s 
EU membership) shows how public opinion can be a crucial factor in 
Turkish membership. Fear of political cost discourages member-states 
governments to decide in favor of Turkey’s membership while their voters 
are strongly opposed to Turkey’s EU entry” (Dagdeverenis, 1).  
In that vein, studies on EU enlargement, with particular focus on Turkey, for example, 
always focus on public opinion and seek to present it to the reader. This speaks volumes 
when it comes to understanding how the EU relationship with states works. It is 
bidirectional and it rests fundamentally on the perception of one towards another (see 
below). 
 Additionally, in this chapter, I present the findings of qualitative interviews I 
conducted during the Fall semester while in Berlin, on the role of identity, religion, and 
discourse in the relationship between the EU and Turkey. As such, this chapter presents a 
normative and qualitative basis for my research and serves as a background to other 
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chapters, especially those dealing with identity construction and its effect on the 
relationship. 
2. Literature and Data on the Public Opinion of Turks and Europeans on EU-Turkey 
Accession Negotiations 
This research presents the public opinion of Europeans on EU-Turkish relations 
through an interplay of three main dimensions: a) Turcoskepticism, b) Euroscepticism, and 
c) enlargement fatigue.  
Canan-Sokullu writes that the emergent Turkoscepticism hasn’t been a single 
monolith episteme shaping the European public opinion on Turkey, but that it has 
encouraged intellectuals and elites to be more vocal against Turkish membership as well 
as that it encouraged the strengthening of the “cultural” argument against Turkish 
membership in the EU (i.e. Europe is a cultural space resting on Judeo-Christian values to 
which Turkey doesn’t belong) (Canan-Sokullu, 484). He defines Turkoscepticism as based 
on: 
 A limited perception of Turkey as a poor and populous Islamic country 
with economic, social, cultural and political problems related to adopting 
and effectively internalizing the values of the European state system. 
Although Turkey’s EU integration project has been a process of political 
incorporation premised on inclusive notions of rights as well as European 
political value orientations, debates at both societal and political levels have 
revolved around perceived differences in collective identities rooted in 
religion, culture, ethnic and national dynamics. This debate has contributed 
to the growth of Turcoscepticism, creating what can be described as doubts 
or negative feelings and attitudes towards Turkey. Turcoscepticism has 
recently been encouraged by fears associated with Islam and Muslim 
immigration. While Europe has experienced immigration from Muslim 
countries – in particular from Turkey since the 1970s – in the post-
September-11 era, concerns about whether Europe would be Islamized 
following Turkey’s EU membership have made the European vox populi 
gradually more anxious. Many voices have suggested that the Turkish 
‘crescent’ would endanger the European ‘cross’, in that the Islamisation of 
Europe would most likely come about through Turkey’s EU membership. 
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The future immigration of Muslim Turks into Europe has, inter alia, 
heightened popular worries, the prospect of Turkey joining the EU 
generating unease among Europeans (Canan-Sokullu, 483/84). 
The European Union, in order to function properly, needs to have a consensus of 
its, now twenty-eight, member states. However, many times, those member states diverged 
from EU’s goals due to public pressure exercised in the referenda. For example, the most 
famous instance of Eurosceptic dissent of the public was the EU Constitution referendum 
in France and the Netherlands when the French and the Dutch voters, respectively, rejected 
the EU Constitution drafted after the Nice Summit (Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca, 1). 
Although rejection of the EU Constitution by Dutch and French voters was not inherently 
connected to Turkish accession negotiations, which also started in 2005, Turkish accession, 
as the research shows, is more likely to cause the biggest split in public opinion with 
regards to the EU enlargement agenda (Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca, 2). Ruiz-Jimenez 
and Torreblanca write: 
 The absence of a direct link between the French and Dutch ‘nays’ to the 
Constitutional Treaty and Turkish accession does not conceal, however, the 
dominant negative mood existing among EU founding member states when 
it comes to support for enlargement. Europeans show little enthusiasm for 
enlargement in general, and for Turkey’s accession in particular (Ruiz-
Jimenez and Torreblanca, 2).  
In addition to this, Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca point out that the general support 
for the accessions of south-eastern European states is rising thus indicating the divergence 
of public opinion on Turkish accession in comparison to some other states, such as the 
south-eastern European ones (Ruiz- Jimenez and Torreblanca, 2). Moreover, the new-
member states do not seem to be generally affected by the EU enlargement fatigue as the 
western European states do, however, they as well are not enthusiastic in their support for 
Turkish accession: 
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 Furthermore, owing to the fact that citizens of the new member states 
(NMS) predominantly favor future enlargements, the 2004 enlargement has 
generally had a positive impact on the levels of support for the future 
accession of countries in south-east Europe, yet assent for Turkish accession 
has not benefited from this effect. As a consequence, a split has appeared 
when it comes to support for future accessions, with Turkey being located 
at the most negative end of the spectrum on future enlargement (Ruiz-
Jimenez and Torreblanca, 2).  
When it comes to the three dimensions of public opinion: enlargement, 
Euroscepticism, Turkoscepticism, the public opinion seems rather divided. To support this, 
Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca have divided their results into three main approaches: 
utilitarian, identitarian and post-national (Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca, 2/3). The 
utilitarian approach, argue Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca, refers to people who view the 
EU through the cost-benefit analysis lens (Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca, 2). In that sense, 
they argue that people will favor enlargement of the EU more if it will bring visible and 
positive economic and safety changes (Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca, 3). The identitarian 
approach, on the other hand, refers to the idea that Europe is a geographically delimited 
entity with its cultural and historic heritage (Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca, 3). Therefore, 
those who belong to this approach would gauge their support for EU policies based on 
identitarian values (Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca, 3). Finally, the post-national approach 
views the EU integration and enlargement as resting on a set of universal principles and 
values, such as human rights and rule of law (Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca, 3).    
Accordingly, they’ve set up three main hypotheses for their research: utilitarian, 
identitarian and post-national. The utilitarian hypothesis states that: “the more that Turkish 
accession is considered beneficial, the higher the support will be for accession and, 
conversely, the costlier accession is perceived, the higher the opposition will be to 
enlargement.” (Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca, 4). Identitarian hypothesis states that: “the 
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more that European citizens believe Turkey is part of Europe (in geographical, historical 
and cultural terms), the more they will support Turkish accession and vice versa.” (Ruiz-
Jimenez and Torreblanca, 5). Finally, the post-national hypothesis states that: “the more 
importance citizens assign to the set of shared principles on which the Union is based, and 
which conform to the enlargement acquis, the more likely their level of support for or 
opposition to Turkish membership will depend on whether they think Turkey meets or is 
in the position to meet these criteria.” (Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca, 6). According to 
Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca’s research, the public support in the EU for Turkish 
membership is low and shrinking (Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca, 7). Although this 
research was conducted in 2008, its results go hand-in-hand with the overall trend of 
shrinking support for EU enlargement process (51% of Europeans against it in autumn of 
2016) and with Jean Claude Juncker’s campaign not to expand the EU more until 2019 
(Eurobarometer 86, 24). Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca conclude that even though the 
support for Turkish membership is low and declining, the results coming from three 
hypotheses are very complex. For example, they conclude that those who support the 
identitarian approach towards the EU are most likely to be against Turkish membership in 
the EU (Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca, 23). However, they also say that those who view 
EU through a post-national lens tend to support Turkish membership the most (Ruiz-
Jimenez and Torreblanca, 23). Finally, the utilitarian hypothesis was found to be the least 
relevant one for the public opinion in the EU on Turkish membership (Ruiz-Jimenez and 
Torreblanca, 23). This testifies to an interesting, albeit conflicting view the EU citizens 
have of Turkish accession. In one way, it appears that perceived ideas of European culture 
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and identity are least permissive of Turkish accession and on the other, it appears that the 
post-national idea of the EU is most permissive for Turkish accession.  
The identitarian hypothesis which demonstrates that identity and culture-oriented 
individuals are less likely to support Turkish EU accession, gives rise to Turcoscepticism. 
As defined earlier, Turcoscepticism bases itself on a negative image of Turkey as a poor 
and Islamic country whose economic and cultural integration in the EU would be 
problematic, if at all possible (Canan-Sokullu, 483). Going in line with constructivist ideas, 
identity, as well as individuals and societies, have become referent objects of perceived 
threats (Canan-Sokullu, 485). Therefore, the reinvigoration of the idea of identity-threat in 
Europe has negative reflected on Turkey and its accession path. Following the 9/11 attacks, 
Europe strengthened its policies against terrorism and immigration, and the EU public 
came to view Muslims and Islam as something foreign as well as something dangerous 
(Cesari, 11). The 9/11 attacks were partially organized in Europe, in Hamburg, and there 
were at least twenty Europeans among the individuals imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay 
since; the EU states have arrested twenty times the number of terrorists the US has (Cesari, 
11). Therefore, the issue of Turkish accession to the EU has been securitized through the 
prism of securitizing Islam and Muslims in the European context. However, the issue of 
othering13 Islam is not a new issue in the European context. Ideas of West, the fight against 
Ottomans and colonialism have all brought discursive othering to Europe long before the 
EU was even created. Europe’s struggle with the Ottomans have become discursively 
                                                 
13 Stuart Hall defines othering as a process by which societies create a discourse, a certain regime of truth 
which enables them to distinguish themselves from other societies by asserting that “they are not what 
those others are” (Hall and Gieben, 294). In that sense, Hall posits that the cultural idea of the West, which 
is predominant in Europe, is used against mainly Middle Eastern and Islamic peoples as a tool to other 
them- meaning that “we”, the West, are not what “they”, the Rest, are (Hall and Gieben, 296). 
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intertwined to Europe’s struggle with Islam and have created an idea of Europe as a 
Christian continent: 
Gradually, despite their many internal differences, the countries of western 
Europe began to conceive of themselves as part of a single family or 
civilization- 'the West'. The challenge from Islam was an important factor 
in hammering Western Europe and the idea of 'the West' into shape. Roberts 
notes that, 'The word "Europeans" seems to appear for the first time in an 
eighth-century reference to Charles Martel's victory [over Islamic forces] at 
Tours. All collectivities become more self-aware in the presence of an 
external challenge, and self-awareness promotes cohesiveness. And Hulme 
speaks of ' ... the consolidation of an ideological identity through the testing 
of [Europe's] Eastern frontiers prior to the adventure of Atlantic exploration 
.... A symbolic end to that process could be considered Pius III's 1458 
identification of Europe with Christendom (Hall and Gieben, 289).  
Therefore, Europe’s history of conquest and struggle has become embedded in 
European consciousness as an identitarian struggle which helped define the continent as it 
is today. With this in mind, the creation of perceived threats of Turkish accession in the 
EU has been a process which intertwined discursive othering with real-life threats. It has 
been conflated with fears of immigration and the well-established fear of Islam. When it 
comes to fears of immigration, Canan-Sokullu identifies two ways of manifesting these 
fears: attack on individual’s pocket economy and symbolic threats that stem from prejudice 
(Canan-Sokullu, 487). Attack on individual’s pocket economy arises from a fear of 
competing with cheap labor influx thus leaving local, costlier, workers jobless (Canan-
Sokullu, 487). In this sense, Canan-Sokullu’s argument is similar to Torreblanca’s and 
Ruiz-Jimenez’ in that it posits a cost-rational approach to Turkish membership. The same 
conclusion is found in Meltem Müftüler-Baç’s and Yannis A. Stivachtis’ book Turkey-
European Union Relations: Dilemmas, Opportunities, and Constraints with authors 
concluding that: 
Most Europeans and Turks believe Turkey’s accession to the EU will serve 
the Turkish interests mostly with divided opinion on its impact on the 
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European interests as a whole. The extent to which the Europeans would 
perceive Turkey’s accession to be in their own interests will determine their 
support for Turkey’s accession. In other words, if Turkey’s accession will 
improve the future of Europe significantly in a material fashion, then most 
probably feelings of animosity and perceptions of Turkey as an alien culture 
would be less intense. (Müftüler-Baç’s and Stivachtis, 129).  
Symbolic threats arise from the in-group and out-group behavior that creates a 
communal identity and culture which then becomes threatened by an influx of new 
linguistic and cultural agents (Canan-Sokullu, 487). In her article, Canan-Sokullu divides 
the public opinion on mass and elite with elite public opinion consisting of high-ranking 
EU officials coming from the EU parliament, the Commission and the Council (Canan-
Sokullu, 485). She concludes her article analyzing the public (mass) and the EU political 
elite opinion on Turkish accession to the EU. Her findings show that from 2006 to 2008 
(the timespan of the research), the perceived threats of immigration and Islamic 
fundamentalism have significantly contributed to public opinion on Turkish accession to 
the EU (Canan-Sokullu, 492). This goes in hand with Dagdeverenis’ research’s conclusions 
that Turkey is the least preferred potential member of all candidate states: 
There is a steady negative trend towards Turkish accession in the period 
2005 – 2010. Four surveys (2005-2, 2006-2, 2008-1 and 2010-2) measure 
European public opinion especially for Turkey’s membership. The 
percentage of those opposed is high (between 55 and 59%). It is worth 
mentioning that compared with other candidate countries Turkey is the least 
preferred country for EU membership. (Dagdeverenis, 6/7).   
However, when it comes to the EU elite, Canan-Sokullu concludes that the 
perceived threats did not influence EU elite’s opinions significantly (Canan-Sokullu, 492). 
Canan-Sokullu’s findings, however, do not preclude EU elites from discursively othering 
Turkey. Senem Aydɪn-Düzgɪt, in her book Constructions of European Identity Debates 
and Discourses on Turkey and the EU writes that the EU elites belonging to the EPP 
(European People’s Party, a center-right, majority, political group) group in the EU 
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Parliament tend to other Turkey through neo-orientalist discourse which constructs EU in 
a geographic and cultural sense and others Turkey as an Islamic, eastern, and immigrant 
threat to a homogenous unity of Europeans who culturally belong to the West (Aydɪn-
Düzgɪt, 133). This indicates that more right-wing oriented parties prefer to utilize the 
identitarian approach when debating Turkish membership in the EU.  
In Turkey, on the other hand, the public opinion relating to the EU has been 
relatively stable and supportive of Turkey’s efforts (German Marshall Fund, 8). Although 
Turkish public generally, and traditionally, supports the membership bid, recent events 
show that the support is fading. The traditional support of Turks for the EU membership 
stems from the same Kemalist principles that have guided Turkey towards its integration 
in in western security umbrella (i.e. NATO). However, Turkish public and elite support for 
the EU membership is multidimensional and does not only depend on the idea of 
modernization of Turkey through its adoption of westernized lifestyle. Therefore, we have 
to look beyond traditional public opinion of the Turkish membership in the EU and focus 
on political parties which, by the virtue of their ideologies, have varying views of the EU.  
Political changes and issues during the negotiations have left their mark on the public 
opinion of Turks when it comes to EU membership. For example, before 2004, when the 
referendum on reunification of Cyprus was held and Greek Cypriots rejected it, the support 
for the EU was as high as seventy per cent (Yeʂilada, 62). Since then, however, the support 
of Turks for the EU membership has fallen to and below fifty per cent (Yeʂilada, 62). The 
disappointment with Cyprus is combined with the fact that the Turkish electorate has 
generally moved towards the right of the political spectrum since the 1990s (Yeʂilada,60). 
This produced a long-term effect of erosion of belief of quality and credibility of the EU 
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accession process as well as the necessity of Turkey’s accession to the EU. Today, in 2017, 
more than fifty years after Europe and Turkey started negotiations towards accession, and 
thirteen years since the Cyprus disappointment, Turks have become quite skeptical of 
whether Turkey wants and needs to enter the European Union (Eurobarometer 85, 2016). 
This is due to multiple reasons ranging from frustration with the length of the negotiations 
to frustration with EU’s lack of reaction after the attempted coup in July of 2016. 
As for the traditional Turkish public opinion of the EU, the most recent 
Eurobarometer report (Eurobarometer 85, May 2016) states that Turkey continues 
supporting the EU membership bid (Eurobarometer 85, 74). The percentage of participants 
who are in favor of Turkey joining the EU is at 39% and there is 26% of those who oppose 
it (Eurobarometer 85, 74). When we compare these results to the results of other member 
states, however, we can see that the support for EU membership of Turkey is low. In 
Albania, 79% of respondents are in favor of membership, in Montenegro 53%, and in FYR 
Macedonia 53% (Eurobarometer 85, 73). However, many more respondents in Turkey 
perceive the EU membership as a positive thing (53%) with 38% disagreeing 
(Eurobarometer 85, 74). Even though Eurobarometer notes that the perception of EU 
membership in Turkey as beneficial is changing (in comparison to Eurobarometer 84, 
support is down from 56% by three points and skepticism is up from 30% by eight points), 
it remains important to note that levels of support have not radically changed in recent 
years and do not constitute a clear breakaway from recent opinion polls (Eurobarometer 
85, 74). Therefore, we can see that generally, Turkish people do support the Turkey’s EU 
membership and view it as something beneficial for their country. 
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When it comes to Turkey’s elites and their views of Turkey’s EU bid, we must look 
at Turkish political parties to obtain and analyze data. The multidimensionality of Turkish 
perception of the EU is illustrated in Olli Rehn’s (former EU Commissioner for 
enlargement) statement that there are three main groups which support Turkish EU bid: 
Kemalist-secular public support, confessional/Islamist support and then the liberal elite 
support. (Müftüler-Baç, 126). Müftüler-Baç writes that, unlike these three groups, the 
nationalists, which are a fourth, and a very important group in Turkish society, generally 
form an anti-membership block (parties such as CHP or MHP) (Müftüler-Baç, 126). She 
argues that their support has withered in recent years due to double standards applied by 
the EU on Turkey in accession negotiations (Müftüler-Baç, 126). She further writes that 
the previous CHP leader Deniz Baykal (who led the party from 2002 until 2010) stated that 
the EU is mocking Turkish national pride (Müftüler-Baç, 127). In an interesting twist of 
events, Müftüler-Baç’s conclusions in 2008 demonstrate a clear breakway from Çarkoğlu’s 
findings from 2002. Çarkoğlu writes that, apart from SP (Felicity Party, founded in 2001) 
whose members don’t support EU membership, all other relevant political parties in Turkey 
then, apart from newly-founded AKP, have clear majorities in support of the EU 
membership (MHP, the nationalist party had a 68% support for the membership) 
(Çarkoğlu, 178). AKP marked support for the membership but it was weak, with 52% of 
members supporting the EU membership (Çarkoğlu, 178).  
However, Turkish elite and public opinion are highly connected to EU’s actions 
towards Turkey. It appears that the public opinion of both masses and elites in Turkey 
comes as a reaction to EU’s policies towards Turkey, irrespective of the state of Turkey’s 
accession. Turkey today is seen in increasingly hostile terms in the EU, especially after the 
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signing of the EU-Turkey migration deal and Turkish refusal to meet all 72-benchmarks 
that would allow Turkish citizens to travel to EU without visas (see “Current Situation, 
section 1.”). Turkey perceives the EU in increasingly negative way as well. EU’s reaction 
(or the lack of it) to the attempted coup in July is seen as a clear sign of EU’s ambivalence 
towards Turkey: 
The reaction of EU institutions and member states to the coup was slow and 
cautioned against overreach in the aftermath. Among most Turkish 
politicians (oppositional CHP and HDP excluded) there is a firm impression 
that this was feeble and unsupportive at best. Europe is perceived as having 
not fully understood the significance of what happened and the 
consequences it could have had. Some see European decision makers’ lack 
of sympathy as expressing tolerance of the coup attempt, and as a visible 
manifestation of Europe’s broader attitude to Turkey. This was described 
by one high ranking Turkish official as “like a matryoshka doll - it has 
Erdoganophobia on the outside, then xenophobia and racism, then anti-
semitism, and Europhobia at the core (Aydɪntaʂbaʂ, Leonard and 
Tcherneva, 2016). 
There is a clear intersubjective perception amongst the two actors which helps them 
other one another. EU easily dismisses Turkey as a reluctant candidate and a country which 
is rolling back on its reforms. Turkey perceives EU as an institution that publicly channels 
general European fears of Turkey as well as their belittlement of Turkish power and 
accomplishments.  
The relevance of this chapter is not only for us to understand the mass and elite 
opinions in the accession process but rather because it enables us to see and understand 
three main trends. First one is that Europeans are clearly divided on the issue of Turkish 
accession and that there is a difference between European public and elite opinions with 
elites favoring Turkish accession more than the public. Second one is that Turks still 
perceive the EU membership as something beneficial for their country in a clear break from 
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AKP’s14 and Erdogan’s more recent public comments and attitudes towards the EU. The 
third and final conclusion is that the divisions in both public and elite opinions of both 
actors on the EU-Turkey accession negotiations follow a deepening political divide and 
lack of constructive cooperation between EU and Turkey. In recent months, the 
immigration deal signed in March, 2016, has been perceived as an obstacle, rather than a 
push for the relationship, due to divergent attitudes of Turks15 and Europeans16 on the issue 
of 72 visa-free travel benchmarks (See chapter “Current Situation, section 1.”). Moreover, 
the attempted coup from July 2016 has brought the relationship to its knees due to EU’s 
lukewarm response and Turkey’s government’s backlash on dissenters and coup-plotters. 
Political reality of the relationship, combined with public and elite opinions on EU-Turkey 
accession negotiations, demonstrate a deteriorating intersubjective relationship which, in 
turn, gives rise to a political atmosphere that is increasingly moving Turkey and the EU 
away from each other.  
3. Interviews 
In this section of the chapter, I will present the findings of my interviews. By using 
a coding analysis, I have identified five main themes across three interview transcriptions. 
The themes are as follows: religious identity of Turkey and  EU, refugee crisis, the size of 
Turkey, Turkish political establishment, and Europeanness. Naturally, these five themes 
are not the exclusive themes in my interviews, however, they seem to be the ones which 
draw the most consensus amongst interviewees and are the most important ones for my 
                                                 
14 I refer only to AKP here as they have won an overall and clear majority of Turkish National Assembly in 
the elections in November, 2015 thus becoming the strongest party in the state.  
15 In this context, the political representatives of the Republic of Turkey 
16 In this context, the political representatives of the EU 
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argumentation. However, before proceeding with the interview analysis, I wish to write a 
bit about the interview process itself. 
Although I have contacted around a dozen of prospective interviewees, only a 
handful (four) of them responded positively to my request to talk about EU-Turkey 
relations. Interviewees rejected my request for interviews for two reasons. The first reason 
is simply unwillingness to talk about such a complicated issue. This reason manifested 
itself mainly within the German-Turkish community where people are generally weary of 
political and social topics; most people told me that they simply didn’t “wish to think about 
it”. However, the second, and by far the most important reason for rejecting my offer for 
an interview was the current emergency situation and Turkish government’s backlash on 
dissenters. In that sense, many potential interviewees told me that, despite the fact that 
information provided would be confidential, they simply did not wish to be involved in 
such a conversation for security reasons. The four interviewees that have accepted my 
requests did not have any specific requirements, however, most of them simply wished to 
be anonymous. In addition, this research uses only three, of the four, interviews for its 
analysis. This is because during this research, I have experienced certain administrative 
difficulties causing me to lose an Informed Consent Form obtained from one of the 
interviewees. With academic honesty in mind, I decided to remove the data from one of 
the interviews in order to ensure trustworthiness of my conclusions. Luckily, however, the 
fourth interview was not significant in information so it did not impact my conclusions at 
all.  
As I indicated in the Methodology section of this paper, the interviews conducted 
were structured interviews. The interviews were conducted in a place chosen by 
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interviewees. I envisioned the interviews as a relaxed conversation regarding the Turkish 
road to EU as well as Turkish and European identities, and prospects for the future. For 
example, for one of the interviews I met my interlocutor in a Berlin café as he felt 
comfortable there. Therefore, the welfare of my interviewees was a crucial point for 
establishing a rapport and receiving factual and honest answers from them. Furthermore, 
even though interviews were structured, some participants could not provide answers to all 
the questions, so I could not obtain satisfying answers to all of them. In that case, I have 
not excluded participants’ answers but have rather reformed the questions in order to add 
more clarity for future use. I also did not delete their responses but have decided to include 
them in the transcription. The average length of the interviews was between twenty-two 
and twenty-five minutes.  
The first theme I wish to explore in this chapter is the theme of religious issues 
between EU-Turkey. When it comes to the theme of religious identity in Turkey and the 
EU, the participants have answered questions such as:” Turkey is a predominantly Muslim 
country. Do you think that that has any influence on EU-Turkey relationship?” as well as:” 
Is EU a “Christian Club”, or a union of and for only Christian states?” (Personal 
Correspondence, 2016). Both questions were met with negative answers in all except one 
interview. The interviewee in question gave a firmly positive answer to the first question 
and a reluctantly negative answer to the second one. As for other interviews, it seems that 
even their negative responses to both questions are not emphatic, but rather 
multidimensional. In that sense, these two questions wanted to address more recent 
concerns in the field of study of the relationship between the EU and Turkey that focus on 
religion-based identity issues. As one of the participants stated, the idea that Turkey is a 
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Muslim country and that that is problematic has emerged after the Cold War (Personal 
Correspondence, 2016). Therefore, the accession skeptics who base their skepticism on the 
argument of religion seem to be products of a new identitarian discourse in the EU. Going 
from there, this identitarian discourse has developed not only because of the end of the 
Cold War but also because of Turkish integration itself. Participant II17 stated that Turkish 
accession negotiations have stimulated EU and Europe to think about who and what they 
are in terms of their identities (Personal Correspondence, 2016). Another participant 
(Participant III) stated that indeed religion plays a big role in terms of Islam because Turkey 
has been othered in European history for decades and centuries (Personal Correspondence, 
2016). Hence, the idea of Turkey as an Islamic invader of Europe has persisted from 
medieval ages hitherto (Personal Correspondence, 2016).  However, during my interviews, 
two participants have pointed out that there are other countries with large Muslim 
populations applying to be EU member states. In that context, Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia and Kosovo were mentioned. It appears that the idea that 
Turkey as Muslim country is not the sole factor which influences the religious-identitarian 
approach. As one of my interviewees said, it is important to note that apart from being 
Muslim, Turkey is also construed as non-white and non-European (Personal 
Correspondence, 2016). In that sense, the aforementioned Balkan states are constructed as 
white and as European which makes them “less Muslim” in the eyes of the EU political 
establishment: 
 I don’t, I think that in the case of Bosnia and Macedonia, the Balkan region, 
which is in the heart of Europe and that region always has more advantage 
than Turkey and also if you look at Bosnian Islam which is always seen as 
a sort of a white and secular Islam, I think that it has something to do with 
Turkey as Ottoman and also its history with Europe from all the wars and 
                                                 
17 I shall refer to interviewees by non-chronological numbers 
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congresses so it’s different. I think also that Germany especially, for 
example, is very engaged with Turkey, especially because of migration and 
because of its Turkish population, that’s why German-Turkish relationship 
is a big part of Euro-Turkish relations and it also kind of helps measure the 
level of integration of Turks in Europe and then, of course, they use their 
level of integration to judge whether Turkey is ready to be an EU member. 
(Personal Correspondence, 2016).  
Another interviewee played into this argument by saying that the Balkan states are 
not “hinge states” between Europe and Asia which makes them more easily digestible than 
Turkey (Personal Correspondence, 2016). Perhaps, this argument on race as a religion-
legitimizer in Europe can be studied more and consequently fill in some conceptual holes, 
especially in EU enlargement studies.  
We can see that constructions of the discourse in Europe are very important as they 
divide Muslims on to “acceptable” and “unacceptable” ones. In this case, the distinctions 
are made based on racial/geographic and experiential18 factors. Despite the fact that 
Europe’s borders are not exactly determined and that Turkey shares a lot with Europe in 
terms of identity, culture and history, the negative image, the romanticized image, of Turks 
seems to prevail in discussions on accession regardless of the fact that Turkey is, or is not, 
ready to be an EU member. Naturally, this kind of discourse is not only connected to 
Muslims and Islam but also to other minority groups. Therefore, Turkey is deemed an 
“unacceptable” Muslim country due to the history of Europe with Turks as well as recent 
political developments inside the country. Policy implications of this would be massive as 
it is easier for European politicians to deal with Turkey from a position of power where the 
public opinion of Europeans is already generally negative (see part a) towards the prospect 
of Turkish accession. This makes it easier for them to construct Turkish cooperation (or 
                                                 
18 Referring to personal, or socio-cultural, experience with Muslims and Islam. 
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the lack of it) through the lens of culture (i.e. Turkey does not satisfy the Copenhagen 
Criteria because Islam is incompatible with European values). 
When it comes to the question of the EU as a Christian Club, the interviewees were 
in a consensus in saying that even though Europe has Christian background and that the 
EU was perhaps more Christian in nature initially, the political developments inside the 
EU institutions have enshrined the principle of secularism despite attempts of instituting 
the Judeo-Christian heritage of Europe in the EU Constitution. For example, one of the 
interviewees (PI) stated that:  
Let me connect it with no 9 and with the Christian Club question, the things 
is that some years ago, some ten years ago, the EU was working on a 
constitution and there was the idea that there’d be a preamble that defined 
the Judeo-Christian heritage of Europe and France, which is very secularist, 
very laicist, was one of the countries that said no, we are not into identity 
politics in terms of religion here, Europe is a geographic entity with political 
principles, in terms of basic human freedoms, government…but, it does not 
have a religious litmus test, so, uhm, in that sense, I wouldn’t necessarily 
think that the EU consciously thinks of itself as a Judeo-Christian club, but 
the extent to which it somehow, subconsciously works to impact members 
particular countries like Poland or Ireland which are defined by religion 
culturally, uhm, but to our view that explicitly that the membership criteria 
say that you can only be a part of the EU if you’re predominantly a Christian 
nation, the question has to be also how many people are still religiously 
active? If religion is relevant at all? (Personal Correspondence, 2016).  
Here, we can see a reference to the EU Constitution which was rejected in 2005, 
however, before its rejection it started a fiery debate on European identity. Certain member-
states asked for a preamble to be introduced which would outline EU as an organization 
which has roots in Judeo-Christian civilization. The request was formally denied by France 
and the Netherlands and has never been re-introduced again. However, on a subconscious 
level, we can see that the requirement, and the fact that only two countries voted against 
and that seven states asked for the introduction of the preamble (led by Italy) is enough to 
conclude that the cultural/identitarian approach has a strong foothold in the EU politics 
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(Black, 2004). Other participants (participant III, namely) stated that although they did not 
believe EU was a Christian Club any longer, there are some secular tendencies arising from 
Christianity which could have an effect on EU's positioning towards certain candidates, but 
that this is highly unlikely due to a strong secular tradition of the EU (Personal 
Correspondence, 2016).  
The second theme I wish to explore in this chapter is the theme of the refugee crisis. 
The refugee crisis plays an important role not directly in the accession negotiations between 
the EU and Turkey but rather in the general relationship between the two. This being said, 
it must be noted that the general relationship largely rests on the accession negotiations and 
that any damages to the relationship, as we have seen before (see "History of Relations") 
can cause a stalemate in the accession negotiations, and vice versa. In that sense, the recent 
refugee crisis (see "The Refugee Crisis: A New Frontier?") is an important element of this 
thesis. Interview questions which deal with the refugee crisis are as follows: "What effect, 
if any, does the current Refugee Crisis have on the EU- Turkey relations?" (Personal 
Correspondence, 2016). The responses to this question have been interesting and complex.   
Participant III, for example, stated that both the EU and Turkey are either using the 
refugees as threats (the case of Turkey) or are perceiving refugees as threats (the case of 
EU) because the whole issue of refugees has been securitized in the wake of terrorist attacks 
and Islamist radicalism:  
Europe is using Turkey as a buffer zone to keep the refugees out and is also 
making negotiations on the visa regime, and of course Turkey is using this 
situation as a leverage and says that the borders will be opened if Europe 
doesn’t listen. I think also that Europe is scared of the refugees due to 
terrorism and we have to see that many terrorist attacks were also conducted 
by European Muslims. Europe has to see the radicalization inside which is 
a consequence of failed social integration policies as well as the poor 
situation outside its borders. (Personal Correspondence, 2016).  
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Participant I carried out a different but also interesting point that states that the 
refugee crisis is a part of the larger package of accession negotiations:  
Because we can tie their hands on many things, you know, legally, that they 
may not want to pursue19, but that’s, leaving that aside, assuming that they 
want to, the refugee crisis is at least being used as an element in the broader 
picture package deal kind of approach. Turkey says you guys do this to help 
us with the refugee crisis, and then we will, you know, accommodate you 
on the refugee issue. So, in that sense, the refugee crisis has had an effect 
on the relationship and on the bargaining between sides. It is one of the 
issues. (Personal Correspondence, 2016).  
This response establishes that the refugees and the refugee crisis is being used as a 
leverage in the accession process. President Erdoğan and AKP have prominently become 
symbols of accepting Syrian refugees in the world media, however, many do not report the 
fact that they are also gaining political leverage over the EU by accepting so many refugees 
(who live in poor conditions). We can see that the EU, in order to keep Turkey a "buffer 
zone", so to speak, has agreed to give six billion Euros to Turkey for accommodating the 
refugees, predominantly Syrian ones (see "Current Situation, section a).  Therefore, the 
refugee crisis has become a significant issue in the relationship on a constructive level. The 
refugees, who are securitized, are seen as threat-agents who need to be kept outside the 
EU. Turkey, on the other hand, realizes that these agents in themselves can help Turkey 
realize its interest of gaining not only a hand in the accession process (perhaps, more 
inclination of the EU to open negotiation chapters which are largely frozen?) but also 
gaining the visa free travel without fulfilling all benchmarks for it (see "Current Situation, 
section a). Participant II's response testifies to this argument: 
It propelled but in a completely different context. But, remember that five 
or six years ago the relationship was more profound. So, the accession 
negotiations were happening, right now the relationship has become 
                                                 
19 This in reference to the reform package initiated during the accession process (I.e. Copenhagen Criteria 
completion) 
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securitized, so the Europeans want to use Turkey as a buffer zone and 
Turkey tries to blackmail the Europeans. You’re right, but sort of the 
agreement was a positive thing for the relationship, and especially for the 
refugees, and Greece, and the loss of life was very high especially in the 
winter, so it is very dangerous, so this was a success. But on the other hand 
it is clear that Erdogan is willing to use this issue as a part of the domestic 
rhetoric, engaging with Russia and everything. When the European 
Parliament reprimanded Turkey for its rule of law record and recommended 
the suspension of recommendations because you cannot do much in this 
kind of situation, Turkey said that the EU should be careful because they 
have a certain leverage over it. In a way, he is conducting his EU policy, 
but it is important to remember that it is also a part of his domestic policy, 
because Turks receive this message, his policy, as a very brave and 
honorable defense of Turkish interest against others who aren’t interested 
in Turkish welfare and are trying to partition Turkey. (Personal 
Correspondence, 2016).    
The third theme coming from the coding analysis is the theme of the Turkish 
political establishment. This theme covers an important element of the relationship, 
namely, the way the current regime establishment interacts with the EU and their policies, 
behaviors as well as statements related to the EU matters. This theme is presented through 
questions: "Does Erdoğan’s style of leadership, in your view, harm EU-Turkish relations?", 
as well as: “Do you think Turkey has been a credible partner in integration process? As in, 
has Turkey been successfully following EU’s guidelines on integration?" (Personal 
Correspondence, 2016). The participants answered generally in agreement, saying that, in 
both questions, there was a negative approach of Turkey towards the EU. For the first 
question, they agreed that President's style of leadership is harmful, however, some of them 
stated that it really is not only up to the president but also up to the institutions of the state 
which are traditionally weak in Turkish politics. For example, PII stated that: 
I think it’s more than the style of leadership, it is also that, but it is also the 
quality of Turkish institutions, so this strong-man, single leader tradition is 
not uncommon in Turkey. Ataturk used to be the same figure so the opposite 
camp is sort of similar in that way. So still people venerate Ataturk as a sort 
of a divine figure, like he never made a mistake, he did everything right. 
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But, the most important issue is the lack of democratic checks and balances 
mechanism. (Personal Correspondence, 2016).  
In addition to that, PII stated that initially AKP's pro-EU reforms were a genuine 
step forward in both the accession process and Turkish integration process (Personal 
Correspondence, 2016). However, since then, due to the lack of checks and balances, 
effects of those reforms were undone (Personal Correspondence, 2016). Participant III had 
a similar position but did not base his arguments on Turkish institutions: 
But, now with everything happening around Erdogan, this whole process 
changed. He really showed a different Turkish position. Today we can 
criticize him but in the beginning of his political rule, especially during the 
first period of four years, he was doing many pro-EU reforms, and he 
banned the death penalty, allowed headscarves in universities. He was really 
pro-EU and with the Kurds, he was opening Turkey to something else. 
(Personal Correspondence, 2016).  
We can see that both participants acknowledge a certain twist in Turkish politics 
which was caused, amongst other things, by the weak institutions that allowed the 
accumulation of power in the hands of the President. Another aspect in which president's 
style of leadership harms the EU-Turkey relations rests in the fact that there are many in 
Europe who do not wish for Turkish accession into the organization and they feel especially 
encouraged by the authoritarian elements in president's rule:  
Right, it does harm, in that sense, you know if there are people who do not 
wish Turkey well, in terms of it not wanting to come to the EU, then 
Erdogan is giving them extra ammunition by the way he behaves. They 
might say his own behavior, the party he leads, some might say look a 
secular stable democratic Turkey we are willing to consider, maybe there 
are some other issues in terms of economics where Turkey must get better, 
but that’s a different story. But, in the sort of a cultural and political sense, 
the way he operates is giving extra fire, ammunition, to those who say “Nah, 
Turkey doesn’t belong”. In that sense, yes, he harms, he harms, I would also 
say he harms Turkey’s negotiation position, diplomatic influence. Because, 
it is the "brist of the mill" of those that already are doubting that Turkey is 
the right country. So, that, hand on the table, style of leadership is not good. 
(Personal Correspondence, 2016). 
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 This interpretation is quite interesting as we have seen two recent trends happening 
in the EU politics regarding the events in Turkey; general lack of will for pushing for 
reforms and general perception of Turkey as a state that cannot be returned towards the 
accession path. In that sense, countries such as Austria and institutions such as the EU 
Parliament are insistent on ending the accession negotiations. In one hand, they are right 
because Turkey has not been fulfilling EU recommendations but on the other hand, they're 
perceiving Turkey to be just another candidate state without acknowledging specific 
(geo)political as well as social factors influencing Turkish politics. The extreme rise in 
terrorist attacks in Turkey (the most recent one happening on the New Year's night of 2016 
on 2017) are instilling fear in the public and are pushing the authoritarian government to 
be even firmer, especially in the wake of the post-attempted coup developments (BBC, 
2017). EU needs to acknowledge that and provide support for Turkey to transition and 
consolidate its democracy which is not dead and can be revived. However, in the case of 
both the EU and Turkey there is a fundamental question to be asked; is there a will for 
cooperation? This relates to the question of credibility of Turkey towards the EU (and vice 
versa). Participant I stated that: 
 And one can say certainly with Erdoğan that, you know, Turkey hasn’t 
really been fully willing to uphold the criteria, they keep on backsliding on 
things, and having a regime like Erdoğan’s where there’s the death penalty 
issue, the press freedom issue, uhm, so, uhm, with number five the question 
was has it been really credible when it is so long, now the question is, if it 
has been that long, has Turkey simply not met the criteria? Or, is it the EC/U 
that’s been moving the markers and changing the game all the way. There, 
I don’t have it on top of my head, what the specific things were, but, you 
know, when you talk about credibility, the fundamental issue is, with the 
EU, does the EU want to enable Turkey to enter? Turkish side- does Turkey 
really want to do what it takes to get in? And in both cases, there are 
question marks. (Personal Correspondence, 2016).  
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This answer follows the overarching theme of this research. The accession 
negotiations have been ongoing since 1963 with the Ankara Agreement (see "History of 
Relations") whose end-goal was Turkey's accession to the then-EEC. Both Turkey and 
EEC have experienced radical changes in their political and social fabric during the past 
fifty-four years and it appears that the will for accession to continue is fading. The mistrust 
both agents have towards each other is ever-present and the cooperation, especially on 
crucial political issues such as the refugee crisis or Turkey's respect for the rule of law is 
at the lowest point in years.   
The fourth theme which is relevant for the study of EU-Turkey relations is the issue 
of the size of Turkey. Turkey is a country of eighty-one million people. It's neighbors are 
Iran, Iraq, Syria, Greece, Bulgaria, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan (actually, its exclave 
of Nakchivan). This testifies not only to the population size of Turkey but also to its 
geographic size. Turkey is located in the Asia Minor and has for centuries been a trading 
center for the Euro-Asian traders. Its location is both ideal as well as problematic because 
Turkey is perceived as a country that does not belong either to Europe or Asia. The size of 
Turkey, both geographic and population-wise, is a crucial aspect of its accession 
negotiations, although it is not enumerated in the Copenhagen Criteria. The participants 
have answered the following question:" Do you think that the size of Turkey has any impact 
on its EU integration?" (Personal Correspondence, 2016). There are three main arguments 
that have come up from the answers. First one is that Turkey, as a large country, is relatively 
economically and politically unstable (Personal Correspondence, 2016). Furthermore, it is 
a country which will be hardly digestible by the EU (Personal correspondence, 2016). 
Second one is that Turkey would occupy the most EU Parliament seats and would be a 
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large net-recipient of EU budget funds which would encumber the EU financially and 
would cause other member-states issues as more funds would go to Turkey than would 
come back (Personal Correspondence, 2016).  Third argument is that Turkey would 
become the most influential member-state in the EU Council (Personal Correspondence, 
2016). In that sense, because the voting procedure in the EU Council is a combination of 
qualified majority principle with the population-size majority principle (EU Council, 
2016). In that sense, in order for a law to pass in the Council, there needs to be a majority 
of 55% of member-states (16 out of 28) who comprise more than 65 % of the EU population 
(EU Council, 2016). Turkey would add a significant leverage in the population-size aspect. 
Participant I has given a profound answer to this question, connecting multiple issue 
Turkey faces on its accession path and giving an answer which states that all of the 
problems Turkey faces (from identity-related issues to size) are not canceling themselves 
out but are rather a part of the problem: 
 If you look at your first and your tenth question, what you’re talking about 
are the factors that are going to impact the possibility of Turkish integration 
in the EU, if you go back to that then there is the religious, the size, 
population size, but not only that because you could have a wealthy 
population, that more than size, if Turkey were a big but stable politically 
and economically, you know, and if it were in a different neighborhood, 
there’d be a different situation. I mean, ah, so, I mean if you compare it to 
Norway, go diagonal. Norway is not in the EU? Why would it be? It has a 
number of advantages over Turkey, most importantly- good neighborhood, 
small population which is wealthy, stable politics, not the Islamic factor that 
may complicate things, stable government- that’s an interesting 
juxtaposition. To take and compare these two. Why would it be easier to 
integrate Norway than Turkey? Then we can see that we have religion, 
government, politics, size and all of the individual factors that make up the 
composite influence- how do those interplay together? If, you say, Norway 
were not so wealthy but has 4 million, more rural, people. Not very well off, 
farmers…But if its stably run and is progressing because four million partly 
economically struggling inhabitants is easier for the EU to deal with than 
80 million. A combination of things is a problem. (Personal 
Correspondence, 2016).  
127 
 
This answer relates itself to the first argument. Turkey has a large population in its 
central, central-southern, and central-northern areas which are hardly reachable. There, the 
population is not developed as much as it is in the EU member-states and is harboring more 
traditional, religious sentiments that are different from the perceived European life-style. 
On top of that, Turkish problems with accommodating large masses of refugees, dealing 
with terrorism, political drawbacks, as well as the issue of culture of democracy in the 
country are all factors which add up and make Turkey an unwanted candidate. When it 
comes to the second argument, the issue is as follows: 
 I am not sure if the EU funds would be so generous to Turkey due to its 
size, it is so big and it would be a big disturbance to the EU budget, but the 
very existence of this political prospect, condition, would be very important. 
Size, you mentioned Turkish size, of course it would be a big issue. Why? 
Because until the Turkish candidacy, the big countries in the EU were those 
who contributed to the EU budget. So, Germany and France were the big 
players so they had the most influence but they also contributed the most to 
the EU budget. In the Turkish case that would be reverse, so Turkey would 
be a very big country, big population, but it would be a net recipient, not a 
net contributor to the EU budget. So, I would say, in light of the Turkish EU 
membership, and in light of the fact that Europe will need immigration, one 
way or the other, that would be a big influence. But, of course that’s very 
difficult to say in the public, Merkel does it- the people who don’t 
understand it and are thinking just about themselves but in the big picture, 
they don’t see it. (Personal Correspondence, 2016).  
The EU Parliament issue is another big thing. Apart from the budget, which is 
approved by the EU Parliament, the EU Parliament itself would have the most 
representatives from Turkey thereby surpassing even Germany which has the most 
representatives. What this means is that, under the current arrangement, the EU parliament 
has 751 members (700 members plus the President) and cannot go over that number. If 
Turkey were to become a new member-state, it would have the maximum of ninety-six 
members of the EU Parliament which would mean that the Parliament structure would have 
to be changed (perhaps leading to some member-states to lose representatives?) in order to 
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accommodate the new arrangement. Participant III believes that the size of Turkey is one 
of the biggest reason for why the EU is not keen on accepting Turkey: 
 Oh yeah, I think so. I think so. I think also that that’s one of the main 
reasons why Turkey was not accepted and we have all these Copenhagen 
Criteria but for human rights we did a lot before, and for economy, and in 
comparison to Bulgaria and Romania we fared well. But the people did not 
understand why, especially the Turks here (Germany), why Bulgaria and 
Romania entered the EU instead of Turkey and that’s what made people 
angry about this whole thing. But, I think it’s really because of the size 
because we can see that Turkey would have the most representatives in the 
EU Parliament. (Personal Correspondence, 2016). 
 When it comes to the third argument which is related to the EU Council, participant 
II stated the following: 
 In my opinion, we already have the Council voting mechanism with its two 
criteria: there’s a double-qualified majority of member states, one needs to 
have that and it benefits the small states to pass something in the Council. 
But there’s also a population-weighted vote which depends on the 
population size. There could be a per-capita GDP weighted vote or the 
contribution to the EU budget criterion if Turkey enters which would 
balance its influence, so introducing the third criterion to the voting 
mechanism would protect the small states like Malta and their influence in 
the Council. These economic criteria would reduce Turkish influence to the 
size of, perhaps, Poland so Turkey wouldn’t be as strong as Germany. 
(Personal Correspondence, 2016).  
The final theme arising out of the coding analysis is the theme of Europeanness. 
Europeannes as a term will be applied in this thesis to denote the feeling of whether 
somebody belongs to the perceived European geographic-cultural identity (the degree of 
Europeanness). In the interview process, this issue was addressed through question three:" 
Is Turkey a European nation? And if so, do you think Turkey belongs in the EU?" (Personal 
Correspondence, 2016). However, questions found in the first theme are also connected to 
this one, as the issue of religious identity has important ramifications when it comes to 
constructing the European identity. Participant II gave an excellent example of how 
Europe, as a geo-cultural entity, is subject to historical changes: 
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If you ask me, I will answer to you that the borders of Europe have been 
changing but it’s also that the borders of Europe have been more a matter 
of politics and not a matter of science. For many thousands of years, the 
Greeks lived on both sides of the Aegean, no one considered this something 
very important. Founding texts of European civilization come from Egypt, 
from Alexandria. In the same sense, you can make the case for Russia. 
Russia has been a part of Europe sometimes and sometimes it has been a 
part of this Russo-Asian world. It was also the case that, sort of, the borders 
of Catholicism were the borders of Europe and the Orthodox were not really 
European. There’s also the case of Cyprus, Cyprus is very far from the 
nearest Greek island and is closer to the Turkish coast and Israel, and 
Aleppo, and Cairo, than European countries. No one said that Cyprus was 
an Asian country during the accession process. It is a cultural division, I 
wouldn’t necessarily check the Turkish membership because of that but I 
also understand that there have to be certain values of Europe so if Turkey 
is adapting to them then it should have a fair chance at the accession. 
(Personal Correspondence, 2016).  
Coming from the region of Balkans, which for a long time belonged to a so-called 
"Communist block" of states during the Cold War (although SFR Yugoslavia was a 
member of the "Non-Aligned Movement") it is easy to see how Europe's identity is a 
changing matter. During the Cold War, the primacy on “Europe” was centered around 
countries of the Western Europe (Benelux, France, the UK, Italy), but non-democratic 
countries who were not included in the EC (European Community) were outside of that 
discourse on Europe (for example, Spain and Portugal even belong here, although they 
entered the EU during the 1980s which changed their position). Turkey, although being 
connected to Europe for centuries, has become an othered subject discursively after the 
Cold War, unlike the former-Communist block states which rapidly became members of 
the EU. Turkey today finds itself at odds with the vision of Europe as a closely bound union 
of liberal democratic states that are closer to the continent. Turkey, being at the borders of 
Europe (Asia Minor) is often not seen as such whereas countries like Georgia who are also 
at the borders of Europe, do not seem to have a discursive problem (but rather a problem 
of their neighborhood) when it comes to their EU aspirations.  
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Turkey carries a strong laicist-Kemalist legacy which for years constituted the major 
socio-political orientation in the country and is being changed now under the rule of AKP. 
This legacy hindered democracy throughout history (i.e. it was a direct cause of four coups) 
but it also kept Turkey as one of rare majority-Muslim but secular countries. Religion is 
still a matter of contention in Turkey and its effects on the population are a matter of great 
social and political debate. Another perspective which confirms the existence of this 
religious-social-political debate in Turkey is the perspective of participant III who states 
that:  
Ok, I would, let’s say it like that, in certain discourses and debates, Turkey 
is a European nation. If you look on the formation of the state, secularism 
as its doctrine which follows the European model and the Western model. 
Ataturk had a very Western-European idea of a nation. I think also, of 
course, that in terms of culture and language, and mentality itself, I think 
it’s a more Mediterranean nation and I wouldn’t say that it’s really a 
European nation in itself. It is a mix of both and I don’t like emphasizing 
the idea of hybridity, but I think it’s very influenced by Eastern, Arab and 
Islamic traditions but also very influenced by the Western, modern and 
secular tradition. If you look at fashion, modernization, state ideas and 
politics, Turkey is really modern. It is a parliamentary system despite 
Erdogan’s autocratic rules, it is still a parliamentary system. (Personal 
Correspondence, 2016).  
The Kemalist idea of a Western-European nation is precisely the idea of modernization 
of Turkish nation after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Mustafa Kemal purged Turkish 
language and culture of Oriental and Islamic influences, and has created a modern nation-
state on the basis of a completely new state ideology called Kemalism (see chapter 
“Turkey, EU, and the Construction of Identities”). This new state ideology worked well, 
but it was a great barrier for the full development of Turkish democracy (Turkey only 
became a multiparty democracy in 1946 when CHP won the first multiparty elections- see 
chapter “History”, section 1). Today, the strength of Kemal's personality remains in 
Turkish political life, but Kemalist ideas and Kemalist factions are fading away under the 
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influence of growing political islamization of country. Both Kemalism and Islam as 
political tools are hindering Turkish progress on its road to the EU and are also hindering 
Turkish democracy and rule of law. The strengthening of Islam as a political tool in Turkey 
(and the neo-conservativism of AKP) is perceived by many in Europe as an inevitable 
occurrence as Islam, according to them, is incompatible with democracy (Ertuğrul, 1). 
Because of AKP's governing, Turkey is even more othered as a non-European, 
nationalistic, Islamic country which does not belong in the EU. This has important 
implications for the relationship of the two as the process of othering is not only a social 
one, but also a political one.  
Subchapter 3. Refugee Crisis: A New Frontier in the Relationship? 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapters, we have established that the reasons for the deteriorating state 
of EU-Turkey relationship have a social dimension. This conclusion was further confirmed 
by the findings of the previous sub-chapter (see “Public Opinion”- section I.) which 
concluded that although Turkish-EU relationship is perceived across different variables 
(such as, for example, Turkey’s size or the enlargement fatigue), the identitarian variable 
seems to have the most influence on the perception of the relationship. Therefore, the 
constructivist argument posited early in this thesis that EU-Turkey relations are what the 
EU and Turkey make of it, does have a cogent analytic strength. However, if we want to 
explore the relationship in a holistic way, we have to study the particular instances where 
the manifestation of this social dimension in EU-Turkey relations is most visible.   
This chapter, as well as subsequent chapters, will be crucial for determining and 
disentangling precisely what makes the relationship between EU and Turkey so socially 
encumbered. Furthermore, they will explore what kind of interests manifest themselves 
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from the identities formed by the logic of appropriateness20 operating between EU and 
Turkey. As the relationship between the EU and Turkey is a social process, the current 
global context influences it in both constructive and destructive ways. The recent refugee 
crisis (2014- present) is an evidence of a destructive influence. Although the refugee crisis 
holds an inherent constructive value which can help Turkey and the EU realize its interests 
by joining together, it appears that the social anxieties formed due to the crisis itself have 
negatively influenced the way both agents behave in the process of implementing the 
Migrant Swap Deal, signed in March of 201621. Following the ideal-typical analytical 
models, the refugee crisis issue will here be analyzed through the prism of securitization 
of Islam, refugees and immigration in Europe. This chapter seeks to conclude that, although 
the Migrant Swap Deal of March 2016 was a positive step for the relationship, the 
subsequent political issues have given rise to a negative discourse between the EU and 
Turkey that showed the internal social and political structures of othering in the 
relationship. 
2. EU, Turkey, and Immigration 
The issue of immigration (both legal and illegal) into the European Union has been 
one of the most emphasized aspects of the discussion on EU’s unity and legal practices. 
Although the EU does not have a supranational migration or asylum policy (that is- a 
common asylum policy), it has certain mechanisms, such as the Frontex agency established 
in 2004, or the European Border and Coast Guard (essentially a part of Frontex), 
established in 2016, intended on helping the EU control its external borders. These 
mechanisms are working together with the larger system, which controls immigration, 
                                                 
20 For more information, see “Constructivism: Accession Road is What Agents Make of It”. 
21 For more information, see “Current Situation”, section a.  
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called the Dublin Regulation. The Dublin Regulation establishes an intricate system of 
processing asylum applications on the territory of the EU. It states that the asylum 
applications are not processed on the EU level but rather that a country where an applicant 
applied for asylum, or where an asylum-seeker first arrived, processes his asylum 
application, and decides what happens to the applicant (Terron, 2015). The goal of the 
Dublin Regulation was essentially to curb the number of asylum applications to the EU 
territory by limiting asylum-seekers to apply to only one country (Huysmans, 756). 
Therefore, the asylum system established by the Dublin Regulation is essentially a re-
routing system which represents an EU-level legislation, aiming to strengthen the national 
sovereignty over asylum-related issues. The Dublin Regulation today is seen largely as one 
of the main reasons for why the recent refugee crisis encumbered the European system so 
much.  
Starting in 2015, the refugee crisis swept over Europe and, in conflation with 
horrible terrorist attacks (e.g. Paris in January and November of 2015), caused panic on 
both public and elite levels. UNHCR reports the extent of the crisis by offering concise 
data comparisons for every month of the refugee crisis. For example, in January of 2016, 
there were 73, 135 arrivals reported from the Mediterranean Sea routes (e.g. Libya or 
Egypt), compared to only 5862 from January of 2017 (UNHCR, 2016). Furthermore, there 
were 362,373 asylum seekers on the territory of EU in 2016 (UNHCR, 2016). In 
comparison to 2015 this is a significant decrease because in 2015 there were approximately 
1,015,078 asylum seekers on the territory of the EU (UNHCR, 2016). However, both 
figures from 2015 and 2016 demonstrate a significant influx of asylum-seekers and 
refugees on the territory of the EU:  
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Per Eurostat, 213,200 asylum seekers applied for protection in the EU 
during the second quarter of 2015, representing an increase of 15% over the 
first quarter (185,000) and 85% over the second quarter of 2014 (Ulviyye, 
110).  
Most of the asylum seekers who entered Europe by the Mediterranean Sea route 
ended up going to Italy or Greece (therefore, the first-intake countries). The sudden 
increase in the number of asylum-seekers in Europe in 2015 put considerable strain on such 
countries whose ports and cities were overflowing with refugees coming from Libya and 
Egypt (See Figure 1.0 below). They started calling for a more flexible and urgent response 
from the EU in the form of financial assistance but also investments to EU’s neighborhood 
as well as negotiating the readmission agreements such as the one with Turkey.  
Figure 1. Number of Immigrants Arriving to Greece weekly between 9th of June 
and 27th of October, 2015 (Okyay and Zaragoza-Cristiani, 52). 
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Concomitant with the Mediterranean Sea route (which ended in Italy or Greece), 
another route opened for immigrants on their way to the EU, the Balkan route. The opening 
of this route, starting in Bulgaria and Greece, and ending in Slovenia or Hungary, was 
caused by the overflow of refugees/immigrants on the Turkish border with Bulgaria 
(therefore, the EU). This caused further strain to countries such as Hungary or Slovenia 
because smaller Balkan states, such as FYR Macedonia, simply could not afford keeping 
in the asylum-seekers and processing them, so they opened their borders and allowed them 
to pass through. This put the entire Schengen System22 at risk because many member-states 
such as Hungary, Slovenia, Austria, and Denmark started closing their borders and 
reinstating the border guards in order to protect themselves from the influx of refugees. 
The Dublin Regulation was deemed lacking and calls for a more integrated, EU-level, 
approach to the asylum system have increased. Because the EU could not find a unified 
approach to dealing with the refugee crisis, the EU officials started negotiating bilateral 
treaties with countries such as Turkey in order to stem the flow of refugees to Europe (the 
so-called readmission agreements): 
There are many more examples if the restrictive and control-oriented 
imperative that drives European migration policy. Among the most visible 
are the coordination of visa policy in the Union and the coordination and 
facilitation of so-called readmission agreements. The latter are agreements 
with neighboring countries about the readmission of illegal immigrants 
found on the territory of an EU member state (Huysmans, 756).  
                                                 
22 The Schengen System is a system of managing EU’s external borders while at the same time providing 
EU citizens with free movement across national borders (European Commission, 2017). It abolished border 
controls, passport checks and visas between participant states (European Commission, 2016). The system 
was established in 1995 and has since then been one of the greatest achievements of the EU (European 
Commission, 2016). It provides free movement for more than 400 million European citizens (European 
Commission, 2016). It comprises 24 member-states of the EU and includes two other European states 
(Norway and Switzerland) who aren’t EU members (European Commission, 2016). 
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Following EU’s incentives to start negotiations on the readmission agreements, the 
EU-Turkey delegations started meeting later in 2015. The signing of the EU-Turkey 
Migrant Swap Deal ended in March of 2016. This deal saw EU and Turkey approach each 
other and cooperate openly thus bringing hope for the revival of strained relations: 
 What followed was the most significant advance for Turkey’s EU 
accession process since 2010 – and perhaps a last-ditch effort to salvage the 
much-criticized framework for negotiations. At a mini-summit in October 
2015, European leaders agreed to “re-energize” Turkey’s accession process 
in return for its cooperation in stemming the flow of refugees. On 1st of 
November, the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, flew to Istanbul and 
met with President Erdoğan two days before he general election in Turkey, 
agreeing, in principle, to a European aid package of €3 billion and to 
revitalize the accession talks in return for a Turkish commitment to serve as 
gatekeeper for Syrian refugees. In December 2015, the European 
Commission opened a new accession chapter (Chapter 17 on Economic and 
Financial Matters) for the first time in five years. And, in March 2016, 
Turkey and the EU shook hands on a final arrangement for Turkey to take 
back migrants who had made their way to Greece, and secure its borders in 
return for €6 billion in refugee aid, visa-free travel for Turkish citizens (as 
early as summer 2016, but as soon as Turkey fulfils the 72 benchmarks), 
and revived talks on accession to the EU (Aydıntasbas, 4).  
Therefore, as we can see, the refugee swap deal was from the start aiming not only 
at stemming the flow of migrants from Turkey to Europe but also at bringing Turkey closer 
to the EU in both accession negotiations terms as well as in visa-free travel terms. It is also 
important to add that the deal was limited to sending a maximum of seventy-two thousand 
asylum-seekers back to Turkey, a number which did not satisfy many but was regardless 
included as a goal (Okyay and Zaragoza-Cristiani, 51). After the signing of the deal, crucial 
developments happened in Turkey which effectively changed the discourse on 
rapprochement in a negative way. Only a month after the deal was signed, President 
Erdoğan dismissed PM Davutoğlu from his post. Davutoğlu, former foreign minister of 
Turkey, was a crucial AKP official in Turkish politics after Erdoğan and was seen as one 
of the masterminds behind the refugee deal (alongside Chancellor Merkel). This sudden 
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change at the top of Turkish politics was followed by an increasingly harsh discourse of 
President Erdoğan regarding the seventy-two benchmarks Turkey had to fulfill in exchange 
for the visa-free travel regime. Even though the benchmarks were a part of the deal from 
the beginning, as one high Turkish official said, President Erdoğan and the Turkish 
government refused to amend the anti-terror law citing security concerns in the wake of 
terrorist attacks across the country (Aydıntasbas, 6). In May, only one day after Davutoğlu 
resigned as the Turkish PM, President Erdoğan made a harsh public call saying that if the 
EU did not enact the visa-free regime for carriers of the Turkish passport, then Turkey 
would: "We'll go our way, you go yours" (BBC, 2016).  
After May, the situation in Turkey was further complicated with the attempted coup 
d'etat which failed. However, the government crackdown on the alleged coup-plotters saw 
thousands arrested or fleeing Turkey. The EU Parliament reacted in November by voting 
to suspend the accession talks with Turkey over its blatant disrespect for the rule of law 
(EU Parliament, 2016). The EU Parliament decision was a symbolic response (it is legally 
non-binding) to announcements that Turkey might reintroduce the capital punishment for 
the alleged coup-plotters. President Erdoğan again reacted angrily by saying that Turkey 
would open its borders to refugees going to Europe: 
You cried out when 50,000 refugees were at the Kapikule border,” he said, 
referring to the border crossing with Bulgaria, one of the busiest in the world 
even in normal times. “You started asking what you would do if Turkey 
would open the gates. Look at me — if you go further, those border gates 
will be open. You should know that (Nordland, 2016). 
 President Erdoğan obviously realized that Turkey has substantial leverage over the 
EU decisions now when the EU is in panic and is vulnerable. Accordingly, Turkish officials 
such as the former PM Davutoğlu used discourses on Europe as a Christian fortress to 
legitimize their calls, and the righteousness of their demands, in international community: 
138 
 
Erdoğan also accused Europe of being inconsistent with its own values and 
causing deaths in the Mediterranean due to its negligence in this 
humanitarian crisis. In a similar vein, Turkey’s PM Ahmet Davutoğlu called 
on the EU to stop “putting the onus on Turkey, adopting a purely defensive 
approach with wholesale security measures and building walls to create a 
Christian ‘fortress Europe (Okyay and Zaragoza-Cristiani, 54).  
The EU's response to these public attacks has been largely institutional, starting 
with EU Parliament's symbolic decision on halting the accession talks and expressing 
concern for the rule of law, and the respect for the principle of separation of powers in the 
government through tools such as the EU Commission Report 2016: 
 EU-Turkey relations are even more strained after the failed coup attempt 
of 15 July. While Turkey criticized the EU for not condemning the attempt 
to overthrow the elected Turkish government strongly enough, the EU 
struck back, criticizing the post-coup crackdown in which thousands of 
people (including journalists and academics) were detained and warning 
Turkey about the grave consequences for its membership prospects of the 
potential reinstatement of the death penalty (Okyay and Zaragoza-Cristiani, 
62). 
However, it is evident that President Erdoğan's statements cause significant 
frustration and distress in Europe. Although the Refugee Swap Deal is standing, and the 
readmissions are happening, the EU is frightened that the whole crisis could easily be 
repeated, especially if Turkey intentionally opens its border with Bulgaria to millions of 
people.  
The discourse set in President Erdoğan's statements constructs migrants as a 
political tool that can be used in order to achieve political means. In that sense, because the 
migrants have become a securitized element in the now largely transactional relationship, 
they are no longer perceived as people in need of shelter but rather elements within a larger 
power discourse. The EU fears another migrant influx, and more terrorist attacks, while 
Turkey needs EU's political and financial assistance to deal with its own immigrant influx. 
As Turkey has spent more than eight billion USD supporting refugees and has registered 
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more than 2.2 million Syrian refugees on its territory, the necessity for obtaining EU’s 
financial assistance is fundamental for its continued support for immigrants (Ulviyye, 107). 
However, even though Turkey is in need of financial assistance, it is very important to note 
that before the deal was signed, Turkey refused multiple international assistance offers in 
order to convey an image of itself as caring for the refugees: 
 Interestingly, according to reports published particularly in the initial years 
of the crisis, Turkey had turned down most offers of international assistance 
(Okyay and Zaragoza-Cristiani, 54).  
Turkish officials did this in attempt to demonstrate to the international community 
the dedication, and humanity, Turkey fosters towards the Syrian refugees in the face of 
Europe’s lack of response. Turkey used its humanitarian position to legitimize calls to the 
EU to acknowledge its position as a country that is a boundary between “Europe and chaos” 
(Okyay and Zaragoza-Cristiani, 54). These calls strengthened Turkey’s position in 
negotiations and allowed it to demand increase in the aid offered by the EU:” This 
argument was used not only to legitimize Turkey in the eyes of the international 
community, but also to negotiate higher amounts of financial aid from the EU.” (Okay and 
Zaragoza-Cristiano, 54). By establishing itself as a migration nexus state, Turkey’s 
political position became stronger in that it started appealing to international masses by 
criticizing EU’s lack of empathy towards the refugees in comparison to Turkey’s 
willingness to help. As the numbers of refugees started rising in the second half of 2015, 
Turkey saw a chance, a window of opportunity, to push its agenda on EU’s panicked 
politicians: 
These developments opened a window of opportunity for Turkish 
authorities to voice arguments aimed at cornering the EU. On the one hand, 
this strategy was aimed at delegitimizing Europe’s claims to normative 
actorness with utmost respect for human rights and much sensitivity 
towards humanitarian crises, while legitimizing Turkey with its higher 
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degree of moral and material support given to refugees. On the other hand, 
it was to demonstrate that the survival of the Schengen area largely 
depended on Turkey’s discretion in cooperation, given the divisions within 
the EU (Okyay and Zaragoza-Cristiani, 54).  
When it comes to Europe, the issue of migrants has also become a politically 
disruptive problem. Migration and the refugee influx are seen as one of the most important 
factors which weaken national traditions and the homogeneity within the EU (Huysmans, 
758). The issue of securitizing migrants in the EU has developed over the years and is not 
a novel issue, however, with the surprising increase in refugee numbers arriving to Europe 
in 2015, the discourse of securitization of migrants became conflated with many existential 
issues in the EU, such as the economic crisis, which then yielded the growth of populism 
across the continent (in France, Germany, Italy, Denmark, Hungary...). The issue of 
migration then became the most apparent issue, and the most important one for the 
existence of the EU in European public/political discourse. The importance of the issue of 
migration for the EU was very apparent during the Turkey-EU delegations’ meetings prior 
to the March 2016 deal. The EU gave massive concessions to Turkey in order to strike the 
best bargain with regards to the migration agreement. For example, the issue of the EU 
Commission Report of 2015 came up. As I wrote in the previous chapters (see “Current 
Situation, section II”), the EU Commission report has served as both a constructive and 
deconstructive element in the relationship between the EU and Turkey. In this sense, the 
concessions given by the EU to Turkey in the fall/winter of 2015 testify to my statement: 
The extent to which the migratory crisis constitutes the EU’s soft underbelly 
becomes even more apparent when its intensified efforts and its readiness 
to give major concessions to strike a deal with Turkey are embedded in this 
particular political context. Illustrative of the EU’s vulnerability is that, by 
indicating that it could and might cease keeping the gate, Turkey was getting 
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the EU to commit to hitherto very hard-to-get rewards, such as the VLD23 
acceleration and the opening of new chapters. The delayed release of the 
European Commission’s Annual Progress Report from its scheduled pre-
election release date of 14 October to 10 November was rather revealing in 
terms of the extent of ‘normative’ concessions the EU was ready to make. 
According to the leaked minutes of a meeting between Erdoğan, Tusk and 
Juncker during the mid-November G20 meeting, Juncker reportedly said 
that the Commission faced much criticism because it delayed the report ‘on 
Erdoğan’s request’ (Okyay and Zaragoza-Cristiani, 58).  
We can see that EU’s need to protect its borders and soothe the anxious public have 
forced it to bend its usually staunch normativist principles; by prioritizing the immigration, 
the EU has confirmed that even its normative-institutional principles are not as strong as it 
has believed. Delaying the EU Commission report for almost a full month gave Turkey a 
chance to organize its government, as the fall of 2015 was a post-elections period, and the 
negotiation team without the normative pressure, and unnecessary publicity, caused by the 
EU Commission’s report.  
 Because of the negative political discourse and existential European political crisis, 
many politicians supporting the open-borders policy have changed their stances. For 
example, the crisis resulted in Chancellor Merkel proclaiming multiculturalism a sham in 
a public speech. This proclamation came as a surprise because Germany under Chancellor 
Merkel has generally been labelled as probably the most immigrant-friendly country in 
Europe. Her policy of "Wir schaffen das" ("We got this"), supporting the open borders 
policy, has become symbolic globally in the wake of the refugee crisis. However, the public 
pressure as well as fears of new terrorist attacks have caused Merkel's CDU to toughen its 
stance towards immigrants. Müftüler-Baç writes that the question of multiculturalism in 
                                                 
23 Visa Liberalisation Dialogue- political dialogue aiming to liberalize the EU visa system for Turkish 
passport-holders. For more information, please visit the Eur-Lex website at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52016DC0140, Accessed March 18th, 2017. 
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Europe is an implication that a multicultural society, the one including non-Europeans, is 
a threat to the values, norms and culture of the European society (Müftüler-Baç, 79). This 
threat, argues Müftüler-Baç, comes from immigration and perhaps even potential 
expansion of the EU because it introduces more non-European peoples to the generally 
homogenous EU society (Müftüler-Baç, 79). Therefore, because of these fears, the EU has 
a strongly protectionist migration policy. When it comes to Turkey, we can see how this 
migration policy played out in EU's attempts to prevent large influxes of refugees to enter 
EU soil. On one hand, the EU was willing to provide substantial financial assistance to 
Turkey (Ulviyye, 113). However, on the other hand, the EU has agreed to open negotiation 
chapters in order to stimulate the accession talks with Turkey in exchange for Turkey's 
signature on the deal (Ulviyye, 113). This testifies to the fact that EU does not really see 
Turkey as a viable candidate state because, if the accession process is a normative issue, 
then it should flow (or stall) regardless of the refugee crisis (Ulviyye, 113). In this instance, 
the refugee crisis has confirmed that accession road is what agents (the EU and Turkey) 
make of it; it is a normative process but it is also a political tool aimed at alleviating social 
and economic anxieties, in this case regarding the influx of Syrian refugees to the EU.  
When it comes to the deal itself, it must be stated that it worked, however 
provisionally. The number of refugees going from Turkey to Europe was reduced and the 
readmission process began (See figure 1.2. below).  
Figure 1.1: Line-graph depicting the total number of arrivals in Greece from Turkey 
per month from April 2015 to June 2016 (Okyay and Cristiano-Zaragoza, 61). 
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Although the migrant swap deal is working, it has been criticized by many human 
rights advocates for its lack of legal strength and potential disregard for human rights. 
These criticisms serve to testify to the anxious and quick atmosphere in which the deal 
itself was forged. The Migration Policy Institute writes in March of 2016 that there are 
only two ways under which the migrants can be readmitted from the EU territory: a) if they 
are “irregular migrants” meaning that they did not apply for asylum or do not qualify for 
it, and b) if the country from which they arrived is a “safe country”, that is, a country in 
which they had or could have claimed protection (Migration Policy Institute, 2016). It is 
debatable whether Turkey is a safe country at all because even though their laws do comply 
with EU regulations, the number of people processed and protected falls short and indicates 
that their system is not ready for readmission of a significant number of more than 72,000 
asylum seekers. For example, in February 2016 out of 200,000 asylum seekers, only 38, 
595 have received protection (Migration Policy Institute, 2016). Furthermore, the issue gets 
a new dimension as the most (40%) of asylum seekers are children, as well as the fact that 
most asylum seekers who come to Greece are in genuine need of protection (52% are 
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Syrian and 41% Afghan out of 57,000 who arrived in February of 2016) (Migration Policy 
Institute, 2016). Accordingly, even if the EU and Turkey successfully exchange asylum 
seekers, a process which is ongoing, the issue with the deal is that a few migrants can be 
returned: 
 However, the deal has also unveiled a paradox for a European Union that 
has spent several decades preaching its own high asylum standards to 
neighboring countries. To achieve its self-imposed goal—a significant 
reduction in arrivals and an increase in returns to Turkey—policymakers 
will have to drastically cut legal corners, potentially violating EU law on 
issues such as detention and the right to appeal. But if governments execute 
the agreement in conformity with international and European legal 
frameworks, few arrivals are likely to be returned, and the agreement risks 
becoming the latest in a long series of undelivered promises to exasperated 
publics for whom the complex legal conundrums of implementation are 
both meaningless and irrelevant (Migration Policy Institute, 2016). 
 Therefore, we can see that the deal did yield a desired effect for the EU, that is, the 
significant reduction in arrivals on the EU soil (see Figure 1.2. above) and that Turkey 
almost got everything it wanted (six billion Euros and an almost-achieved visa-free regime 
with the EU). However, the readmission aspect of the deal seems to be lacking in 
fundamental EU values as well as legal practice which, in combination with the power 
discourse between the EU and Turkey over migrants, confirms the idea that the 
intersubjective image between the EU and Turkey is largely an anxious, if not outright 
negative, one.  
3. Conclusion 
Conflated with many events, from EU's financial crisis to the attempted coup d'etat 
in Turkey, the refugee crisis seems to be a crucial part in the intersubjective world of 
mistrust the EU and Turkey project towards one another. The securitization of the term 
"refugee" and of the general refugee crisis has brought about populist rises across the 
continent which genuinely lessen the prospect of Turkish membership to the EU. 
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Generally, far-right populist parties in Europe tend to emphasize the Judeo-Christian 
civilizational project of Europe and are intent on ejecting any "otherness" from Europe in 
discursive and, unfortunately, practical terms (I.e. evicting Muslims from different EU 
countries). These calls have become very influential in Europe’s public discourse due to 
the refugee crisis, and as such represent the singularly unique existential threat to EU’s 
unity. The necessity of the migrant deal between the EU and Turkey is overshadowed only 
by the necessity of preserving the European Union in the face of such threats. The 
construction of Turks and Muslims as threats to European cultural homogeneity seem 
abstract, however, they have important implications for EU's foreign policy as we have 
seen on the example of including accession negotiations as an element of quid pro quo 
transaction on the refugee deal. On the other hand, Turkey's ruling establishment seems 
intent on using power in both material and social (I.e. public speeches) terms to achieve its 
goals. The populist rhetoric coming from Turkey sometimes even appeals to populist 
securitization of Muslims in order to legitimize its power hold as well as the "morality" 
with which it is handling the crisis. President Erdoğan often mentions Europe's insensitivity 
towards refugees (e.g. the idea of Europe as a fortress) in his public appearances to appeal 
to his voters, but this discursive element carries a strong political message which states that 
if Turkey's wishes (or AKP's wishes) are not fulfilled, then Europe will suffer at the hands 
of refugees. Such a rhetoric is indeed disconcerting; however, it has become a political 
reality in the EU and Turkey and, therefore, must be thoughtfully scrutinized in the future.  
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Subchapter 4. Cyprus: Identity, Security, and the EU-Turkey Relationship 
1. Introduction 
Earlier in this research, I wrote that the issue of Cyprus stands tall as one of the 
most important issues in the relationship between EU and Turkey (see "History", section 
2). In a sense, the Cyprus issue has become something more than a matter of divergent 
interests; it has become a symbol of Greco-Turkish struggle and it has also become 
symbolic of EU's powerlessness in dealing with its own internal political issues. However, 
the Cyprus issue is not only a burden on the relationship between EU and Turkey but rather 
on the international community as well. The United Nations Force in Cyprus was 
established in 1963/4 on a demilitarized zone that runs along what is known as "The Green 
Line", that is the line dividing TRNC (Turkish Republic of North Cyprus), an 
internationally unrecognized country established in the northern part of Cyprus in 1983, 
and the RoC (the Republic of Cyprus), an EU member state since 2004, established in 1960 
on the whole island (Meisler, 156). The UNFCYP mission to Cyprus has been patrolling 
the Green Line for more than forty-five years now and stands as one of the longest, if not 
the longest, UN peacekeeping missions in its history. It was established by Ralph Bunche, 
under U Thant's leadership of the United Nations (Meisler, 156).  Therefore, investigating 
the influence of Cyprus on the EU-Turkey relationship presents a complex, albeit an 
important problem that can help us understand generally the International Relations of the 
Mediterranean region and Europe. The complexity of the struggle of reunification of the 
island of Cyprus under one government has produced a vast amount of academic materials 
on this topic as well as a recurring public controversy. 
This chapter will analyze the Cyprus issue by using three main points which go in 
line with three analytical models presented earlier in this research (See chapter 
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"Constructivism and IR: Accession Road is What Agents Make of It", section 2). The three 
points seek to demonstrate the constructivist basis for analyzing the Cyprus issue and its 
effect on the EU-Turkey relationship as well as Turkey's accession process to the EU. The 
first point states that due to the negative intersubjective image between Turks and Greeks 
(both in Turkey/Greece and on Cyprus), the solution to the problem seems unlikely. This 
negative intersubjective image has been a product of two processes, namely the Greco-
Turkish relations as a historical struggle (if not enmity) and an open utilization of the EU 
normative-institutionalism by Greece, and later on by Cyprus, to exert pressure on Turkey 
to concede to their demands. That is to say, the normative-institutional processes of the EU 
have been constructed as means of pressuring Turkey to concede its interests in Cyprus in 
exchange for improving its position in the EU accession negotiations. This paper will argue 
as the second point that because the RoC acceded to the EU, the matter of reuniting the 
island of Cyprus is no longer a matter of only security concerns but also of cultural-
identitarian trust developed on the island. Because peoples from northern and the southern 
part of Cyprus were divided for so long, the formation of a common identity which is 
necessary for a sustainable solution of the issue should be one of the goals of reunification 
negotiations as well as of EU's efforts in integrating the TRNC area in its system. This has 
important implications for the EU-Turkey relationship as Turkey refuses to concede to any 
solutions which are not in the interest of the Cypriot Turks. The third point will argue that 
because Turkey is experiencing a period of resurgent nationalism and a turn in illiberalism, 
its demands in Cyprus will revert back to the domain of power-politics, including stronger 
reliance on Turkey's military presence on Cyprus and construction of Cyprus as a sine qua 
non in Turkey's foreign politics. This causes Turkey to lose legitimacy as an interlocutor 
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in the reunification talks and is reverting its Cyprus policy to the pre-Erdoğan era (that is, 
from 1974 until 2002). Finally, all the points will be crucial for understanding how the EU-
Turkey relationship is influenced in a global context. This relationship does not only 
depend on bilateral relations but also on Turkey's and EU's regional, international, political, 
and identitarian interests.  
a. The First Point: Historical Basis of Mistrust Among Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, and 
Its Implications for the EU-Turkey Relationship 
i. History and Mistrust 
The analysis of the historical foundation of mistrust among Greece, Turkey, and 
Cyprus in this research will be based on the post-1878 period of Greco-Turkish relations. 
With that in mind, we have to acknowledge that Greeks and Turks, as ethnic and national 
groups, have a perceived historical struggle stretching well from the fall of the Byzantine 
Empire, the Ottomans, and then to the modernity. However, this research will not focus on 
it for the sake of clarity and simplicity.  
The island of Cyprus was occupied by the Ottomans for almost three centuries 
(1571-1878) after which it was annexed by the United Kingdom (Bhutta, 65). The period 
of Ottoman occupation of Cyprus, in the wider context of Greco-Turkish relations, was 
perceived by Greeks to be a yoke on their nation, and by Turks as a period of multicultural 
peace (Heraclides, 8). In 1878, Cyprus was awarded to United Kingdom by the Ottoman 
Empire who exerted its sovereignty over the island until 1914, when the UK annexed them 
in the wake of WWI (Bhutta, 67). Greece, however, gained its independence in 1829 and 
has since then, with the help of Russian Orthodox Church, expressed a yearning for union 
with its Cypriot brethren (Bhutta, 66). Although the Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus was 
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allowed to operate freely during the Ottoman rule, it was connected greatly to the Orthodox 
Church in Greece and in Russia with Russians instigating the Greek Cypriots to revolt 
against the Ottomans after the Greek War of Independence (Bhutta, 66). This proved to be 
important for Cypriot Greeks' later attempts at unifying Cyprus and Greece (enosis). 
During the 20th century, relations between Turkey and Greece were often transferred on to 
Cyprus. There are three main events in the 20th century which further entrenched a negative 
intersubjective image between Greeks and Turks: The Greek-Turkish War (in Turkey 
known as the "Turkish War of Liberation") lasting from 1919 until 1922, the enosis 
movement instigated by Cypriot Greeks, and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 
following the constitutional crisis and an attempt of coup d'etat by the Cypriot Greeks.  
The Greek-Turkish War remains one of the most important elements in the cultural 
history of othering between Turkey and Greece. The aftermath of the Greek-Turkish War 
was an establishment of an independent Republic of Turkey (Treaty of Lausanne in 192324) 
and the ultimate victory of the Turkish National Movement over the Greek idea of Megali 
(the greater Greece) and their establishment as an autochthonous nation in the region 
(Heraclides, 7). The Greek-Turkish War gave rise to the Sevres Syndrome, that is a fear of 
Turks of the partitioning of their territory as outlined by the Sevres Treaty25 signed during 
the Paris Peace Conference in 1920 (Heraclides, 21). Following the Sevres Syndrome, the 
partitioning of the Ottoman Empire has remained a subconscious fear of many Turks when 
it comes to their independence and sovereignty: 
                                                 
24 Treaty of Lausanne was signed at the end of the Greek-Turkish War (1923); won by Turkey. Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk emerged as a father of the Turkish Republic and any aspirations to cede and divide Turkish 
territory were stopped.  
25 The Treaty of Sevres partitioned former Ottoman province amongst the victors of the WWI. The partition 
of Turkey would be conducted by ceding different territories and giving it to other states or non-Turks for 
administration. In this case, and this is particularly painful for Turks, the area of Thrace would be given to 
Greece and the city of Izmir (Smyrna) would be placed under Greek administration (Mallinson, 106). 
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The main Turkish concern that is a cause for intense insecurity and has a 
bearing in Turkish self-identity is holding on to their territory and issues of 
sovereignty. This is due above all to being “burdened by memory of 
territorial losses” from the days of the Ottoman Empire, many of which 
were territories that were annexed to Greece, from 1830 until 1920. This is 
related to another surprising perception: that even though they have lived in 
the region for centuries (as Ottomans and from 1922 as Turks), they have a 
sense of not being an ‘autochthonous element’ of the region but the ’latest 
comers’ (Heraclides, 20). 
On the Greek side, the Greek-Turkish War presented a major defeat and a 
confirmation that territories of the Byzantine Empire, whom they perceive as essentially 
Greek, were lost to Turks (read Ottomans) who were perceived as barbaric invaders of the 
area: 
According to the first narrative the modern Greeks are ‘resurrected’ 
descendants of the Ancient Greeks; that ‘Greece’ was reborn after its demise 
in the 4th century B.C. like the mythical phoenix from its ashes. 
Paparrigopoulos incorporated the Macedonian and Byzantine eras in the 
Greek narrative and thus was able to achieve historical continuity and also 
provide a crucial synthesis between Ancient Hellenism and Christianity 
cum Byzantium, which however implausible is the self-evident truth for the 
Greeks (Heraclides, 9).  
The idea of national cause and national survival in both cases has become a well-
entrenched social and political norm. Although the relationship between Greece and 
Turkey has somewhat progressed from 1974 (the year when Cyprus was invaded), old 
enmities persist. These historical constructs inform Greek and Turkish politics daily which 
strengthens the process of othering.  
Therefore, as we can see, the Greek-Turkish War was constructed by both Greeks 
and Turks as an essential war for establishing of their identity in the aftermath of the 
Ottoman Empire. The subliminal mistrust and cultural-historical bitterness that has 
developed after the war persist until today even though both nations have conceded that 
they do not foster territorial pretensions with regards to one another.  
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The Cypriot Greek attempts at enosis (unification) with the Greek mainland can be 
seen as a cultural proxying of Greco-Turkish enmity and are also crucial for understanding 
the issue of Greek and Turkish positioning when it comes to the Cyprus. During the British 
rule over Cyprus (Britain officially made Cyprus its colony in 1925) in 1931, the Greek 
Cypriots instigated pro-enosis protests on the island (Bhutta, 67 and 68). The pro-enosis 
protesters demanded that the UK allows Cyprus to unite with Greece. The protests 
essentially created an atmosphere of mistrust between the Turkish and the Greek 
community on Cyprus and have resurrected subliminal cultural process of othering from 
the state of brief hibernation26. The British, however, have handled the protests and 
managed to suppress them but not for long because their own resources began fading and 
their power over colonies started crumbling after the WWII. The 1931 pro-enosis protests' 
political and social legacy remained until the 1950s when the Greek Cypriots, this time led 
by Archbishop Makarios of the Greek Cypriot Orthodox Church, sent a petition to the UN 
formally requesting unification with Greece (Bhutta, 68). We can clearly see the influence 
of Church on Greek Cypriot's political aspirations. Bhutta establishes that Turkey started 
thinking more strategically on Cyprus precisely because of the Greek Cypriot Orthodox 
Church's political interferences that were backed by the Soviet Union (Bhutta, 69). In that 
sense, the spread of Marxist ideology operating within the USSR on the island would not 
bode well for Turkey who was a NATO member at the time and who played a prominent 
role in curbing the influence of Soviets in the Mediterranean region. William Mallinson 
writes: 
More recently, Turkey has been crucial to the West as a cold war buffer 
against the USSR, as the Cuban Missile Crisis so poignantly demonstrated, 
                                                 
26 The Friendship Treaties signed in 1930 have relaxed the relationship between Turkey and Greece until 
1950s when the Cyprus issue became more prominent (Mallinson, 21).  
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when the USSR cited the stationing in Turkey of US nuclear missiles so 
justification for doing the same in Cuba (Mallinson, 112). 
Furthermore, the British, under whose authority Cyprus was, did not really react to 
the petition as they wanted Cyprus under their control. British interests in Cyprus revolved 
around Cyprus being a crucial geostrategic island in their access to the Suez Canal. Since 
the Suez Crisis27 happened in 1956, it would not be so far-fetched to argue that the British 
wanted to keep Cyprus in order to prevent the possibility of such an event (Mallinson, 115). 
After the British Minister for Colonies, Henry Hopkinson, stated that some colonies would 
never be independent nations, the Greek government mobilized their diplomacy in the UN 
in order to consider Cyprus' right for self-determination (Bhutta, 69). The Greek 
intervention was set off by a disappointment the Greek government had in Britain. Because 
of the rise in nationalist pressures on the Greek government, it felt compelled to 
diplomatically retaliate against the British, which had no intentions of abandoning Cyprus. 
A Greek Cypriot reaction to UN's non-reaction on Makarios' petition was the creation of 
EOKA (The National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), a guerilla junta aiming to secure 
Cypus' independence (Bhutta, 69). It goes without saying that Turkey could not stand the 
strengthening of Greek position on Cyprus. This would endanger Turkey's position in the 
East Mediterranean as Greece would be in control over most of it (if not all of it) and would 
                                                 
27 The so-called War of Attrition between France, Britain, and Egypt marked the end of Anglo-French 
colonial pretensions in the Middle East (and in general). The crisis was sparked when General Nasser 
nationalized the Suez Canal in a move that surprised the British and the French, who administered the Canal 
until then. They decided to move against Nasser by conceiving a plot in which Israel would attack Egypt, 
followed by an ultimatum from France and the UK to cease all fights or risk their takeover of the Canal 
(Meisler, 94). Nasser rejected the ultimatum causing UK and France to invade (Meisler, 94). During the 
invasion, the plot became public causing Britain and France great embarrassment (Meisler, 94). Nasser won 
and the US-British-French relations were historically low due to American disappointment with the invasion. 
In the aftermath, the Suez Crisis marked the slow weakening of British and French colonial rule.  
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be too close to Turkey's borders (see chapter "History of Relations", section 2). Bhutta 
quotes the former Turkish FM Zorlu in saying: 
From the military perspective, the island of Cyprus has to be in the hands 
of a state, which is concerned in the fate of Turkey and the surrounding 
Middle Eastern States…. The dominant power on the island would have a 
position of control over the harbors of Turkey. If this dominant power is the 
same dominant power in the islands to the west [of Turkey], Turkey would 
be de facto encircled by this power. Turkey thinks that it is convenient to 
maintain the current status quo of the island. If it is going to be changed, 
then it must be returned to Turkey. …Turkish people cannot think 
differently about the future of an island which is existentially important to 
the defense of the country (Bhutta, 70). 
Furthermore, the notion of Greeks extending influence to the area where Turks 
lived was unacceptable and evoked memories of ethnic conflicts just years before (and with 
that, population exchanges). The British saw that Turkey was disconcerted with the events 
in Cyprus and decided to bring them in the geopolitical game. The British did not want to 
relinquish Cyprus to anyone else; it was far too important for their geopolitical aspirations. 
The developments in the international sphere, that is, the relationship between Greece-
Turkey-Britain influenced the developments on Cyprus. The two communities there 
became enraged at each other resulting in development of EOKA and TMT (Turkish 
Resistance Organization) (Mallinson, 109 and 110). The inter-communal violence was 
prominent, with terrorist attacks on both sides occurring intermittently. In 1958, for 
example, the Cypriot Turks started responding aggressively to Greek Cypriot's demands 
for enosis with violence instigated by Denktash (Turkish Cypriot deputy leader) who 
returned from Turkey to Cyprus and gave an incendiary speech at a rally (Mallinson, 32). 
The ensuing inter-communal violence caused many Cypriot Greeks to flee their homes 
(Mallinson, 32). Today, both sides of Cyprus are relatively ethnically homogeneous, which 
was not the case before the 1974 invasion. As British colonial power faded- especially after 
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the Suez Crisis, all three sides attempted at negotiating over the island. This was instigated 
by Greek and Iranian proposals in the UN. The Greek proposal of 1958 called for Cypriot 
self-government leading to independence and the Iranian proposal called for trilateral talks 
on the issue (Mallinson, 32-33). The Iranian proposal was passed and the trilateral meetings 
began in Zurich in December of 1958 and in London at the same time. The results were the 
following: Cypriot independence with strong guarantees to Muslim minority under 
guarantees of Britain, Turkey, and Greece (Mallinson, 33). The island would have a Greek 
president (from 1960 until 1974, this was Archbishop Makarios), Turkish vice-president, 
joint national assembly (however, separate communal assembly's), and would receive 950 
Greek and 650 Turkish military troops (Malinson, 33). The British would retain two bases 
on Cyprus (Mallinson, 33). Although Makarios' dream of enosis was seemingly destroyed 
at the time, the compromise on the issue brought relative stability to the island, but not for 
long. The decade of the 60s set up a perfect motive for Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. 
The Zurich and London Agreements produced three treaties: Treaty of Establishment 
(transferring sovereignty form the UK to Cyprus), Treaty of Guarantee (signed by all four 
parties), and Treaty of Alliance (establishing provisions for Turkish and Greek military 
presence on Cyprus) (Mallinson, 34).           
As we can see, the constitution of Cyprus did not really confer sovereignty on the 
island but rather a sort of a protectorate. It's complicated structure (uncannily similar to 
today's Bosnia and Herzegovina) did not satisfy already divided Cypriot Greeks and Turks. 
Calls for partition of the islands soon started over boundaries of Turkish and Greek 
municipalities or common armed forces (Mallinson, 34-35). In that atmosphere, 
Archbishop Makarios proposed his Thirteen Points aiming at amending the Constitution 
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and securing more powers to Cypriot Greeks. Turkey instantly rejected the proposals 
especially because of stipulations that saw the decrease in institutional power of Cypriot 
Turks (President and vice-president of the state would lose veto power, for example) 
(Mallinson, 35). As the inter-communal violence grew, Turks started mustering the 
invasion (according to them, this was provided under the Treaty of Guarantee), the Greeks 
were getting ready for enosis, and international players (Britain and the US) started 
thinking about partitioning the island. The 1960 arrangements were out of the picture. In 
the meantime, the UN got involved and sent its peace troops to watch over inter-communal 
violence (see above). The relations between Greece and Turkey worsened consequently. 
Turkish and Greek minorities in respective countries were maltreated and the situation was 
very tense:  
There is no sign yet that the campaign is abating. It is undoubtedly 
organized from Ankara and it reveals an ugly side to the Turkish character. 
There has always been an element in any Turkish Government, which wants 
to get rid of the Greek minority here. Cyprus is an excuse but only an excuse 
for prosecuting such a campaign. Secondly, and also independently of 
Cyprus, the Turkish Government find it convenient for home political 
purposes to encourage the latent chauvinism of their people (Mallinson, 40).  
As the inter-communal mistrust grew worse, Turkey and Greece threatened military 
interventions in Cyprus. Turkey was more aggressive, stating that it would invade the 
island and divide its Turkish part from the Greek. In this atmosphere, many were 
dissatisfied with the ruling garniture in Cyprus. President Makarios' position was not as 
strong as during the early 60s, and many Cypriot Greek fractions did not want him in that 
position. In 1974, the military junta coup led by Nikos Sampson, a journalist and an EOKA 
member, and supported by the Greek government, overthrew Makarios in a violent coup 
d’état (Bhutta, 80). Turkey reacted swiftly, led by PM Ecevit, and invaded the northern 
part of Cyprus (mainly Turkish territory). Since then, the situation on Cyprus has been 
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monitored by the UN but it has not changed and remains in a state of frozen conflict. Cyprus 
was divided into TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) and was recognized only 
by Turkey, and into the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus. The developments 
in 1974 bring to a conclusion the first aspect of this point.  
As we have demonstrated, the Turkish-Greek-Cypriot relationship is the one of 
security concerns imbued with significant socio-historic meanings. This conclusion 
follows the constructivist train of thought in that it recognizes the social basis of the conflict 
on Cyprus. Since 1974, there were multiple attempts at negotiating the reunification of 
island and it is during that time that the EU started playing a more prominent role in the 
Cyprus issue. The second part of this point refers to the more contemporary relationship of 
Turkey-Greece-Cyprus under the umbrella of EU institutions. Greece acceded to the EEC 
in 1981 and remains an EU member until today, whereas Turkey officially became a 
candidate member in 1999 during the Helsinki Council. Cyprus became a candidate in 1997 
and a member in May of 2004.   
ii. European Institutionalism and Political Struggles 
All three guarantor powers from the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 (that is, UK, 
Greece, and Turkey) have become either members of the EU or its associate members 
starting from the 1960s. In that light, the EU integration process and its logic of 
enlargement made it harder for EU to distance itself from the island of Cyprus. In their 
article on Cyprus-EU relations, Meltem Müftüler-Bac and A. Güney state that in 1973, the 
EEC signed an association agreement with Cyprus, justifying its move by establishing that 
association agreements were merely economic in nature (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 284). 
The diplomatic failure of the EC is in that the Cyprus which signed the EC Association 
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Agreement was the Greek Cyprus as the Turks abandoned government in 1963, due to 
Makarios' Thirteen Points (see above). This issue persists today: 
Unfortunately, the EU treats Northern Cyprus {the Turkish Cypriot part}, 
its governmental and state authorities and hence the Turkish Cypriots, as 
part of the defunct Republic of Cyprus where in fact the Turkish Cypriots 
have been absent since 1963 (Yeşilada, 48).  
 Since Cyprus was generally non-involved in the Cold War (apart from being a 
geopolitical pawn), its Association Agreement with the EC did not bear significant political 
relevance. However, in 1981, when Greece acceded the EC, Cypriots recognized an 
opportunity for joining Greece under the common borders. This is manifested in the 
statement made by Costas Simitis, former Greek President, in 2003 when he stated that 
Greece and Cyprus have finally achieved enosis within the EU borders (Müftüler-Bac and 
Güney, 285). Furthermore, the Greek accession to the EU meant something more important 
for the EU-Turkey relations: 
Greek membership meant that Greece would use the EU institutions in two 
distinct ways: one was to prevent the recognition of Turkish Cypriots inside 
the EU economic framework, and the second was to link all new 
developments between Turkey and the EU to the resolution of the Cyprus 
problem (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 285).  
The prevention of Turkish Cypriot recognition in the EU economic framework 
meant excluding Cypriot Turks from economic arrangements made within the EC market. 
Encouraged by the developments in Greece and the Association Agreement they signed in 
1973, the Greek Cypriot (that is, the RoC- the southern part of Cyprus) applied for full 
membership to the EU in 1990 (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 285). One of the goals of Greek 
Cypriots was to force Turkey, which had its own EU aspirations (see "History", section 3), 
to make concessions resulting in reunification of Cyprus and to push it to pull its military 
from the island (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 285-286). In 1993, the EU Commission 
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accepted Cypriot application and included RoC in its next round of enlargement in 1994 
(Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 286). While Turkey was negotiating the Customs Union with 
the EU (signed in 1995, effective from 1996), the Greeks threatened to veto the Customs 
Union unless Cyprus was given acceptable day for the start of accession negotiations 
(Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 287). This is a crucial development as the Cyprus issue finally 
became contentious within the European institutional framework and as such has become 
a contentious object in the process of the EU institutional socialization (see 
"Constructivism and IR: Accession Road is What Agents Make of It", section 1, subsection 
iii). Greece removed its objections and agreed to sign the Customs Union with Turkey only 
when the EU confirmed its intentions in starting the accession negotiations with Cyprus 
(Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 287). The EU further agreed that it would start accession 
negotiations without the precondition of Cypriot unity, which bears significant political 
meaning (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 287). The EU insisted in 1993, upon accepting Cypriot 
application for membership, that the resolution, or a prospect of a surer settlement, is a 
precondition for Cyprus' membership in the community (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 286). 
The EU's belief was that it could (re)unite Cyprus by pushing the accession process and 
Copenhagen Criteria. However, the 1995 agreements showed the improbability of such an 
outcome. After including the RoC in its 1997 enlargement package, but excluding Turkey, 
the EU sent a strong signal to Turks that their accession to the EU will be harder and that 
it will be contingent on the situation on the island. The confirmation of this came in 1997, 
at the Luxembourg Council, when the EU Enlargement Agenda 2000 was adopted and 
when Turkey did not receive a confirmation of its application for candidacy for 
membership of the EU but rather a condition on its membership stating that Turkey needs 
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to work with UN to resolve the Cyprus problem (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 288). Cyprus, 
on the other hand, became an official candidate then (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 288). Turks 
firmly believed that the Cypriot application for membership had no validity and that, under 
the provisions of the Zurich and London Agreements, Cyprus cannot join international 
organizations, political, and economic unions of which both Turkey and Greece are not 
members (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 288). Therefore, Turkey inferred that EU’s policy on 
Cyprus was essentially Greek policy and moved towards integrating TRNC in its 
economic, social, and political system (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 288). Turkey further 
decreed that all attacks on Turkish Cypriots will be considered as an attack on Turkey 
(Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 288). In 1999, however, Turkey was accepted as a candidate 
member during the Helsinki Council (see “History”, section 4).  
 The Helsinki Council of 1999 (see chapter “History”) ushered in a new phase in 
EU-Turkey relations, the one which, arguably, lasts until today. When Turkey was 
accepted as a candidate member in 1999, its problems with the EU grew larger as the 
Greeks demanded that all the issues with Turkey be solved through its accession 
negotiations (this excludes Cyprus, however, includes other disputes in the Aegean Sea) 
(Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 289). Furthermore, Turkey’s becoming a candidate state for 
membership meant that, even though the Cyprus issue is not a part of the Copenhagen 
Criteria, the EU would use all of its power to try and resolve it by using Cyprus as a 
leverage against Turkey’s membership. Cyprus, on the other hand, ended its negotiations 
with the EU in 2002 and acceded in 2004. Fortunately, the Cypriot progress in the EU 
negotiations and Turkey’s candidacy brought novel, and positive changes to the 
relationship. Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot leaders started negotiating on the solution 
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of the Cyprus issue under auspices of Kofi Annan, the UN secretary-general. Annan 
presented the infamous Annan Plan prior to the Copenhagen Summit of the EU (during 
which Turkey would receive the date for the start of accession negotiations) (Müftüler-Bac 
and Güney, 290). The opening in relations was paralleled by the change in Turkey’s 
political scene. When the young Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 
2002, it changed the traditional Turkish policy on Cyprus (see section iii) and campaigned 
for opening of the Green Line (see above) in 2003. The opening of the Green Line marked 
the first time in 30 years that Cypriots could move freely from northern to southern part of 
the island (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 290). The PM Erdoğan was truly a refreshing figure 
on Turkey’s political scene and his ideas on Cyprus found admirers amongst EU 
politicians: 
As for Turkey, the Turkish government's traditional foreign policy on 
Cyprus's EU membership is that it is illegal. However, at the November 
2002 general elections in Turkey, a new government was formed by an 
Islamist, conservative party, the Justice and Development Party, which 
seems to have some different views on the Cyprus issue. Thus, in Turkey a 
new hope emerged that the new government might not have the old guard's 
conservative views on Cyprus. It is interesting to note that the first message 
to Recep Tayyip Erdogan, leader of the JDP, came from the Greek Prime 
Minister Costas Simitis signaling a Greek desire to work in close 
collaboration with the new Turkish government. The JDP's party's 
declaration of 6 November 2002 that they would consider a Belgian model 
for the resolution of the Cyprus problem must have sounded like music to 
most ears in the EU. Erdoğan's first visit was to Rome and then to Greece, 
Brussels and Madrid. These visits seemed to demonstrate that the JDP is 
aware that Turkey's road to the EU passes through Athens as well as the 
importance of shuttle diplomacy (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 290). 
 The AKP Party was much more flexible in negotiating on Cyprus and, concomitant 
with vast reforms it undertook in Turkey from 2002 until 2005, it positioned Turkey 
strongly at the negotiating table. The EU involvement in Turkey (as in, the results of the 
Helsinki and Copenhagen Councils) combined with the new government in Ankara yielded 
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solid results and stabilized the relationship between the two. However, the prospect of 
success of the Annan Plan remained to be one of the most anticipated aspects within the 
relationship. The Annan Plan was presented to President Clerides (Cypriot Greek) and Mr. 
Denktash (the president of TRNC) on November 11th, 2002 (Mallinson, 162). The plan was 
presented one month before the Copenhagen Council, where future members of the EU 
signed their Accession Treaties, was held (the enlargement of 2004 is the largest EU 
enlargement in its history)28. Essentially, Denktash and Clerides were expected to agree on 
the plan (its main articles) by the time of the Copenhagen Council, agree on its annexes 
next February, and call a referendum in March of 2004 (Mallinson, 163). The provisions 
of the plan were such that Cyprus would function as a very fragmented, albeit unified, state. 
For example, the Greek and Turkish Cypriot members of the “common state” parliament 
would be able to veto legislation (Mallinson, 164). The head of state would actually be a 
council of six members, two of whom would be Turkish Cypriot, where decisions would 
be taken by simple majority (Mallinson, 164). Finally, the Supreme Court would consist 
of nine members (three Greek Cypriot, three Turkish Cypriot, and three non-Cypriot) 
(Mallinson, 164). The constitution of Cyprus, as proposed in the Annan Plan, would be 
quite similar to the one of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, for example, is the same as the Annan Plan proposal for the Supreme Court 
of Cyprus). The Annan Plan was, therefore, the single most important event in the recent 
history for the reunification of Cyprus due to the political momentum it was created in and 
the necessity for a change in Cyprus which would become a member of the EU shortly 
after the planned referendum. Political representatives agreed on plan’s provisions, 
                                                 
28 Cyprus, The Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Estonia, and Poland 
all joined the EU on May 1st, 2004. 
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however, on the day of the referendum the Cypriot Greeks voted overwhelmingly 
negatively.  
Table 1: The Results of the Referendum on the Annan Plan, April 24th, 2004 (Drevet, 18). 
As a 
Percentage 
Registered Voters Votes Cast Yes No 
South 77.0 89.3 77.6 24.2 75.8 
North 23.0 84.4 22.4 64.9 35.1 
Cyprus 100.0 88.1 100.0 33.3 66.7 
The reasons for why the Cypriot Greeks rejected the plan were multiple with the 
most prominent one being that the Cypriot Turks would gain considerable power in state 
matters. Cypriot Greeks did not want to risk their estate being influenced indirectly by 
Turkey and wanted to strengthen their part of Cyprus more in anticipation of the EU 
membership (Mallinson, 187). In such an atmosphere, the "No" vote coming from the 
Cypriot Greeks shocked the world, and Europe (although many presumed that Cypriot 
Greeks would vote negatively beforehand), and seemingly set Cyprus back. However, the 
division of the island remained and Cyprus managed to accede to the EU in May of 2004, 
just after the referendum. The infamous Cypriot Greek "No" triggered mass protests in the 
Northern Cyprus as Cypriot Turks thought it unfair that they should be left out of the EU 
and Cypriot Greeks should be allowed to enter (Kaliber, 232). Despite the shocking 
referendum result, Cyprus entered the EU, however, the application of the acquis was 
suspended for the northern part of the island until the issue of division was resolved.  
In her book, Divergent Pathways: Turkey and the European Union, Meltem 
Müftüler-Baç writes that in the aftermath of the referendum, the EU Commission sent a 
recommendation to the EU Council in which it stated that the Turkish Cypriots should be 
freed from trade restrictions (Müftüler-Baç, 64). In that sense, the Commission was trying 
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to reward Cypriot Turks and send a message to the Cypriot Greeks, however, since the 
Cypriot Greeks became official members of the EU in May of 2004, they vetoed the 
proposal so the Cypriot Turks remained in relative economic isolation (Müftüler-Baç, 64). 
The crucial developments for the EU-Turkey relationship actually happened in the 
aftermath of the referendum and Cyprus' accession to the EU. In 2005, the EU Commission 
asked Turkey to extend its Customs Union Agreement to all the new members of the EU 
(all the countries that acceded in May of 2004), however, although they obliged, Turkey 
did not expand its Customs Union on to Cyprus because they kept their harbors and ports 
closed to Cypriot goods since 1997 (when Turkey was not included in the EU Enlargement 
Agenda at the Luxembourg Council) (Müftüler-Baç, 64). Turks wanted to press Cypriot 
Greeks to accept Commission's proposals for removing trade tariffs with Northern Cyprus 
(Müftüler-Baç, 64). Turkish EU pressure failed, however, because Cyprus and Greece 
retaliated efficiently. As a new member of the EU, the RoC now had an even stronger 
political position in Europe vis-a-vis Turkey. Starting in 2005, the EU enlargement 
negotiations somewhat changed. The number of chapters, for example, of the Copenhagen 
Criteria was increased from 31 to 35 (still remains on that level) and states were given more 
powers when it comes to vetoing different negotiation chapters (Müftüler-Baç, 65). The 
Commission then adopted its Negotiations Framework with Turkey in July of 2005 as a 
formal map of the accession process (Müftüler-Baç, 65). The EU Commission proposed 
that starting from June 2006, Turkey would open its accession negotiations with two 
chapters (Science and Education, and Culture) which were relatively easy to close 
(Müftüler-Baç, 66). However, Cyprus immediately blocked the chapter on Culture 
(Müftüler-Baç, 66). Furthermore, the EU Commission proposed blocking eight negotiation 
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chapters related to the movement of goods and persons in the EU territory because Turkey 
did not expand its Customs Union on to Cyprus (Müftüler-Baç, 66). Finally, Cyprus further 
blocked the chapter on energy in 2009 (Müftüler-Baç, 66). Apart from Cypriot vetoes of 
accession chapters in the Council, some other member states (like France), vetoed different 
chapters of the accession process thus making it even more difficult for Turkey to integrate 
its system with the EU (Müftüler-Baç, 66-67).  The EU Enlargement policy was, therefore, 
utilized for political purposes: 
In other words, the Turkish negotiation process turned out to be the most 
visible illustration of the role the member states play in shaping EU 
enlargement policy. It is also an important indication of a possible clash 
between the multilateral and bilateral aspects of the negotiation process 
(Müftüler-Baç, 67).  
Therefore, out of 35 chapters of the negotiation process, Cyprus alone vetoed six 
(Müftüler-Baç, 69). This is not counting other member states' vetoes that form a wholly 
different issue. The French, for example, vetoed four chapters explaining that these 
chapters prejudge accession as the final outcome of the negotiations (Müftüler-Baç, 68). 
We have to keep in mind that the EU-Turkey relationship at that time was also influenced 
by the issue of the EU Constitution and a strengthening of the identitarian discourse in the 
EU (see "History", section 5). With regards to Cyprus, the precondition, of course, for the 
removal of Cypriot and EU's vetoes is Turkish adoption of the Additional Protocol 
expanding the Customs Union on to Cyprus (Müftüler-Baç, 64).  
Nothing much changed since 2006 and 2009 with regards to the Cyprus issue. The 
negotiations on the reunification of the island are still ongoing with all sides, including 
Turkey, expressing support for Cypriot reunification and sovereignty. However, the issue 
of Cyprus, as we have seen, has strong implications for the EU-Turkey relationship. As a 
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matter of fact, Turkey's accession to the EU is stalled, amongst other reasons, because of 
Cyprus. In 2012, when Cyprus took over the presidency of the Council of the EU, the FM 
of Turkey Davutoğlu stated that:  
If the Greek Cypriot side stalls negotiations and takes over the presidency 
of the European Union in July 2012, this means not only a deadlock on the 
island, but also a blockage, a freezing point in Turkey- European Union 
relations (Kaliber, 235).  
During the Cypriot presidency of the EU this is precisely what happened but luckily 
enough, a country can preside over the Council of the EU for only six months which means 
that the relationship has resumed since then. Regardless of that, FM's statements 
concerning the Cypriot presidency of the Council of the EU are indicative of what will 
happen when Cyprus assumes the presidency again and are indicative of general political 
attitudes of Turkey towards Cyprus.  
The EU institutionalism, in combination with patterns of historic enmity that was 
proxied on Cyprus, was in this case a crucial element of political pressure against Turkey. 
We can see that, although Turkey in many ways is not ready to satisfy some criteria, 
Turkish opportunity at accession depends almost entirely on its political willingness to 
open up to Cyprus (at least seemingly). That is, not counting other barriers to its 
membership such as EU's polarity on whether Turkey should at all become a member (the 
reason the French vetoed accession chapters). In the rest of this chapter, we will see how 
other factors related to Cyprus influence the EU-Turkey relationship.                                                                                                             
b. The Second Point: Downplaying Security, Amplifying Identity 
Although Turkey still maintains a military presence of 30,000 to 40,000 soldiers 
and military personnel on the northern part of Cyprus, and Greece has around 1,000 
soldiers in the south, the issue of security in the Cyprus-Greece-Turkey triangle has been 
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downplayed since Cypriot accession to the EU. This is because now Cyprus and Greece 
are EU members, Turkey is a candidate, and Turkey and Greece are NATO members 
(Cyprus was a member of the Non-Aligned movement and maintains military neutrality 
with regards to NATO). The foreign relations of these three states have de facto and de 
jure stabilized and calmed the situation in their relationship. However, they did not remove 
the security-related concerns as well as the Sevres Syndrome-related fears of Turkey (see 
above).  Instead, with the gradual Europeanization29 of Turkey's policies as well as Cypriot 
and Greek policies, the relationship was transferred on to the EU-level. As the issue of 
security was downplayed in the relationship, this section will argue that there was an 
increase in identity-related claims with regards to Cyprus. For example, in Turkish social 
and political discourse, there is an idea of vitality of Cyprus to Turkey connected to 
historical constructions of enmity against Greece. The Turkish brethren on Cyprus, 
according to that logic, are being treated unfairly by the Greeks (both native30 and Cypriot) 
as well as the EU. In Greece, similar mechanisms are in place: 
Demonization and threat perceptions are pervasive. On the basis of their 
imagined history and chosen identity the Greeks (in their great majority) are 
convinced that Turkey is since 1974 (from the Cyprus mega-crisis) in the 
throes of ‘neo-Ottomanism’ and expansionism: to divide the Aegean into 
two parts and ‘ensnare’ the eastern Greek islands; grab Greek Thrace, if 
given the opportunity; and control all of Cyprus. The Turks for their part 
believe that Greece is swayed (since the mid-1950s) by the irredentist 
Megali Idea (Great Idea) of the period 1850-1922 (whose avowed aim was 
to conquer as many Ottoman territories as possible), though Athens now 
treads more carefully, not head-on but by using a careful legalistic 
stratagem, be it in the Aegean (to render it a ‘Greek lake’) or with regard to 
Cyprus (union with Greece until 1974, ‘indirect union’ today via the EU 
from the mid-1990s onward) (Heraclides, 7).  
                                                 
29 Europeanization is described as: "a process of change and adaptation which is understood to be a 
consequence of the development of the European Union. It denotes an EU-induced process of domestic 
change and adaptation to the penetrating 'European values, directives and norms' " (Kaliber, 228).  
30 By "native" Greeks I mean Greeks who live, and come from, Greece (The Hellenic Republic). 
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The idea of reunification of Cyprus is potent and is an official policy of all actors 
involved in the issue, however, it seems that the idea of reunification is somewhat hard to 
achieve in a community that is fundamentally divided. Psaltis and Chakal argue that the 
divided collective memory of Cypriot Greeks and Turks- as it pertains to Cyprus’ history- 
constructs the idea of belonging of and to Cyprus in completely divergent ways: 
In the case of Greek Cypriots, and given the official policy on the 
reunification of the RoC, and the withdrawal of Turkish occupying forces, 
the political narrative goes along the following lines “We have always lived 
peacefully with Turkish Cypriots and we can do it again once the Turkish 
troops leave the country” and “the key to the solution is located in Ankara 
and not in the TC community”. For Turkish Cypriots on the other hand, the 
political master narrative that promoted the idea of two separate states in 
Cyprus is, more or less, like this: “The experience of living with Greek 
Cypriots was one of domination and suppression and we will be better off 
having our own state” and “Turkey intervened in 1974 with a peace 
operation to save us from GCs” (Psaltis and Chakal, 230).  
The discursive practices that have become embedded in political discourses 
effectively (re)create mistrust in every way. In the early days (between 1950s and 1970s) 
of the development of the Cyprus issue, the idea of Cypriot community was not always 
connected to the idea of the unified state, however, politicians from both sides have 
advocated a dual partition of the island. Today, such solution is unlikely due to the fact that 
Cyprus is an internationally recognized state which is also an EU member. However, the 
inter-communal life is divided on a more deeper level, which is demonstrated in political 
discourse. When the FM Davutoğlu stated that there would be a freeze in EU-Turkey 
relations if Cyprus assumed the presidency of the Council of the EU (see above), he also 
indicated that the EU is not treating the Turks fairly (Kaliber, 235). In that sense, the idea 
of Turks being mistreated by the EU is not intended only to dab at EU but also to indicate 
that EU is biased towards Turks and follows Greek political desires (both native and 
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Cypriot). As the reunification negotiations continue, and Cypriot integration in the EU 
system is finalized, we are seeing that the security dimension of the relationship is no longer 
as important as the idea of living together (or not). This is not to say that Turco-Greek 
security issues have disappeared but rather that they have been replaced with identity as 
the most important segment in the relationship. The Cypriot bid to join the EU, for example, 
was hailed as a strong incentive for reunification of island and a push for Turkey to become 
an EU member, that is one of the reasons for why the EU Commission accepted Cypriot 
application for membership in the first place (see above). It was also hailed as a signal that 
Turco-Greek enmity and historical struggle can be solved by solving the issue of Cyprus. 
Contrary to these visions, the Cyprus issue did not bring Turks and Greeks (both native 
and Cypriot) any closer than before. 
The historical struggle and mistrust persists. In a recent statement, Turkish 
President Erdoğan demonstrated that the mistrust between Greece and Turkey when it 
comes to Cyprus will probably last forever by saying that even in the case the settlement 
in achieved Turkey plans on having some number of troops (much lower than 30,000-
40,000) permanently placed on the island (The National Herald, 2017). In fact, he said that 
they would remain there "forever" (The National Herald, 2017). This statement in itself not 
only corroborates the basis for arguing that the mistrust of Turks and Greeks both on 
Cyprus and in native states is strong but also indicates that idea of eternity of attrition and 
eternity of claims over the island. Following the conclusions we carried above, that Turkey 
and Greece effectively demonize each other in the process of othering, it can be concluded 
that the idea of eternally claiming Cyprus is not only a nationalistic demagoguery or a 
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statement pertaining to security issues, but also a realization of dreams of confirming 
Turkish, on one hand, and Greek, on the other, identity on the island.  
The increase in rhetoric related to the Cyprus issue does not only confirm the idea 
that the solution to the issue rests in Turkey but also confirms the idea that beyond settling 
the issue, creating a viable democratic and social institutions that will foster the 
strengthening of Cyprus as a reunified island will be hard because social mistrust is 
recreated for political purposes. This is confirmed by empirical studies regarding how 
people on Cyprus perceive their identity. With regards to the Cypriot Turkish community, 
Psaltis and Chakal conclude: 
In the Turkish Cypriot community, the results were as follows: Only 
Turkish and not Cypriot (7.6 %), Turkish and a bit Cypriot (7.3 %) to the 
same extent Turkish and Cypriot (61.8 %), Cypriot and a bit Turkish (12.4 
%) and Only Cypriot and not Turkish (10.9 %). It should be noted once the 
answers of native TCs only are taken into account, then the percentage of 
participants identifying as “Only Turkish and not Cypriot” drops to 2.6 % 
while positions giving more weight to the Cypriot than the Turkish element 
become more similar to the situation in the GC community (about 1/3 of the 
sample) (Psaltis and Chakal, 236). 
On the other hand, we will notice a parallel similarity in the responses of Cypriot 
Greeks: 
In the same research, the Moreno question was asked in both communities. 
In the Greek Cypriot community, the results were as follows: Only Greek 
and not Cypriot (0.8 %), Greek and a bit Cypriot (5.2 %) to the same extend 
Greek and Cypriot (57.9 %), Cypriot and a bit Greek (16.2 %) and Only 
Cypriot and not Greek (19.9 %) (Psaltis and Chakal, 236). 
As we can clearly see, the idea of belonging to Cyprus and being Cypriot before 
being Turkish and Greek is strong, however, the mutual perception of two groups of what 
it means to be Cypriot and be in a community of shared values and interests is different: 
Correlational analysis of the strength of identification with superordinate 
identity and various measures of intergroup relations often show “feeling 
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proud of being Cypriot” is essentially taken to be synonymous with “feeling 
proud of being a Greek Cypriot”. From this perspective, it should be no 
surprise that in some studies strength of identification with being “Cypriot” 
is related to higher levels of prejudice, threats and distrust (Psaltis and 
Chakal, 236). 
This only demonstrates that if identity politics take precedence in the political discourse 
over matters of security or reunification, the prospect of peace and community on Cyprus 
seems hard to imagine. If the idea of being Greek and Turkish is historically positioned at 
two opposing ends, with added religious polarization (Turkish=Muslim, Greek=Christian), 
then the meaning behind being Cypriot Turk and Cypriot Greek, especially if these two 
categories are related to the ideas of being Turkish and being Greek, indicates separation, 
strife, and division. These conclusions might be speculative although we have 
demonstrated strong basis for them in our earlier accounts of Turco-Greek relations, but 
they should nevertheless be investigated more. Finally, if the idea of Turco-Greek enmity 
is so well-entrenched in the social and political discourse in respective national/ethnic 
groups, then the prospect for EU-Turkey relationship will also be gloomier. If the issue of 
Cyprus, whose solution apparently rests on Turkey, is not sustainably solved (that is, if the 
basis for trust is not established and both sides continue their military presence and strong 
identitarian discourse), then the prospect for Turkish accession to the EU will be low. 
In this section, we have demonstrated that, as the identitarian discourse reasserts itself 
through the dimension of mistrust over and in Cyprus, the prospect for the solution of the 
issue will look grimmer. Furthermore, we have established in this chapter that because the 
EU-Turkey relations do depend greatly on the Cyprus issue (see section a), it can be 
concluded that no-solution on Cyprus, or an inadequate solution on Cyprus, will encumber 
the EU-Turkey relations. As the prospect for resolution of the issue remains frozen, or 
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becomes grimmer, then the EU-Turkey relations will be tenser, especially given their 
current state.  
c. The Third Point: Resurgent Nationalism Entrenches Old Positions 
As Turkey is now seen as the main actor for solving the Cyprus issue, this 
subchapter will argue that the recent political turmoil in Turkey, that strengthened and 
emboldened President Erdoğan and the AKP Party in their consolidation of (authoritarian 
and illiberal) power, will make it harder for negotiations to reach a compromise on the 
issue. As we have seen earlier, President Erdoğan's policy towards Cyprus is the one of 
continual military presence. In contrast to his (and AKP's) early positions of opening 
towards Cyprus, and accepting the Turkish responsibility in achieving a compromise, 
President Erdoğan uses the discourse of power to outline his actions. Before outlining this, 
I shall attempt at providing a succinct account of Turkish policy on Cyprus before Erdoğan 
(but after 1974) in an attempt to understand how it informs Turkish policies today.  
The Turkish policy towards Cyprus before the rise of AKP and Erdoğan can be 
summarized in Bülent Ecevit's remark that the issue of Cyprus was resolved in 1974 
(Heraclides, 3). This policy of "no solution is a solution" has remained a strong force in 
Turkish foreign policy. Essentially, Turkey never recognized the statehood of RoC as it 
deemed its existence contrary to Zurich and London Agreements which are no longer valid. 
It, in fact, justified its invasion of Cyprus in 1974 by using the Treaty of Guarantee (see 
above, section a) as a basis for it. The existence of RoC and its application for the EU 
membership was contrary to Turkey's visions for and of the island. The very strong, and 
power-imbued, political stance harmed Turkey internationally, but as Cyprus was "a 
national cause", it remained unchanged during the 20th century (Kaliber, 231). Turkish 
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foreign policy on Cyprus was influenced in part by Turkish national awareness of its 
Ottoman past and its former power. Concomitant with a strong military, Turkey's discourse 
on Cyprus was, during the most of the 1900s, essentially power-arrogant and neorealist 
(Heraclides, 21). The "no solution is a solution" policy had a military backing to it, and 
Turkey's strong military presence on the northern part of the island meant only that war 
was always a solution.  
Fast forward to 2002 when Recep Tayyip Erdoğan becomes the Turkish PM and a 
new democratic, conservative-based, party takes power in Turkey (AKP). The Cyprus 
issue, shockingly, becomes an issue to be solved through peaceful means: 
It is fair to suggest that soon after the AKP came to power, the Cyprus issue 
has increasingly turned out to be an integral part of the internal debates and 
power struggles in Turkey. From the end of 2002 onward, the Cyprus issue 
has emerged as one of the main 'discursive battlefields' of the polarization 
among the ruling AKP and the opposing state elites. For the AKP reforming 
Turkey's Cyprus policy was a necessity not only because it failed and 
proved to be counter-productive, but also it was required by the EU 
(Kaliber, 230).  
The new Turkish foreign policy reconstrued Cyprus as an issue that is not of vital 
importance for Turkey thereby relieving political elites of the pressure and creating space 
for constructive dialogue with international partners under the auspices of the UN.  The 
opening towards Cyprus was marked by Turkish accepting of the idea that they had to push 
harder for the solution, opening the Green Line on Cyprus (see above, section a), and 
creating an atmosphere of political cooperation. The new Turkish foreign policy on Cyprus 
was, therefore, strong, and assertive, but not power-imbued and aggressive. This did cause 
trouble in Turkey where nationalist parties criticized AKP for betraying the "national 
cause" (Kaliber, 231). This must be contextualized in the time where AKP took power over 
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from Bülent Ecevit, a man who was the PM in 1974 and a poster-politician for tough stance 
on Cyprus.  
Today, the situation is effectively unchanged despite initial successes and Turkey's 
support for reunification of Cyprus (see above, section a). However, the recent difficulties, 
and an almost-failure, in negotiations over Cyprus in the time-frame of now-President 
Erdoğan's consolidation of power in the aftermath of an attempted coup in 2016, 
demonstrated the return of the power-imbued discourse over the issue. Although Turkish 
foreign policy on Cyprus has not officially changed and Turkey keeps on supporting the 
reunification and negotiations, the idea that there are 30,000-40,000 Turkish troops on 
Cyprus and a claim that they will be there forever encumbers the process and, 
consequently, influences the relationship between the EU and Turkey. 
Turkish foreign policy in the Mediterranean region since the rise of AKP has 
become increasingly characterized by two things: zero-problems with neighbors and smart 
power assertion. Although initially Europeanized (see section a), Turkish foreign policy 
has recently become more independent (marked by the dual characterization above) of the 
European/EU influence: 
These declarations {the declarations by FM Davutoğlu regarding Cyprus. 
See section b} by Turkish policy-makers reveal that Europeanisation is 
currently far from being a normative/political context influencing Turkish 
policies. They are also indicative of the fact that the current government 
does not feel the same level of dependency on EU perspective to consolidate 
its power and legitimacy in domestic politics (Kaliber, 235). 
The zero-problems characterization comes from former FM and PM Ahmet 
Davutoğlu's influential academic work "Strategic Depth" (Stratejik Derinlik) in which he 
attempts at conceiving a reorganized Turkish foreign policy based on: 
Turkey as the central country on an 'ideational' and geographical basis, with 
a sphere of influence covering the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus, 
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Central Asia, and the Mediterranean, Caspian, Gulf, and Black Sea regions. 
In this vision, it is expected that Turkey would transform into a 'global 
power' from this basis (Ertuğrul, 168).  
This idea carried the notion of Turkish foreign policy as "neo-Ottoman" but also 
resting on the idea of Turkish national power and strength: 
This enabled Davutoğlu to implement his theory of 'strategic depth' and 
'zero problems with neighbors' which sought to repair relations with Syria, 
Iran and Iraq, whilst maintaining the rapprochement with Greece and taking 
the first steps towards repairing 100 years of deeply fractured relations with 
Armenia in order to build secure economic ties and prosperity (Martin, 149). 
Although the FM, and later PM, Davutoğlu was removed from power by President 
Erdoğan in a move which consolidated his power, the neo-Ottoman idea of Turkey's power 
and influence in the region remains strong in Turkish political discourse (see chapter 
"Refugee Crisis: The New Frontier?"). Combined with an upsurge in nationalist rhetoric 
and draconian levels of government repression (that is, the rise in political illiberalism) 
following the attempted coup d'etat in 2016, the neo-Ottoman idea emboldens Turkish 
foreign policy and as such allows its officials to formulate stronger positions in world 
politics.  
With regards to Cyprus, this stronger position remains connected to Turkish 
military presence on the island. Turkey will not pull its forces back unless Greece does so 
as well, remarked Turkish President in a public rally recently (The National Herald, 2017). 
Turkey is increasingly viewing itself in an almost pre-2002 terms as a security guarantor 
to Cyprus (an idea stemming from the Treaty of Guarantee). In this light, the idea of Turkey 
pulling back at the same time as Greece is not delusional, however, it stems from a 
discourse of justification of the invasion of the island. In comparison to Greece, Turkey 
maintains a massive force of dozens of thousands of soldiers on Cyprus (see sections a and 
b) which is a direct threat to the security of the island. Recent negotiations on the 
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reunification of the island stumbled precisely over this issue which further confirms the 
importance of projection of Turkish national ideas (e.g. the greatness of the Ottoman 
Empire and Turkey as its successor) on its foreign policy.  
As the solution to the Cyprus issue stalls, Turkish accession negotiations stall and 
the EU-Turkey relationship remains tense. Since 2006, the EU has maintained that 
expanding the Additional Protocol on Customs Union on Cyprus is a precondition for 
allowing Turkey to complete eight chapters in its accession negotiations process (see 
sections a and b). Furthermore, the solution to the Cyprus issue would solve Cypriot vetoes 
of Turkey's accession chapters. Therefore, President Erdoğan's policies on Cyprus that 
have, as we have established, nationalist undertones, combined with recent consolidation 
of authoritative power in Turkey, make it harder for achieving a compromise and 
negatively influence the EU-Turkey relationship. 
2. Conclusion  
In this chapter, we have carried out three main points related to the Cyprus issue 
and its effect on the EU-Turkey relationship. These three points are that the historical 
mistrust between Greece and Turkey was transplanted on the Turkey-EU relationship 
through the problem of Cyprus. As such, this problem enabled Greece and later Cyprus to 
use EU institutionalism against Turkey. The second point is that due to the fact that EU 
plays an appeasing and balancing role in the region, the security issues between Cyprus-
Turkey-Greece have been downplayed, although not diminished at all, and an identitarian 
approach to dealing with Cyprus took precedence in political space. The issue of identity, 
in combination with EU institutionalism, does not bode well for the relationship between 
the EU and Turkey. Finally, we have established that recent illiberal tones at home in 
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Turkey are being projected on its foreign policy. In that sense, the concept of “Strategic 
Depth” which inherently relies on national ideas of Turkish power was combined with an 
increasingly illiberal tone of politics in Turkey and as such blocks space for maneuvering 
negotiations on Cyprus with regards to Turkish and Greek military presence on the island. 
This also influences the relationship negatively as it keeps the accession negotiations 
stalled thus not allowing for Turkish progress towards membership. Furthermore, it creates 
a tension in the EU-Turkey relations as Turkish military presence on Cyprus, who is an EU 
member-state, creates a sense of insecurity within EU’s borders.  
Finally, the issue of EU-Turkey relations has, in this context, become quite 
internationalized with multiple actors having a stake in it. From Britain to the UN, Cyprus 
issue presents one of the most intransigent problems in the EU-Turkey relationship. As the 
prospect for reconciliation worsens, the relationship remains pessimistically in place and 
creates an atmosphere of instability in the eastern Mediterranean Sea region.  
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Chapter 5. Perspectives for Future 
In this research, we have sought to establish that the socio-cultural, identity-related, 
factors are at the core of the relationship between EU and Turkey. These factors (such as 
the construction of Turkey as non-European based on views of Turks as Muslim) are 
crucial for understanding not only the state of play in the relationship but rather different 
issues affecting both the EU and Turkey. For example, we have established that the issue 
of the refugee crisis, on both sides, opened the doors for the use of political and security 
normativism (such as bilateral treaties on immigration) in order to legitimize, on one hand, 
fears of the invading “others” (that, is Muslims) and, on the other hand, to legitimize the 
political power hold by employing fearmongering rhetoric (e.g. President Erdoğan 
claiming that Europe will be invaded by refugees unless Turkey is satisfied- see chapter 
“Refugee Crisis: New Frontier?”). However, apart from analyzing and establishing that the 
relationship between EU and Turkey is what both make of it- that is, following Wendtian 
logic of anarchy, the relationship between EU and Turkey is socially constructed- we have 
not offered any perspectives for the future of the relationship.  
When I tell my fellow colleagues that I am writing a research on the relationship 
between EU and Turkey, all of them, without excuse, ask me whether I think Turkey will 
join the bloc. My answer is never clear-cut-that is, yes or no- but is rather undetermined, 
for I firmly believe that given the social fears prevailing in Europe and given the political 
situation in Turkey, Turkey cannot objectively claim the right to enter the European Union, 
even though we cannot remove it from EU’s political and social system.  
Furthermore, as this research shows, the relationship between EU and Turkey is so 
complicated and so deeply rooted in historical mistrust that it is hard to expect that material 
interests will be able to guide their relationship in a more productive way. With that in 
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mind, I think that positive aspects of the relationship, such as the customs union, at this 
moment are not perceived as strongly in a positive way as is the construction that Turkey 
simply does not belong amongst Europeans (or that the EU is a Christian club). In that vein, 
the current issues stemming from the authoritarian power-hold of AKP and President 
Erdoğan over the nation simply legitimize the idea of Turkey in Europe as non- European 
because: a) Islam is incompatible with democracy and b) Turks are culturally prone to 
being authoritative (i.e. comparisons of Erdoğan and the Ottoman sultans) which is not a 
European trait.  
 But, does Turkey belong to the EU? And, will it ever be a member state? I cannot 
clearly answer these questions. However, I can offer three main perspectives that can help 
guide the reader in thinking about EU-Turkey relationship as well as about Turkey’s 
integration in the European socio-political consciousness.  
First, the EU-Turkey relationship goes beyond Turkey becoming a member-state 
of the EU. We have outlined earlier the process of modernization through westernization 
set forth late in the Ottoman Empire and especially during the rule of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, 
that effectively sets Turkey on the goal of becoming a modernized, European, albeit 
nationally aware (e.g. retaining the Turkish cultural, Islam-influenced), society. Having 
this in mind, we have to acknowledge Turkey’s political contributions to the Western 
political and security umbrella system (i.e. NATO) while also acknowledging the socially 
embedded idea that the new Turkish nation must be European in order to fulfill the dream 
of its nationhood.  Furthermore, European Union sees in Turkey more than a partner in 
economic and military terms (i.e. a member of the customs union) in that it sees Turkey as 
a friend and acknowledges its role in European history. 
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 Two, Turkey is not capable of entering the EU at this moment (and it will not be 
for a while) due to obvious lacks in institutional strength, rule of law, and respect for the 
principle of separation of powers. However, the EU is not capable of absorbing Turkey 
itself. Current political state in Turkey negatively affects its image in Europe and serves as 
a legitimizer of fears and misgivings about Turkish national identity, and the role Turks 
have played in Europe culturally and historically. Furthermore, due to the size of size of 
Turkey it is impossible to integrate it without harming the dynamic of power between the 
EU 28. Given the fact that Turkey’s population is projected to increase to 95 million by 
2030 and Germany’s to decrease to 78 million at the same time (Germany is the largest EU 
state in terms of population), this becomes an even greater issue (Müftüler-Baç, 71). Were 
Turkey to accede, for example, other states (most prominently Germany) would have to 
give up seats in the EU Parliament in order to accommodate the 96 members Turkey would 
have as the largest state in the 751-member EU Parliament (see chapter “Issues”, sub-
chapter “Public Opinion”, section 2) (Müftüler-Baç, 71). 
Three, in order to increase the cooperation dynamic between EU and Turkey, and 
create an atmosphere of mutual trust and acknowledgment, there has to be a change in 
approach these two players have in their relationship. Given the fact that social constructs 
influencing the relationship are one of the main hinderers of Turkish-EU cooperation (take 
for example the French ban on 4 accession chapters- see chapter “Cyprus: Identity, 
Security, and the EU-Turkey Relationship”), the primacy of the issue of accession of 
Turkey to the EU must be recentered in political discourse and praxis. If the EU insists on 
normative benchmarks that are not fairly implemented on all candidate states (in this case 
Turkey) and if Turkey keeps on insisting that its EU accession is a sine qua non for the 
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relationship, then the political and socio-cultural stalemate in EU-Turkey relations will 
persist. However, were we to open the relationship to other modes of integration such as 
the expanded customs union or a provisional privileged partnership then the stalemate in 
relations might be downplayed and cooperation would have more room to express itself. 
Müftüler-Baç establishes that: 
The Positive Agenda {of 2012, see the “History” chapter, section four} 
targets increased dialogue and harmonization between Turkey and the EU 
on the Schengen regime, enhanced cooperation on energy issues, foreign 
policy, and the fight against terrorism, and increased participation in people-
to-people programs, all mutually beneficial targets for both parties. The 
adoption of the Positive Agenda seems to indicate that, even in the absence 
of full membership, Turkey’s integration in the EU could be possible in 
multiple new policy areas, clearly indicating a path of differentiated 
integration with Turkey. To put it concretely, a path of differentiated 
integration with Turkey would include increased harmonization with 
regards to the single market, extension of free trade arrangements on textiles 
and agriculture, and increased cooperation in the financial sector, in other 
words a deepening of the 1995 customs union agreement. (Müftüler-Baç, 
72). 
Therefore, at the time when Turkey and the EU seem almost incompatible, there 
are still many policy areas of interest to both in political, economic, and socio-cultural 
terms (i.e. Erasmus exchange programs31) that can enhance cooperation and break through 
the icy stalemate. This means that we have to shift the framework under which the EU-
Turkey relationship operates (enhanced political dialogues predicated on the state of the 
accession negotiations) to a new framework of more open communication and cooperation, 
unhindered by purely normative “take it or leave it” (dis)incentives.  
                                                 
31 Essentially an intercontinental study abroad system established by the EU where students from participant 
countries can attend universities at all levels for different periods of time (i.e. from one to four years, or more) 
across the EU. The Erasmus program is considered to be one of the greatest achievements of the EU in social 
terms as it allows for spreading the European culture and education. For more information, please refer to 
the Erasmus webpage: http://erasmusprogramme.com/.  
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 With all of the aforementioned in mind, we also have to acknowledge that Turkey-
EU relationship has had multiple stalemates throughout its history. This means that current 
issues, and the current stalemate, are not anomalies in the relationship.  For example, after 
the 1980 coup, the then-EC froze its relations with Turkey (see “History”, section 2) or in 
2012 when Turkey froze its relations with the EU due to Cypriot presidency of the Council 
(see the chapter on Cyprus, section a, subsection II). The relations rebounded, especially 
after the 1980 coup and the cooperation between Turkey and the EU seemed revitalized, if 
not unstoppable. Turkey is capable of integrating itself into the EU arrangement. The 
question of whether accession to the EU is possible seems a bit overplayed because the 
actual state of play between the two goes beyond the mere “yes” or “no” to Turkey 
becoming an EU member-state. 
Finally, as we can see, Turkey and the EU still have many tools to work with in 
order to improve their political and social relationship. However, the real work must be 
implemented in bringing Turkey closer to Europe in socio-cultural terms, and vice versa. 
This work established a strong and socially motivated background of EU-Turkey relations. 
From the ideas of Kemalism that inspired Turkey’s integration into the West to constructs 
such as the “Turk” or the “Christian club”, that serve to remove Turkey and the EU from 
each other, the relationship must be constructed in a new way that would allow for bridging 
of differences, amelioration of negative social constructs, and acknowledgment of strong 
socio-political, and historical ties.  
  
182 
 
Conclusion 
In this work, I have outlined the three most contemporary issues in the EU-Turkey 
relationship: the refugee crisis, the Cyprus issue, and the aftermath of the attempted coup 
d’état in July of 2016. To analyze them constructively, I needed to account for the complex 
historical patterns of socio-political mistrust and examples of othering in the relationship. 
Since the start of this project, there were many events that have modified its 
approach to studying the EU-Turkey relations. With that in mind, when I started writing 
this thesis in June of 2016, I did not anticipate that I would have to provide an account of 
the July coup d’état and its subsequent influence on the relationship (and contribution to 
the volatility of Turkish politics). Although I initially sought to use conventional 
constructivism for understanding the EU-Turkey relationship, it had become clear to me 
during this research that I would have to approach the matter in a more critical manner. 
Hence, this thesis is a work in critical constructivism, such that it wishes to approach the 
matter in particularist way, while looking at discoursive political practices.  
There were plenty of instances where discourse hit a proverbial bingo thus 
contributing to the strength of my conclusions (such as President Erdoğan’s threats during 
the refugee crisis). However, there were also many challenges since the work is 
particularist in nature (that is, it looks at particular instances to understand the relationship). 
These were related to the volatile nature of politics between the EU and Turkey. In that 
sense, the complexity of the relationship has encumbered the methodology of this work 
initially but has been hopefully overcome (or its negative influence thoroughly minimized). 
As this research tries to understand the EU-Turkey relationship in a time when it seems to 
be at its most precarious, it needed constant and consistent updating, reworking, and 
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adjusting to the present circumstances. This will probably cause many conclusions of this 
research to be outdated in the near future. However, the strength of this work does not 
necessarily lie in its conclusions. I would argue that the strength of this work lies in the fact 
that it provides a cogent argument for understanding the EU-Turkey relationship by 
utilizing the ideal constructions (often referred to as historical patterns of mistrust and 
othering, that is- issues of socio-historic and identitarian nature).  
Since critical constructivism is not a theory of international politics, but rather a 
theoretical-methodological approach to studying international relations, this work does not 
seek to fully explain the relationship between the EU and Turkey. Consequently, this 
research cannot predict the future course of the relationship, except maybe ascertain that 
it’s outlook is pessimistic (in the full meaning of the word). However, this research can 
offer (and it offers) a methodical unpacking of social constructions that encumber and 
constrain EU and Turkey in their relationship. These allow us to have a better grasp at what 
guides the logic of the relationship. Furthermore, we can use these constructions to 
understand how we can reconceptualize Turko-European relations in a more sustainable 
manner.  
At the present moment, the Turkish-European relations are, more than ever, on the 
verge of a precipitous fall. The accumulated mistrust over the last two years has caused 
unprecedented amount of political misunderstanding and has, as a matter of fact, 
strengthened the process of othering between the two. It seems that Turks and Europeans 
have never been more distanced in civilizational terms. Europeans perceive themselves at 
the forefront of political-economic integrations within a liberal-democratic order and they 
perceive Turks as sliding into the Ottoman-era socio-political order. Turks, on the other 
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hand, are growing increasingly nationalistic. This is due to the strong power-hold of the 
current AKP establishment (and especially President Erdoğan) which legitimizes itself by 
using constructions of threats to Turkish existence, similar to the Sevres syndrome, either 
from “Islamophobic Europeans” or from internal enemies, such as Kurds.  
 Because of that, this work holds immense academic and practical importance. Were 
we to understand better what guides the logic of the relationship between European Union 
and Turkey, we would be able not only to understand the relationship itself, but also create 
more sustainable dialogue between the two. In that sense, European Union would have to 
insist less on normativity in its relationship with Turkey and Turkey would have to insist 
less on complete integration as a sine qua non for the relationship, at least for the time 
being. This would, I firmly hold, help us relax the tensions and create more space for 
development of firmer political trust, and consequently strengthen the public support for 
the relationship.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Informed Consent Form Sample 
  
Informed Consent Form 
Lake Forest College/Undergraduate Thesis Project 
Toni Cerkez 
 
Title of Project 
 
From Ankara to Brussels: The (Dis)Integration of Turkey in the EU 
 
Researcher’s Name(s) and Contact Information 
I have been invited to participate in a study conducted by [Toni Cerkez, Lake 
Forest, Illinois). The faculty advisors for this project are professors: PhD Ahmad Sadri, 
PhD Aleksandar Jankovski and PhD James Marquardt (main advisor). Contact 
information: tonicerkez@hotmail.com / +1 847-275-5032 
 
Purpose  
The research is a senior bachelor thesis aiming to investigate social and political 
nature of the relationship between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey with a 
particular focus on social theory of International Politics. 
 
Participants 
The participants in this research project are:  
 
Target population are experts on the topic; members of various NGO’s or 
governmental organizations as well as faculty of local universities and simply regular 
people who agree to participate. There is no particular condition for being a participant of 
the study. However, the research is aiming on recruiting Euro-Turks, academics of both 
Turkish and non-Turkish origin (but who are knowledgeable of EU processes). 
 
Procedures 
If I agree to participate in this study, I will be asked to do the following:  
 
The qualitative process (the interview) will be conducted on the location of 
agreement. Audio taping will be a method used for conducting an interview and the 
participant will have to participate in the research only once, in the capacity of an 
interviewee. Length of time for participation depends on how long it takes for the 
participant to answer questions (note, the research will strive to provide participants with 
questions prior the interview) and on how many answers he/she knows how to answer. The 
researcher expects the interview to last around 20 to 40 minutes and conceptualizes an 
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interview as an insightful and pleasant conversation on the topic. All this information will 
also be presented orally to the participant. 
 
Voluntary Nature of the Study 
 
I understand my participation in this research is completely voluntary.  There will 
not be any penalty or loss of benefits if I refuse to participate.  I understand I can withdraw 
from the study or refuse to answer any question at any time, without penalty or loss of 
benefits.  I will contact Toni Cerkez should I decide to withdraw from the research.    
 
Expected Risks of Participation 
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there will be no more risk of harm than 
I would normally experience in daily life.  The anticipated risks associated with my 
participation in this research will be minimal.  
 
Benefits of Participation 
Other than the experience of participating in this research projects, there are no 
particular benefits for the participant; you. 
 
Cost and Compensation of Participation 
The researcher does not expect any costs on behalf of the participant and, should there be 
any, is willing to fully refund the participant. 
 
Privacy 
I understand the data collected in this study will be kept private and confidential. 
Specifically, the researcher will enclose my data on a password-protected PC and on 
password-protected cloud server. Furthermore, after the research is complete, the 
researcher will destroy all the data on participants in order to preserve their identity and 
privacy.  
 
Questions, Suggestions, Concerns, or Complaints 
Before I decide whether to accept the invitation to participate in this project, I can ask 
any questions about the study.    
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• If I have any questions, suggestions, concerns, or complaints about this project, I 
can contact Toni Cerkez    
 
Statement of Consent   
I affirm that I have read this information, asked questions and received answers, 
and am at least 18 years old. By my signature, I consent to be a volunteer in this research 
project.   
 
 
Signature of participant    Date 
 
________________________________________   __________________ 
Printed name of participant    Date 
Person Obtaining Consent: 
I have explained to the participant above the nature, purpose, risks and benefits of 
participating in this research project.  I have answered any questions that may have been 
raised and I will provide the participant with a copy of this consent form.   
 
_______________________________________   
 __________________ 
Name of [authorized] person obtaining informed consent Date 
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Appendix 2. Senior Thesis Questions 
Interview Questions for Undergraduate Senior Thesis Research 
Toni Cerkez 
From Ankara To Brussels: The (Dis)Integration of Turkey in the EU 
1. Turkey is a predominantly Muslim country. Do you think that that has any influence 
on EU-Turkey relationship? 
2. Is EU a “Christian Club”, or a union of and for only Christian states? 
3. Is Turkey a European nation? And if so, do you think Turkey belongs in the EU? 
4. Is Turkey a politically stable country? If yes, why? If not, why? 
5. Is EU a politically stable entity? If yes, why? If not, why? 
6. Do the Euro-Turkish negotiations have any impact on Turks living in Europe? 
7. Does Erdogan’s style of leadership, in your view, harm EU-Turkish relations? 
8. What effect, if any, does the current Refugee Crisis have on the EU- Turkey 
relations? 
9. Has the recent attempted coup in Turkey demonstrated Turkey’s lack of democracy, 
or its democratic strength? As in, was Turkish democracy abrogated/harmed after 
the coup or was it saved and improved? 
10. Do you think EU has been a credible partner during the integration process? As in, 
did the EU treat Turkey fairly and normatively? 
11. Do you think Turkey has been a credible partner in integration process? As in, has 
Turkey been successfully following EU’s guidelines on integration? 
12. Will Turkish EU integration help Turkey become a more prosperous nation? 
13. Does the size of Turkey have any impact on its integration in the EU? 
